1967 1076

VOL X

(15 SEPT – 31 OCT)

File No. 1076

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Name of File—

INTER - ARAB AFFAIRS

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

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LAST Year's File No. 1076/66

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1076

(1883) D. 156230 177M 10/65 P.I. Gp. 610

1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cyphers/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 499 D M

[Date] 15Sept. R M

Repeated to

A.L. Southorn 15.IX

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BEIRUT.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1066 OF

14 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN.

BAHREIN. CAIRO. JEDDA. KHARTOUM. KUWAIT. RABAT.

TUNIS. TRIPOLI. UKMIS N.Y..WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.2323: RETURN OF AMBASSADORS.

I SAW THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED.

2. IN USING THE WORDS IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF YOUR TELEGRAM. I ADDED THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED THESE ALLEGATIONS ON THE MORNING THEY WERE FIRST MADE AND THAT THIS DENIAL WAS ACCEPTED AT THE TIME BY THE M.F.A.

3. IN SPEAKING OF OUR CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION. I BRIEFLY REHEARSED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH /led us

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389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

LED US TO CONSIDER THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS HAVING AN EXCEPTIONALLY DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGE TO BRITISH PROPERTY IN EARLY JUNE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BEIRUT RADIO BROADCAST THE ALLEGATIONS ON 6 JUNE BUT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO ALLOW PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN TO THE BRITISH DENIAL.

(B) THE ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMBASSY AND THE MOST IMPORTANT DAMAGE TO BRITISH COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TOOK PLACE THE SAME DAY.

(C) ON 9 AND 10 JUNE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LIFTED THE CURFEW AND AUTHORISED THE HOLDING OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH CAUSED MOST OF THE REST OF THE DAMAGE.

4. THE MINISTER SAID THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WHO HAD DISCOVERED THAT NO MONEY WAS AVAILABLE AND THAT SPECIAL AUTHORITY WOULD HAVE TO BE SOUGHT FROM PARLIAMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE COULD THUS HOLD OUT NO HOPE OF MR. DIMESHKIEH BEING ABLE TO PUT FORWARD ANY EARLY PROPOSALS ON THIS SUBJECT. THOUGH HE WOULD NATURALLY BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION. I SAID YOU ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE

/to this

TO THIS MATTER. BOTH AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND BECAUSE THE TOTAL DAMAGE WAS SUBSTANTIAL (I MENTIONED THE FIGURE OF £90.000 AS A VERY ROUGH APPROXIMATION). IT WOULD THUS GREATLY FACILITATE MR. DIMESHKIEH~S FAVOURABLE RECEPTION IN LONDON IF HE COULD AT LEAST BE AUTHORISED TO CONVEY AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPENSATION. THE MINISTER SAID HE WOULD RAISE THIS WITH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BUT COULD NOT PROMISE A DECISION BEFORE MR. DIMESHKIEH LEFT FOR LONDON EARLY NEXT WEEK. I ALSO MENTIONED THE QUESTION OF THE EARLIER MECAS LOSSES AND GAVE THE MINISTER COPIES OF PREVIOUS NOTES ON THE SUBJECT.

5. I AM SENDING BY BAG A FULL CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONERNING DAMAGE TO BRITISH PROPERTY IN EARLY JUNE AND WOULD RECOMMEND THAT MR. DIMESHKIEH SHOULD BE PRESSED HARD ABOUT THIS ON HIS ARRIVAL WHEN. SO THE MINISTER TOLD ME. HE WILL HAVE A NUMBER OF MATTERS TO RAISE WITH YOU BEFORE LEAVING FOR NEW YORK TO JOIN THE LEBANESE DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

6. THE INTERVIEW ENDED WITH MUTUAL GOOD WISHES FOR

/OUR

OUR FUTURE RELATIONS. AND THE MINISTER~S ARGUMENT

THAT THEY HAD NEVER BELIEVED THE ALLEGATIONS

AGAINST US OR WANTED TO WITHDRAW AMBASSADORS BUT

HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO DO SO IN DEFERENCE TO

PUBLIC OPINION.

F O PASS RABAT 11. SOSFA.

RESTRICTED 98 Rahal 076

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 919 15 September, 1967

AR S 22.IX

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 919 of 15 September.
Repeated for information Saving to:

Washington	UKMis New York	
Paris	Moscow	
Algiers	Amman	
Bahrain	Beirut	Benghazi
Jedda	Khartoum	Kuwait
Rabat	Tripoli	Tunis
Tel Aviv	H.C. Aden (Personal)	
LIC Aden	JIC Nicosia	

Heikal's Friday Article sums up the thesis he has been following over recent weeks. Before the Khartoum Summit, the following points crystallised in Egypt:

(a) the clash between Arab nationalism and colonialism was inevitable; but though direct conflict with Israel is unavoidable the conflict with the United States could take other forms, "fortunately the fact that Israel is not(repeat not)merely a blind instrument of colonialism but also an independent body whose ambitions may clash with those of its master"

(b) Egypt's Arab Nationalist and Socialist future was irreversible; though Egypt could not(repeat not)become a closed society, and free thought and its organs must be revitalised.

(c) The Arabs in their struggle need relations with both East and West.

(d) They also need a technological revolution.

2. At Khartoum other points emerged:

(a) the need for Arab unity: no(repeat no) country - even the biggest - could determine the Arab destiny alone

(b) The defence of Arab soil falls on all Arabs regardless of their social systems: differences in these are admissible and even useful in peaceful times; there are two stages to the struggle

(i) removal of the consequences of the aggression

(ii) the Palestine cause.

Stage (i) must come first. No(repeat no)State (? Egypt ? Jordan) could be asked to do the impossible and must be exempted if only for a time from participation in the struggle if it lacks the means.

3. Further points emerged after the Summit:

(a) None but the Palestinians can speak for them or compromise their rights

(b) The door to political work is open on condition that peace, or negotiation with Israel are ruled out

(c) Political action can now begin at the U.N. - either in

/the

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the Assembly or in the Security Council, from a common policy.

(d) The door to military action is open at any time to those capable of it, with the economic support of the rest

(e) Egypt is the most capable of such action.

4. Heikal repeats fighting is inevitable short of a miracle - which was possible but unlikely. There was no(repeat no)prospect of a rapid solution at the U.Ns. The only force which could bring pressure on Israel was the United States, who so far encouraged her; - and even if the United States wished to use pressure it was doubtful whether it could do so at present because of the decline in Johnsons popularity and the United States elections. Therefore the most likely solution to the immediate problem - stage one - was fighting. But of what kind? Many had spoken recently about the parallel in Viet Nam. But Heikal lists a number of reasons, military and political, why the parallel is not(repeat not)valid. The only possibility is conventional warfare in which the victory will be decided in the air.

5. The war-like tone of the Article may be partly to rally the troops but partly also as a counter to Lutfi Al Kho Lis Article of 7 September (my telegram No. 892). In general, it is increasingly realistic, particularly in its acceptance that the United States is not(repeat not)necessarily able, whether or not(repeat not)willing, to influence Israel. Britain is not(repeat not)mentioned, and there is a further reference to Egypt's need for relations with the West and also to the need for the liberalisation of the Egyptian régime.

Foreign Office pass Saving unnumbered to Washington, UKMis New York, Paris, Moscow, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartou, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, H.C. Aden, LIC Aden, and JIC Nicosia.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1300Z 15 September
Recd 1951Z 15 September

[Repeated as requested].

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Eastern Dept.

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Robat 1076

SAVING TELEGRAM

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
21 SEP 1967

AS 22.IX

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telegram No. 28 Saving 15 September, 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 28 Saving of 15 September,
Repeated for information Saving to Abu Dhabi and other posts.

Middle East Talking Points - 14 September, 1967.

The Algiers newspaper El Moudjahid on 27 August reported the expulsion from Brazil of a counsellor at the Algerian Embassy who had been accused of having contact with revolutionary elements.

Stokely Carmichael, the extremist American Negro advocate of Black Power, has just arrived in Algiers from Hanoi, having previously attended the Latin American Solidarity Organisation conference in Havana to which Algeria sent observers. Cuban comment on the Middle East crisis has been eulogistic on the Algerian extremist attitude.

On 31 August at the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference President Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia reached agreement on the withdrawal of U.A.R. forces from the Yemen. Yet on 5 September Moscow broadcast in Arabic that "a Soviet military delegation is on a visit to the Yemeni Arab Republic and has had a meeting with the Yemeni Minister of the Interior". The Imam of Yemen, Mohammed Al Badr, has charged both the Soviet Union and China with seeking military bases in the Yemen, according to the Lebanese paper Al Hayat of 29 August.

Writing a special article on Anglo-Egyptian relations for the London Sunday Times (10 September), Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, Editor of the Cairo paper Al Ahram and often regarded as President Nasser's spokesman, said it was time for a "genuine dialogue" between the two countries. "So many things could be put right if we were to meet and discuss our differences as equals for the first time in our history," he wrote.

"There used to be a fair amount of mistrust towards us among the Arabs, but now we have created great political capital in the Arab countries. This enormous area includes, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and so on." - President Tito, at a social and political workers' meeting in Trbovlje, 4 September.

The East German Communist Party paper Neues Deutschland, which is occasionally used to publicise Soviet Communist plans, reported on 16 August the presence in Egypt of a "national freedom movement" of workers whose purpose was to ensure "the territorial integrity of the country" and to "strengthen the revolutionary régime."

/According

According to the article, education and weapon training has already begun at youth camps and sports fields in the Nile Delta and large cities. 5,000 workers in the industrial centre of Shubra el Kheima, north of Cairo, were trained and armed. They were the "first participant groups in the People's Opposition, ready to defend and protect their production places."

Neues Deutschland criticised the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in the U.A.R. because it had "not been entirely successful in the political mobilization of the masses." The paper claimed that the recent reorganization of the Egyptian Army was "part of the plan to support the People's Opposition."

A box containing 365 Lebanese eggs used to be sold to Iraq for LL.32. Now a similar box of East European eggs is sold to Iraq for LL.26, reported the Lebanese paper Al Hayat on 31 August. At a meeting of Lebanese farmers Lebanon's Economy Minister, Dr. Saeed Hamadeh, said that the Iraqi authorities wanted guarantees for the stability of Lebanese egg prices so that Iraq may resume its imports from Lebanon. The Lebanese farmers (according to Al Hayat) told Dr. Hamadeh that East European eggs were intended for the dumping trade "because the authorities in East Europe do not care so much about profits and losses as marketing their products and getting foreign exchange".

"What does the Syrian régime really want?" asked the Columnist Basem Jisr in the Lebanese paper Al Jarida on 30 August. He commented that Syria was "always refusing". The stand taken by the Baathist régime in Syria on Palestine could be explained only in the light of three theories: "The régimes popular weakness (weakness among the people?) forces it to rush forward to seek questions larger than those of the Syrian people; the régime believes in the continuation of revolution without really applying Socialism or liberating Palestine; or it has in it certain persons who seek to destroy the Nasser myth, which stands in the way of fulfilment of international motives, regardless of their colour." Basem Jisr added that there were those who held Syria responsible for involving the UAR in war with Israel when the UAR was not prepared for it.

"While standing on the bank of the Suez Canal I said to myself: I am standing here close to the Egyptian ruler. Had I been able to talk to him as Israeli Premier to Egyptian President, as person to person, I should have proposed that we find a way for talks. But the Khartoum Conference has issued its irresponsible verdict - that there shall be no peace with Israel." - Israeli Premier Eshkol, during his tour of Northern Sinai, 6 September.

/"It is

"It is sheer madness to allow revolution to become an effort to achieve the impossible, because as time goes on the revolutionaries come to realise that their capabilities are lagging far behind their flights of fancy." - Heykal, Editor of Al Ahram, in his Friday article, 8 September, quoted by Cairo Radio.

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J.I.P.G.D.

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PRODROME RABAT

1076

PRODROME LONDON
FOR 001 FOLDN 181237Z GR 134
ROUTINE TEL AVIV TO RABAT
TELNO 12 18 SEP 1967.

DDSD FO TELNO 1033 OF 18 SEPT R F I TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY), KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.
MY TELNO 1021.
R E F U G E E S.
FIRST RESUMED CROSSING OF REFUGEES DID NOT TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER, AS PLANNED.
2. ACCORDING TO ISRAEL PRESS REPORTS, THE REPATRIATION WAS TO HAVE BEEN RESUMED UNDER AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ON 16 SEPTEMBER, BUT ON 17 SEPTEMBER, JORDAN REQUESTED A POSTPONEMENT OF THE OPERATION UNTIL THURSDAY, 21 SEPT. AND ASKED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON 20 SEPTEMBER.
3. ISRAEL PRESS SUGGESTS VARIOUS REASONS WHY JORDAN REQUESTED POSTPONEMENT, INCLUDING '' PATENT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM ON PART OF EMIGRES TO RETURN '' AND JORDAN'S WISH TO EXPLOIT THE REFUGEES FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES =
H A D O W
BT
SENT 181240Z AW

A.L. Southorn 18.IX

C d'A

1.O. 19/9

PRODROME RABAT

NEAR EAST REPORT

VOL.XI, No.19 September 19, 1967.

JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

ANALYSIS:

Targets of Revenge

While world attention is focused on the plight of the Arabs who were displaced during the war, there is an astonishing indifference to the fate of the 100,000 Jews who remain in Arab lands and who became the targets of savage revenge.

Little has been reported about these Jews, many of whom were terrorized, imprisoned, tortured and murdered. Many are still in prison.

Egypt

The government forced all its 25,000 Jews to register at the end of May. When war broke out, more than 600 heads of families, including community leaders, were put in the Abouzabel prison near Cairo, while 200 were taken to the Al Barraga jail near Alexandria. The Grand Rabbi of Alexandria, Jacques Nefussi, and the Chief Rabbi of Cairo, Chaim Douek, were arrested. A few elderly prisoners were released but the rest were harshly treated. Some were tortured. Homes and property have been confiscated. Many were dismissed from jobs.

About 225 Jews of Italian and Greek nationality were allowed to leave. Spain offered visas to its nationals. They were allowed to take no more than 50 Egyptian pounds.

Libya

There was a savage pogrom against Libya's 4,500 Jews, most of whom were Libyans or Italians. Many were killed—burned in their shops or cars, hurled from roof tops or balconies and beaten. Almost all Jewish synagogues and stores were burned and sacked. Police and firemen arrived too late.

The government intervened in mid-June and about 3,500 were placed in army camps for protection from the mobs. A week or two later, Jews were permitted to leave and approximately 3,000 were granted temporary refuge in Italy.

Syria

Even before the June war, the 4,400 Jews in Syria were terrorized by night arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and torture. Arab refugees moved into the Damascus ghetto, attacking the Jews, who were not permitted to move.

Iraq

The 3,000 Jews of Iraq suffered restriction of citizenship, travel, employment and property ownership.

Radio Baghdad announced that the Chief Rabbi had denounced the "treacherous Zionist aggression" and had made a donation to the Iraq army. But Cairo's *Voice of the Arabs*, on June 17, accused Iraqi Jews of collaborating with Zionism, demanding their strict supervision.

Many were arrested and released after ransom.

The Swiss Embassy protested on behalf of Israel but the Iraq government denied mistreatment.

Aden

British authorities intervened and evacuated the entire Jewish community of 350 after a pogrom in which several Jews were murdered and three synagogues destroyed.

Lebanon

Lebanese authorities threw a cordon around the Jewish quarter in Beirut after uncovering a plot to blow it up. Many Jews were evacuated to Christian areas.

Many of the 8,000 Lebanese Jews want to emigrate. The daily *Al Anwar* urged the government to bar their departure.

Tunisia

Jews were attacked by rioting Arab mobs. Synagogues and shops were burned. The Government denounced the outbreaks and President Habib Bourguiba apologized to the Chief Rabbi, promising compensation for the damage.

The Government appealed to the 20,000 Tunisian Jews to remain but has not prevented anyone from leaving. Many hundreds emigrated to France.

On July 31, the military court sentenced two youths to 15 years for burning the Great Synagogue. Others were convicted of attacking the U.S. and British embassies and looting Jewish property.

Morocco

The opposition Istiqlal party and the labor unions proclaimed a boycott of the 60,000 Moroccan Jews. A number were killed.

King Hassan denounced the outrage. But some Jewish civil servants were forced out of their jobs. Several hundred Jews made their way to Spanish territory and then went abroad.

Algeria

The 3,500 Algerian Jews are French nationals and are free to go to France whenever they wish.

Radio Algiers attacked Jews when the war broke out but there has been no violence.

•

The Department of State is deeply concerned over "acts of violence and reprisal against Jewish communities in a number of Arab countries," James Wine, special assistant to the Secretary of State informed the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations on Aug. 30.

It has sought to use influence and resources toward alleviating the plight of these victims of the war. However, the Department feels that "necessary diplomatic or other initiatives toward promoting the protection of threatened Jews and the evacuation of those seeking haven elsewhere should best be undertaken by non-U.S. parties because of anti-U.S. feelings within Arab countries and the absence of diplomatic relations."

While treatment varies considerably from country to country, the status of Jews remains "generally uncertain or hazardous in all Arab countries," Wine wrote. "Qualified nonpartisan sources have stated that in general the atmosphere is one of increasing antagonism. . . . The Department will do all it can toward relieving the plight of those unfortunate persons who are still in suffering or jeopardy on account of anti-Jewish actions in Arab areas."

Many *Near East Report* readers have ordered extra copies of our special supplement *Myths and Facts* to provide their friends with the background story of the Arab-Israel conflict. Order your copies today: single copy, 25 cents; 10 copies, $2.00; 20 copies, $3.00; 50 copies, $5.00.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 29 SEP 1967

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PRODROME LONDON
FOR ONI FOLDN 211236Z GR 170

1076
AL. Southorn
21.IX

ROUTINE TELAVIV TO RABAT
TELNO 13 21 SEP 1967.
ADDSD F O TELNO 1042 OF 21 SEPT R F I TO UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT,
BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY), KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO,
ALGIERS, WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.

C & A.
Rec 21/9

-1076

MY TELEGRAM NO 1033 : REFUGEES.
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS WHEN THE ISRAEL DELEGATION APPEARED
YESTERDAY FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT
THE JORDANIAN'S REQUEST, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE
INFORMED THEM THAT THE JORDANIAN DELEGATE HAD TOLD HIM THAT
HE HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORISED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO ATTEND.
THE MEETING THEREFORE DID NOT TAKE PLACE AND THE RESUMED
CROSSING OF REFUGEES WILL NOT BEGIN TODAY.
2. A MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR SPOKESMAN TOLD THE +JERUSALEM
POST+ LAST NIGHT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE
TO HOLD FURTHER MEETINGS.
ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT ANY FURTHER
REQUEST FOR A MEETING, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT AFTER THE
JORDANIANS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR FAILURE TO ATTEND YESTERDAY,
ISRAEL WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM
HADOW
SENT 211237Z AW

PRODROME RABAT

UNCLASSIFIED

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B. Urwick

AZS 2 ✕

10.4/10

WASHINGTON, D.C.
21 September 1967

The Chancery,
Rabat.

UNCLASSIFIED

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 511 D M

[Date] 21 Sept R M

Repeated to

This is interesting.
A.L. Sowtown 22/9
C a/Afr 23/9.
L.O. 24/9

[Priority] ROUTINE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TUNIS.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 270 OF

21 SEPTEMBER R F I TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINTON

CAIRO RABAT TRIPOLI ALGIERS BENGHAZI KHARTOUM

BEIRUT AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND KUWAIT.

THE HEAD OF U N DEPT OF THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN

MINISTRY ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY TO CALL YESTERDAY

TO DISCUSS THE NEW U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION.

2. BOUZAYAN INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT~S MAIN

PREOCCUPATION WAS THE ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION. HOW

WAS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS IN FINDING

A SOLUTION? TUNISIAN GOVT WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A

REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO A

SETTLEMENT. BUT THEY WERE HANDICAPPED BY HAVING

ONLY AN IMPRECISE ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI POLICIES

and intentions

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AND INTENTIONS. AS THE TUNISIANS SAW IT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE HAD HARDENED CONSIDERABLY OF LATE: COULD WE GIVE THE TUNISIANS ANY FIRM INDICATION OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE? AND DID H M GOVERNMENT HAVE ANY IDEAS OR PLANS FOR PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT EITHER THROUGH ACTION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR ELSEWHERE? AS THE TUNISIANS SAW IT THE JOINT U S -SOVIET RESOLUTION OF THE EMERGENCY SESSIONS PROVIDED A STARTING POINT. THIS TIME THE ALGERIANS MIGHT NOT PROVE A STUMBLING BLOCK: THE TUNISIAN ASSESSMENT (WHICH CLOSELY FOLLOWS MR DAWBARN~S VIEWS) WAS THAT THE ALGERIANS WERE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN BELLIGERENCE AGAINST ISRAEL BUT NOW SEEMED READY TO LET OTHER ARAB STATES DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT POLICIES THEY WISHED TO PURSUE.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT BOUZAYAN COMPLAINED MILDLY THAT PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA~S SPEECH OF 23 AUGUST (MYTELS 248 AND 249) SEEMED TO HAVE PASSED LARGELY UNREMARKED BY HMG AND THE US GOVT. HE HAD SPOKEN

four

OUT CLEARLY ON THIS QUESTION AS YOU SIR. (AT YOUR MEETING WITH HABIB BOURGUIBA JUNIOR IN NEW YORK ON 21 JUNE) AND THE AMERICANS HAD URGED HIM TO DO SO. BUT SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCERNABLE REACTION FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT.

4. THE TUNISIANS WOULD ACCORDINGLY BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW OUR THINKING AND ANY PLANS WE MAY HAVE FOR THE SESSION SO THAT THEY MAY JUDGE HOW FAR THEY CAN HELP BOTH THE ARAB AND AFRICAN DELEGATIONS IN PARTICULAR AT NEW YORK.

5. HEAD OF CHANCERY SAID IN REPLY THAT WE HAD NATURALLY FOLLOWED PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA~S INITIATIVE WITH MUCH CARE AND INTEREST AND WE APPRECIATED THE TUNISIAN INVITATION TO COMPARE NOTES WITH THEM. HE REFERRED TO YOUR STATEMENT IN THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISMENT AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT ARAB -ISRAEL WAR AND INDICATED PURPOSE OF H M G TO HELP TOWARDS SECURING AN ISRAELI WITH DRAWAL WHENEVER POSSIBLE (GUIDANCE NO 218). HE ALSO EXPLAINED OUR HIGH LEVEL INTERVENTION WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON

behalf/

1076/67
Flag 'A'

BEHALF OF THE WEST BANK REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO RETURN HOME.

6. IN THE SEQUENT CONVERSATION. HEAD OF CHANCERY WENT OVER THE MAIN POINTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY SETTLEMENT. BOUZAYAN DOUBTED WHETHER ANY ARAB STATE COULD YET AFFORD TO RECOGNISE ISRAEL. BUT TO CON- TRIBUTE TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE TUNISIANS MUST BE ABLE TO TEST ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

7. THE TUNISIANS HAVE ALSO CANVASSED ~~ITTCANVASSED~~ THE RUSSIANS FRENCH AND AMERICANS HERE - PRESUMABLY ON ROUGHLY THE SAME LINES. BUT SINCE BOUZAYAN IS FRIENDLY AND WELL DISPOSED AND SINCE THIS OFFERS US SOME CHANCE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH TUNISIAN THINKING. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF I COULD BE AUTHORISED TO CONVEY A SPECIALLY TAILORED EXPOSE OF OUR VIEWS AS AT PRESENT. OR FORECAST OF TACTICS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TOGETHER WITH ANY REC OMMENDATIONS WHICH YOU WOULD WISH ME TO URGE ON THE TUNISIANS.

8. PLEASE SEE ALSO M I F T. — 1076/67 Prog'3

F O PASS RABAT 26.

SERVICE TELEX

PRODROME RABAT
QTC 3
FOR 001/22 GR 165 220435Z
ROUTINE TUNIS TO RABAT
TELEGRAM NO 27 21 SEPTEMBER 1967

1076

ADDRESSED TO FO TELEGRAM NO 271 OF SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO:-
UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
CAIRO
ROUTINE TO:-
RABAT
TRIPOLI
ALGIERS
BENGHAZI
KHARTOUM
BEIRUT
AND SAVING TO :-
AMMAN AND
KUWAIT.
ARAB-ISRAEL.

Discussed - can you manage a short saving telegram Edwards 22/9

O.S.

Dfr. ALS 22.IX

A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT PUT OUT YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED THAT DURING THE COURSE OF A REVIEW OF TUNISIAN FOREIGN POLICY WITH ITS CABINET, PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD STATED THAT TUNISIA SUPPORTED THE PROPOSITION ON MARSHAL TITO SOLUTION ~~ITION ON M~~ ~~R H~~ ~~LL TITO NOR~~ ~~OLITION~~ TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION. (MONSIEUR STAMBOLIC, PRESIDENT TITOS SPECIAL ENVOY HAD PREVIOUSLY PAID A FURTHER VISIT TO TUNIS). TUNISIA CONSIDERED THESE PROPOSITIONS TO BE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS INVOLVED.
2. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA HAD INSTRUCTED BAHI LADGHAM, SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE PRESIDENTE, TO GO TO CAIRO ON 22 SEPTEMBER TO CONFER WITH PRESIDENT NASSER ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT AND THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSITIONS.
HOOPER

SENT 220438Z JB

PRODROME RABAT

60K

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BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL.NO. 14 - SAVING - 22 September, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 14 Saving of 22 September. Repeated for information Saving to Belgrade.

No. 1. TITO PLAN

The Yugoslav President's special envoy, M. Petar Stambolic, visited Morocco from 14 to 18 September as the bearer of a personal message from Tito to King Hassan. The Moroccan Government have held their cards very close to their chest and have revealed nothing about the visit, not even a communiqué. M. Stambolic on the other hand, in a statement made on his departure, said that a close similarity of view had become apparent in his discussions with the King on the Middle East crisis and the Yugoslav proposals for its solution. For the rest, he merely underlined the friendly relations that existed between the two countries and expressed the hope that they would continue to develop further.

2. Repeated for information Saving to Belgrade No. 1.

WALKER

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F.O. TEL. No. U/N SAVING TO ....Beirut 1076

BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

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C d'Aw.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 29 SEP 1967

Telno 33 Saving 22 September 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 33 Saving of 22 September.
And unnumbered Saving to certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

21 September, 1967.

Since July 1 the world's tanker owners and oil companies have ordered 49 ships of over 200,000 tons each, according to an Oslo shipbroking company, R.S. Platou A/S. Altogether, there are 136 tankers of 150,000 tons or more on order throughout the world, many of them for delivery within the next three years. Unless the Suez Canal is deepened none of these super-tankers will be able to use the waterway when loaded.

Tunis Radio on 15 September expressed surprise at the statement issued at the end of the OAU African Heads of State conference in Kinshasa expressing sympathy and support for the UAR on the Arab-Israeli issue.

"What calls for astonishment is the silence observed by all Arab radios about the substance of the address of the Cairo delegation to the conference, in which it was suggested that one should simply return to the United Nations resolutions as a starting point for the solution of the Palestine problem", commented Tunis Radio. "They behave as if the matter did not concern every Arab, as if our brothers wanted to carry on in the same way as before the events of 5 June - that is, say one thing and do another. These men resort to utterly different ways of reasoning in addressing international circles and the Arab peoples... They address the former frankly and commit themselves to solutions they cannot refute; but when they speak to the Arab peoples, they encourage them in their desires and dreams and hide from them anything that could arouse their anger or disagreement until, years later, there inevitably comes a new failure and a setback more bitter and harrowing than the last."

Calling on the Arab masses "to rally round the progressive régimes," Damascus Radio on 14 September said: "After the uncovering of the plot of Field-Marshal Amer and the junta of senior Right-wing leaders in the UAR, it seems that the revolution now needs a comprehensive purge of its ranks to eliminate elements which belived in the need for revolutionary authority only because they thought it guaranteed them special privileges."

Moscow Radio, broadcasting in Arabic for Algeria on 6 September, referred to "the acute political struggle between supporters and opponents of a progressive policy in the UAR", which was "far

/from

from having ended with the dismissal of Amer and those surrounding him." It quoted Pravda's two correspondents recently in Cairo as saying that Amer intended to launch a propaganda campaign placing responsibility for the Arabs setback "on the UAR's friends".

"Col. Nasser's policies also face opposition from various quarters at home. The extreme Leftists, led by Col. Ali Sabri and backed by Egyptian Communists, are already making veiled criticisms of the Government in some newspapers, and have suggested that Egypt is taking too soft a line with America". - Hindustan Times despatch from Khartoum, 7 September.

"The (Khartoum) conference did not proclaim slogans. It was content with setting forth the aim of safeguarding the rights of the Arab..... It admitted that in dealing with our cause we were more emotional than rational". King Hussein of Jordan, in a letter to his Prime Minister, Sa'd Jum'ah, quoted by Amman Radio, 13 September.

An editorial in the 3-9 September issue of Algérie Actualité said that the agreement on the Yemen "would put an end to five years of ideological war for the installation of a progressive régime. The solution which provides for an end to the fighting is desirable, but would it mean the reinforcement and consolidation of the Republic? It is dangerous to reply in the affirmative."

The Syrian Communist Party Secretary-General Khalid Bakdash, wrote in the Party's paper Nidal as-Sha'b in mid-August: "We must admit that many Arab progressive elements, even we Communists on some occasions, fail to pay due attention to the political factor and its international effect. Often statements are made, slogans put forward, and attitudes adopted without consideration of their international impact and the effect they may have on the popular masses throughout the world, including friendly countries. We recall here, for instance, the well-known statements by Shuqayri and others, which are, devoid of any sense of responsibility". (Bakdash's article was broadcast by the clandestine East German-based station "Voice of the Iraqi People" on 6, 7 and 8 September and printed in the Beirut Communist weekly Al Akhbar.)

The Tehran paper Azhang of 27 August reported thatone of the "Iranian traitors" who had taken refuge abroad had had talks with the first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party. This had astonished Iranian public opinion in view of Bulgarian promises of non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Azhang commented: "Are not the Bulgarian authorities aware that there is no longer a Tudeh Party in Iran? Don't they know that several traitors condemned to death in absentia are to be found in Communist countries?... We hope the Bulgarian authorities will not allow a few turncoats to interfere in the friendly relations between our two countries and introduce tension between them."

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F.O. TEL. No. 166 SAVING TO Rabat 1076

RESTRICTED

Cypher/Cat A

AJS 2.x

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 939 22 September 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 939 of 22 September. Repeated for information to UKMIS New York and Saving to Washington, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Algiers, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, HC Aden (Personal) and JIC Nicosia.

Arab/Israel.

Heikal's weekly article under the title "Sailing in Difficult Seas" strikes a note of caution and realism about the coming debate at United Nations and the policy of political action.

2. United Nations debate is unlikely to take things more than one or two steps forward. It will have to be followed by a wide range of political contacts during which it will be possible to see the way the wind blows, before the moment comes to submit a resolution to the General Assembly or the Security Council. Since the war the dust has cleared. Imperialist intentions and Israel's overweaning ambition have been revealed - as for the reserves of endurance of Egyptian régime (mention here of Amer as the great patriot who was not (repeated not) equal to events) but there are rocks and shoals: how to reconcile non-alignment with loyalty to friends: how to avoid being pushed by Israel into the USA/USSR polarisation: how to remain on terms with China (indirect reference to Chinese withdrawal of aid) because of Egypt's association with USSR and Yugoslavia): how to seek Latin American support while sympathising with revolutionary aims of tricontinental conference at Havana: how to preserve diplomatic secrecy without making one's friends suspicious. United Nations may produce a satisfactory resolution but it may be a far step from that to execution. Nevertheless such a resolution would greatly strengthen subsequent political and economic pressure on Arabs.

Foreign Office pass to UKMIS New York 83 and Saving to Washington, Paris, Moscow Amman, Algiers, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, HC Aden (Personal), JIC Nicosia.

Mr. Tesh Sent 1100Z 22 September
Recd 1705Z 22 September

[Repeated as requested]

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 29 SEP 1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag: Cypher/OTA

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 515

[Date] 23Sept

D M

R M

Repeated to

A.L. Sowton 29.IX
C a. d'Ath 29/9
L.O. 29/9

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING ~~FROM~~ RECEIVED FROM AMMAN

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1130

OF 23 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS

NEW YORK. UKMISSION GENEVA. BEIRUT. ALGIERS.

BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY). BENGHAZI. CAIRO. JEDDAH,

JERUSALEM. KHARTOUM. KUWAIT. RABAT. TUNIS.

WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

DISTRIBUTION

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1042 TO FOREIGN OFFICE:

REFUGEES.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE NOW UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS FOR THE RETURN OF THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL GROUP OF REFUGEES FOR WHOM APPROVAL HAD BEEN GIVEN BEFORE 31 AUGUST. IN FACT NONE OF THEM APPEARS NOW TO WANT TO RETURN FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MY TELNO 1118.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

N.S. Record.

T.P. Lee

2. THE JORDANIANS ARE NOW INCENSED AT THE CONTINUING REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELIS TO CONSIDER THE BULK OF THE APPLICATIONS FORWARDED TO THEM AND HAVE UNFORTUNATELY LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE SENIOR INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE NOW HERE. VON MARDACH. THEY CLAIM THAT HE HAS MISREPRESENTED THEM TO THE ISRAELIS AND WANT HIM TO LEAVE JORDAN.

3. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF PRESS CONCENTRATION ON THESE PETTY SQUABBLES AND JORDANIAN IRRITATION ARE ALLOWED TO OBSCURE THE BASIC PROBLEM WHICH DERIVES FROM ISRAELI NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.N. RESOLUTION AND THEIR REFUSAL TO AUTHORISE RETURN OF THE MAIN BODY OF REFUGEES.

4. PLEASE REPEAT TO UKMIS GENEVA MY TELNO 1118 IMMEDIATE.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS RABAT 4. SOSFA.

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

(1106)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TUNIS.

25 September, 1967.

When I went to return the call of my new Yugoslav colleague on 21 September, the conversation naturally soon worked round to the visit here of Monsieur Stamboulie, the Yugoslav proposals for a Middle Eastern settlement, and the British reaction to these - of which we both, at the material time, knew only what we had seen in the press and heard on the radio.

Monsieur Petrovic confirmed what Bourguiba Junior had told me when I went to see him two days earlier for a "round-up" before he set off for the General Assembly and I went on leave - namely that there had been a very considerable measure of agreement between Yugoslav and Tunisian views. I asked him what he thought the Yugoslav answer would be to the British criticism that the "Tito plan" was unbalanced in that the Israelis were asked to make all the concessions without any counterbalancing concessions from the Arabs. Monsieur Petrovic said that first of all there was not, strictly speaking, any such thing as a "Tito Plan". Nor did the Yugoslavs intend to put forward any formal draft resolution in the General Assembly. What they had had in mind was to put forward a series of heads of argument which could be discussed and, of course, modified by the interested parties and others in New York. It was of course obvious that the Arabs would have to make concessions, if only because the Israelis would certainly not withdraw from the occupied territories unless they got at least some form of recognition and the ending of the state of war. However, the Yugoslavs had reckoned that to insist on, and to specify, at this stage the concessions the Arabs would have to make would only have confirmed the extremists in their intransigence and delay the development of a consensus in favour of more moderate policies.

As to this, the Yugoslavs thought there were some grounds for hope. The Syrians were still behaving foolishly: but the contacts they had had with them suggested that the Algerians were gradually coming round. The key man in all this was, of course, Nasser: and there seemed some reason to suppose that he had learnt his lesson, and was freeing himself from the influence of the extremists in his entourage.

Monsieur Petrovic said that he hoped that the Israelis would not overplay their hand. Opportunity only knocked once and if they were too uncompromising they might miss the bus. In particular they would be foolish to miss the chance of coming to some sort of agreement with Nasser by waiting in hopes that some more amenable government would emerge in Egypt. In the

/first

D.J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

first place, if Nasser fell the result would be chaos, and an agreement made with some feeble and transient successor would not be worth the paper it was written on. In the second, only Nasser had sufficient strength and influence to impose a settlement on terms likely to be acceptable to the Israelis. The choice before the Israelis was therefore, in effect, an agreement with Nasser or no agreement at all: and they would be wise to make it sooner rather than later.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Belgrade, Beirut, Tripoli, Benghazi, Rabat, Jedda, Kuwait and Tel Aviv; to the British Interests Section of the Canadian Embassy in Cairo, the British Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Algiers and the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations New York.

(R.W.J. Hooper)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rabat

A.L. Southorn
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With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

(110610)

BRITISH EMBASSY
TUNIS

25 September, 1967

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
- 3 OCT 1967

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WITHOUT DELAY WE MUST TACKLE THE QUESTION OF ENSURING THE FREE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. THE DENIAL OF THIS RIGHT WAS ONE OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF THIS SUMMER'S TROUBLE. AS THINGS STAND, NO COUNTRY ENJOYS THE USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL. UNLESS THIS ROUTE IS QUICKLY AVAILABLE AGAIN, THERE MUST INEVITABLY BE DAMAGING CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF WORLD TRADE. THE ECONOMIES OF THE WORLD WOULD PERMANENTLY REDUCE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION WHICH CAN BE BLOCKED OR INTERRUPTED FOR A LONG TIME.

AN EVEN MORE URGENT PROBLEM IS THAT OF THE PEOPLE - THE INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE - WHO HAVE SUFFERED PERSONAL LOSS AND DISRUPTION OF THEIR LIVES. THE ASSEMBLY RIGHTLY EXPRESSED URGENT CONCERN FOR THE REFUGEES DURING ITS EMERGENCY SESSION. LAST MONTH A LIMITED STEP WAS TAKEN TOWARDS THE ALLEVIATION OF THE PROBLEM WHEN SOME FORMER RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN THERE. IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT REGRET TO MY GOVERNMENT AND TO ME THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN MORE PROGRESS OVER THE RETURN OF INNOCENT PEOPLE TO THEIR HOMES. I HEARTILY ENDORSE MR. GUSSING'S PLEA THAT THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION BE DIVORCED FROM THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, IMAGINATION, CO-OPERATION AND RESOURCES - ALL WILL BE NEEDED . I BELIEVE THAT THIS ORGANISATION CAN PLAY A DECISIVE PART IN LAUNCHING A CONSTRUCTIVE SCHEME FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH COULD SHOW THE WAY TO WIPE OUT THAT HUMAN MISERY WE CALL THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. WHAT WE NEED IS A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE AND IMAGINATIVE APPROACH TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM.

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

AND I BELIEVE THAT JERUSALEM TOO, REQUIRES A SPECIAL MENTION. OUR POSITION, THE BRITISH POSITION WAS MADE QUITE CLEAR WHEN, WITH THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THIS ASSEMBLY, WE VOTED THIS SUMMER FOR THE RESOLUTIONS CALLING ON ISRAEL TO DO NOTHING TO PREJUDICE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. WE STAND BY WHAT WE SAID. THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ALONE. THREE GREAT RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD TURN TO THE OLD CITY AS A SACRED PLACE.

IN SPEAKING OF ACTIONS TENDING TO PREJUDICE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, I AM BOUND TO ADD THAT I WAS CONCERNED BY THE REPORT IN YESTERDAY'S NEW YORK TIMES, ACCORDING TO WHICH ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. I FEEL THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARE CLEAR AND DISTURBING.

IT MAY WELL BE THAT A WIDER UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE WILL HAVE A PART TO PLAY IN ALL THIS. UNDER THE DEVOTED LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL ODD BULL, UNTSO HAS DONE SO MUCH TO RESTORE CALM WHERE IT IS ALLOWED TO OPERATE. PERHAPS THIS SHOULD BE BUILT UPON. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE NEED FOR ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD BE SHORT: WE HOPE A STABLE PEACE AND GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS WILL GROW IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ALL KNOW THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS RIGHT WHEN HE SAYS THAT ''THE ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN END TO INCITEMENT AND HATRED, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CALM AND RECOURSE TO REASON''. A U.N. PRESENCE COULD BE CRUCIAL TO THE FIRST STEPS ON THIS PATH.

MY OWN VIEW IS THAT A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN ONLY COME THROUGH OUR UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION AND WE, THE MEMBERS, MUST WITHOUT DELAY, SEEK TO AGREE THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE ORGANISATION IS TO OPERATE....

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE VS370/67....

PRODROME RABAT

Extract from a Speech by the British Foreign Secretary at the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September

"It is deplorable that over three months after the end of the Arab-Israel war we in the United Nations have not been able to agree on a constructive resolution tackling the main causes of the conflict. The debates in the Emergency Special Session during the summer, and the proposals discussed privately at that time, showed clearly that the weight of international opinion was for a balanced approach from which stability might emerge. Let us now build on this common ground.

I would like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbours must recognise its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggression designs, and an end to policies inconsistent with peace.

As I suggested in June, and as I am glad to see, the Secretary-General has himself recommended that there should be a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the area, charged with making direct contact with the parties to the dispute His would be no easy task. But that makes his appointment the more necessary and the more urgent.

Without delay we must tackle the question of ensuring the free use of international waterways. The denial of this right was one of the root causes of this summer's trouble. As things stand, no country enjoys the use of the Suez Canal. Unless this

/route

route is quickly available again, there must inevitably be damaging changes in the pattern of world trade. The economies of the world would permanently reduce their dependence on routes of communication which can be blocked or interrupted for a long time.

An even more urgent problem is that of the people - the individual people - who have suffered personal loss and disruption of their lives. The Assembly rightly expressed urgent concern for the refugees during its Emergency Session. Last month a limited step was taken towards the alleviation of the problem when some former residents of the West Bank were allowed to return there. It is a matter of great regret to my Government and to me that there has not been more progress over the return of innocent people to their homes. I heartily endorse Mr. Gussing's plea that the humanitarian aspects of the refugee situation be divorced from the political and military aspects.

Looking to the future, imagination, cooperation and resources - all will be needed. I believe that this Organisation can play a decisive part in launching a constructive scheme for development in the Middle East which could show the way to wipe out that human misery we call the refugee problem. What we need is a new and comprehensive and imaginative approach to the whole problem.

And I believe that Jerusalem too requires a special mention. Our position, the British position, was made quite clear when, with the vast majority of the members of this Assembly, we voted this summer for the resolutions calling on Israel to do nothing to prejudice the status of Jerusalem. We stand by what we said. This is not an issue between Israel and Jordan alone. Three great religions of the world turn to the Old City as a sacred place.

/In speaking

In speaking of actions tending to prejudice the status of Jerusalem, I am bound to add that I was concerned by the report in yesterday's New York Times according to which Israeli settlements are to be established in occupied territories. I feel that the implications of this are clear and disturbing.

It may well be that a wider United Nations presence will have a part to play in all this. Under the devoted leadership of General Odd Bull, UNTSO has done so much to restore calm where it is allowed to operate. Perhaps this should be built upon. We would hope that the need for any such force would be short: we hope a stable peace and good-neighbourliness will grow in the Middle East. We all know that the Secretary-General is right when he says that "the essential precondition in the Middle East is an end to incitement and hatred, the achievement of calm and recourse to reason". A United Nations presence could be crucial to the first steps on this path.

My own view is that a settlement in the Middle East can only come through our United Nations Organisation and we, the members, must without delay seek to agree the framework within which the Organisation is to operate....."

Traduction non-officielle

1076

Extrait d'un discours prononcé le 26 Septembre par le Ministre Britannique aux Affaires Etrangères, à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies.

" Il est déplorable que plus de trois mois après la fin du conflit entre les Arabes et Israël, nous aux Nations Unies n'avons pas pu nous mettre d'accord quant à une résolution constructive couvrant les causes principales de ce conflit. Les débats à la Session Spéciale d'Urgence au cours de l'été, et les propositions discutées en privé à cette époque, ont démontré clairement que la plus grande partie de l'opinion internationale était en faveur d'une démarche équilibrée d'où pourrait surgir la stabilité. Tâchons maintenant de construire quelque chose sur ce terrain commun.

Je tiens à répéter ce que j'ai dit lorsque j'étais ici auparavant: la Grande Bretagne n'accepte pas la guerre comme étant un moyen de régler des disputes, ni qu'un Etat puisse étendre ses frontières comme un résultat de la guerre. Cela veut dire que les Israéliens doivent se retirer. Mais, en même temps, les voisins d'Israël doivent reconnaître le droit d'existence de ce pays, qui doit bénéficier de sécurité à l'intérieur de ses frontières. Ce à quoi nous devons oeuvrer dans cette région est une paix durable, la renonciation à tous projets d'agression, et la fin de politiques incompatibles avec la paix.

Comme je l'ai suggéré au mois de Juin, et comme je suis heureux de constater que le Secrétaire-Général l'a lui-même

/..recommandé

recommandé, il devrait y avoir dans la région un Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire-Général, chargé d'établir un contact direct entre les deux parties. Ce serait là une tâche difficile, ce qui rend sa nomination d'autant plus nécessaire et urgente.

Sans délai, nous devons nous attaquer à la question d'assurer l'usage libre des voies d'eau internationales. Le rejet de ce droit a été une des causes primordiales du conflit de cet été. A l'heure actuelle, aucun pays ne bénéficie de l'usage du Canal de Suez. A moins que cette voie ne soit bientôt accessible, il y aura inévitablement des changements maléfiques dans les mouvements du commerce mondial, car celui-ci réduirait d'une façon permanente sa dépendance sur des voies de communication qui peuvent être bloquées ou interrompues pendant longtemps.

Un problème encore plus urgent est celui de la population et des individus qui ont subi des pertes personnelles et le bouleversement de leurs vies. Au cours de sa Session d'Urgence, l'Assemblée a exprimé, à bon escient, son souci quant aux réfugiés. Le mois dernier, une mesure limitée a été prise vers un allègement du problème, quand quelques anciens résidents de la rive occidentale ont reçu l'autorisation d'y retourner. Je regrette, et mon Gouvernement regrette également, qu'il n'y ait pas eu plus de progrès dans le retour à leurs maisons de personnes innocentes. Je soutiens chaleureusement la prière de Monsieur Gussing que les aspects humanitaires du problème des réfugiés soient dissociés des aspects politiques et militaires.

Nous tournant vers l'avenir, il faudra faire preuve d'imagination, de coopération et de ressources. Je crois que

.../llOrganisation

l'Organisation des Nations Unies peut jouer un rôle décisif en lançant un plan constructif de développement au Moyen Orient qui montrerait par quel chemin on peut arriver à résoudre ce problème de misère humaine qu'est le problème des réfugiés. Ce dont nous avons besoin est une nouvelle façon d'aborder tout le problème, faite de compréhension et d'imagination.

Je crois également que Jérusalem mérite d'être mentionnée spécialement. Notre position - la position britannique - a été énoncée clairement, lorsque, avec la grande majorité des membres de cette Assemblée, nous avons voté cet été en faveur des résolutions faisant appel à Israël de ne rien faire qui puisse porter préjudice au statut de Jérusalem. Notre position n'a pas changé. Ceci n'est pas un problème uniquement entre Israël et la Jordanie, car trois des grandes religions du monde se tournent vers la Vieille Cité comme vers un lieu saint.

En parlant d'actions tendant à porter préjudice au statut de Jérusalem, je dois ajouter que j'ai ressenti de l'inquiétude en lisant le rapport dans le New York Times d'hier, d'après lequel les Israéliens allaient établir des groupements dans les territoires occupés. Je considère que ce que cela implique est clair et troublant.

Il se peut fort bien qu'une présence plus étendue des Nations Unies aura un rôle à jouer dans tout ceci. Sous la conduite dévouée du Général Odd Bull, les Forces des Nations Unies ont fait beaucoup, là où elles peuvent agir, pour ramener le calme. Peut-être pourrait-on étendre cette action. Nous voulons espérer que le besoin pour une telle force armée sera de courte durée: nous espérons qu'une paix stable et qu'un bon voisinage se

/..développeront

développeront au Moyen Orient. Nous savons tous que le Secrétaire-Général a raison lorsqu'il dit "que la première condition essentielle au Moyen Orient est la fin de la haine et de l'excitation à la haine, et le retour au calme et à la raison". Une présence des Nations Unies pourrait être décisive pour l'accomplissement des premiers pas sur cette voie.

Mon point de vue personnel est qu'un règlement au Moyen Orient ne peut venir que par l'entremise de notre Organisation des Nations Unies, et nous, les membres, devons sans tarder chercher à nous entendre sur le cadre dans les limites desquelles l'Organisation doit agir....."

AMBASSADE DE GRANDE BRETAGNE

RABAT

Le 27 Septembre 1967.

F.O. TEL. No. 108 SAVING TO Rabat 1076

AZS 3.X

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

C.O. Mr. Hadow seems to have hardened considerably & the Israelis since June. Observations 5/10/67

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 3 OCT 1967

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 1055 Cat A 26 September, 1967

Yes. We may yet need some reorientation by posting to an Arab capital! JEW 6/10

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1055 of 26 September,
Repeated for information to UKMission New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Beirut and Saving to UKDel.Geneva, Algiers, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Rabat and Tunis.

1076.

Amman telegram No. 1130: Refugees.

I entirely agree with paragraph 3. The Israel Press are continually producing small irrelevant factors as an argument as to why the Jordanians are responsible. I fear that the growing resistance movement on the West Bank (my telegram No. DA/433/67 of 25 September (not to all)) is going to provide a further irrelevant excuse in that every returning refugee will be portrayed as a potential dissident. I do not know what line Eban is now taking about the return of refugees, but I believe he was one of the few in the Israel Cabinet who were in favour of allowing them all back subject to a security check and proof of actual original domicile; but I should have thought that his hand has been considerably weakened and that he probably now feels that he cannot stand up to the majority Israeli Cabinet who have all along for psychological reasons, been difficult about letting all the refugees back.

2. The facts remain that:-

(a) The Israelis have denied the opportunity to return to at least 120,000 original inhabitants of the West Bank. No amount of argument about petty details can get away from this.

(b) The international community over the years has spent large sums of money on the installations (e.g. in Jericho) for the housing and welfare of the "professional" refugees. It is quite scandalous that the Israelis expect the international community to have to spend this money all over again to erect similar installations on the East Bank. It is almost insolent for the Israelis to say that they will play their part in assisting the international community and UNWRA in setting up new camps.

(c) The Israelis now claim that it is clear that King Hussein and the Jordanians are out to exploit the new refugee problem for political ends. The answer is obvious: offer to take back the refugees. Probably many of them will not wish to return, but the Arabs will have had the ace of the new refugee problem removed from their hands.

/(d) The

(d) The Israelis complain about a refugee "myth" having been created in 1948. They themselves are now creating a situation which will be no myth.

(e) The return of refugees has nothing to do with the security problem on the West Bank. It is a purely humanitarian problem, and in one case the Israelis have reserved the right (which would appear reasonable) of excluding known terrorists from the lists of those allowed to return.

3. I am seeing Lourie tomorrow and will continue with the above arguments. When I last saw him before his holiday he was certainly sympathetic to them, but I fear the Foreign Ministry does not cut much ice here on this question. I am also seeing Jack Herzog (the Principal Adviser to the Prime Minister) on Monday. He is a known hard-liner on the refugee question. Unless instructed to the contrary I propose to go at him hard on the above lines and would be grateful for any further ammunition you can provide.

4. The argument that Israel is in violation of United Nations Resolutions is not a powerful one here. The Israelis have already been in violation of resolutions on the refugees for nearly twenty years and have not suffered. They are also inclined merely to argue back that the Arabs are in violation of United Nations Resolutions too and what has the United Nations even done to get the Arabs to comply.

Foreign Office pass UKMission New York No. 223, Washington No. 233, Cairo No. 101, Beirut No. 157 and Saving to UKDel.Geneva No. 1. Algiers No. 1, Bahrain No. 7, Jedda No. 7, Benghazi No. 4, Khartoum No. 2, Rabat No. 1 and Tunis No. 1.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1130Z 26 September
Recd 1520Z 26 September

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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UP 3/11

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

UNITED NATIONS
27 September, 1967
Section 1

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS OF 1967 AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Brown to Lord Caradon (United Nations, New York)

(No. 151. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
My Lord, *27 September, 1967.*

Sir Leslie Glass' despatches Nos. 21 and 22 of the 9th of August together constitute a full and fitting record of the Middle East Crisis of the summer of 1967 as seen at the United Nations. The crisis was—indeed, still is—of course also a crisis of the United Nations itself. The record of the Organisation's performance as set out in these despatches is not very encouraging, more particularly in the peace-keeping context. It is also disappointing that since the despatches were written, the Security Council has been unable to make any further contribution. The General Assembly can so far claim credit only for holding the line against a thoroughly unbalanced view of the direction in which a solution might be found. The most positive developments have perhaps been certain initiatives by the Secretary-General himself, including the appointment of representatives for specific tasks and, more important, his initiative in extending the role of UNTSO to supervising a cease-fire on the Suez Canal. As this despatch is written, the next round is beginning in the General Assembly. We must wait to see whether the United Nations can now, after all, help towards a constructive solution in the Middle East.

2. The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force is not only one of the most controversial aspects of the crisis, but one of particular concern to the United Nations and the Secretary-General. For this reason, I think it may be useful to amplify the record contained in paragraphs 3 to 5 of Sir Leslie Glass' despatch No. 21. U Thant has argued at length, notably in his Report on the withdrawal of UNEF (A/6730/Add. 3 of the 26th of June) that he had no scope for delaying once the host Government withdrew its consent to the presence of the peace-keeping force. Without questioning the validity of U Thant's view that peace-keeping forces must, by their nature, have the consent of the host Governments, it can be held that the Secretary-General acted a little hastily when, on the 16th of May, he asked the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to inform his Government that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must come directly to the Secretary-General and added "On receipt of such a request, the Secretary-General would order the withdrawal of all UNEF troops from Gaza and Sinai, simultaneously informing the General Assembly of what he was doing and why". Against this statement, the Secretary-General's subsequent meetings on the afternoon of the 17th of May and again on the afternoon of the 18th of May with representatives of countries providing contingents were perhaps inevitably to inform them rather than to consult them about action to be taken. On a point of detail, the chronology on the 18th of May, as set out in the Secretary-General's Report (A/6730/Add. 3) differs somewhat from that described in paragraph 4 of despatch No. 21. According to the Secretary-General, the meeting of the UNEF Advisory Group preceded despatch of his formal reply to the UAR, though only by an hour or so. "Although there was some difference of view in the Advisory Committee as to how the situation should be handled, there was no formal advice to the Secretary-General to delay his reply so that the Committee could convene the General Assembly to discuss the UAR request for withdrawal." It is, moreover, clear from the chronology that U Thant not only had news of Egyptian troops having passed through the UNEF positions but also knew that two of the major contributors would withdraw their contingents very promptly. On a minor point, one can perhaps regret that U Thant saw fit to make a speedy public protest against Israel buzzing of General Rikhye's aircraft while failing at the time to react

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publicly to the manhandling of United Nations troops by Egyptian Forces, although in his Report to the Assembly he handled both issues in a more balanced way.

3. I am sure that it is right to emphasise, as the first of these despatches does, the importance of the Security Council and of the United Nations in situations such as that which has given us such concern in the Middle East this summer. This is why it is important to seek to make the United Nations more effective in dealing with such crises. I accept that the Security Council can only act when there is broad East/West agreement. I would be more reluctant to subscribe, as a general proposition, to the further conclusion that the Council can only act when the parties to the dispute are in agreement as to what should be done. I would suggest that the Security Council's right to take enforcement action must be preserved at least in theory. Nevertheless in the Arab/Israeli case, I would agree with Sir Leslie Glass that there is little chance of progress towards a settlement until the parties have concluded that they must make some concession to break the deadlock—or at least, until they are willing to have concessions imposed upon them by the United Nations. One of the main functions of the United Nations is then shown to be to persuade the party to see reason. This is surely a classic case for the United Nations to show that it can work actively towards the peaceful settlement of a dispute.

4. I cannot conclude this despatch without adding the congratulations of all who have been concerned with this crisis here in London for the part your Lordship and the members of your Lordship's Mission played during the arduous proceedings of the summer.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of the two despatches under reference.

I have, &c.

GEORGE BROWN.

No. 77
(CP3/11)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Representative at

Reigate

and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper

Foreign Office
27 Sept. 1967

REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE

Name and Date	Subject
F.O. Despatch No 151 to NY	M.E. Despatch

ARS 12-X

A similar despatch has been addressed to Her Majesty's $\frac{\text{Consular Officer}}{\text{Representative}}$ at

1076

No. 151

(UP 3/11)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

27 September, 1967

My Lord,

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/2.

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Lord Caradon, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., O.B.E.,
etc., etc., etc.,
United Kingdom Mission to
the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
10 OCT 1967

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to the further conclusion that the Council can only act when the parties to the dispute are in agreement as to what should be done. I would suggest that the Security Council's right to take enforcement action must be preserved at least in theory. Nevertheless in the Arab/Israeli case, I would agree with Sir Leslie Glass that there is little chance of progress towards a settlement until the parties have concluded that they must make some concession to break the deadlock - or at least, until they are willing to have concessions imposed upon them by the United Nations. One of the main functions of the United Nations is then shown to be to persuade the party to see reason. This is surely a classic case for the United Nations to show that it can work actively towards the peaceful settlement of a dispute.

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5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of the two despatches under reference.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

109 Rabat 1076

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Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1071 28 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1071 of 28 September
Repeated for information to:- U.K.Mis New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo and Beirut and Saving to U.K.Mission Geneva, Algiers, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Rabat and Tunis.

My telegram No. 1055: Refugees.

I saw Lourie yesterday. As expected he was entirely sympathetic to the argument that it was in Israel's best interests to offer to have all the refugees back. He confirmed that this was still Eban's private opinion, but he said that there were now very few supporters of the Eban line in the Cabinet.

2. He said that, with regard to the present leg of the operation, the Jordanians had now agreed to have further talks with the Israelis and the Red Cross on 29 September and Tekoa had been called back for this purpose. I expressed surprise (having in mind Amman telegram No. 1130) and said I would be interested to know the outcome of this meeting if in fact it did take place.

1076/67

3. From various other sources I have the impression that the Cabinet's attitude is governed both by:-

(a) an irrational bloody-mindedness purportedly based on Jordanian behaviour over the return of the refugees in the early stages and now Jordanian incitement of the Civil Disobedience Movement on the West Bank and

(b) the alleged appreciation that the more difficulties that King Hussein has to face, the sooner he will have to agree to talk terms. I think that Dayan, who was previously in favour of the return of refugees, is now a supporter of this line of thought.

/Foreign

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- 3 OCT 1967

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Tel Aviv telegram No. 1071 to Foreign Offic

Foreign Office please pass U.K.Mis New York 227, Washington 236, Cairo 103, Beirut 159 and Saving to U.K.Mission Geneva 2, Algiers 2, Bahrain 8, Jedda 8, Benghazi 5, Khartoum 3, Rabat 2 and Tunis 2.

Mr. Hadow Sent 1121Z 28 September, 1967
Recd 1412Z 28 September, 1967

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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F.O. TEL. No. ... U/N SAVING TO ... RABAT 1076

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SAVING TELEGRAM

A.L. Sorghum 6.X

FOREIGN OFFICE TO ABIDJAN

Telno 34 Saving 28 September 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

F.S.(E) - para. 7

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 34 Saving of 28 September. Repeated for information Saving to certain other posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

28 September, 1967

Soviet Premier Kosygin, at a Kremlin reception on 23 September for a North Vietnamese Government delegation, said the arms sent to Viet Nam "are in trustworthy hands and are beating the aggressor as he deserves". Since June, Soviet writers have been critical of Arab handling of arms from the Soviet Union.

2. The Beirut Communist weekly Al Akhbar on 10 September followed the Soviet line of encouraging "progressive" régimes and movements in the Arab world. It said the problem was "the need to preserve Egypt's progressive gains, to maintain its radical changes and to carry them further ahead". It spoke of "widespread participation of the masses in guiding and watching political, economic and social work".

3. Al Akhbar has published details (10 September) of the Egyptian Air Force's unpreparedness at the time of the Arab-Israeli war. It quoted L'Humanité's correspondent in Egypt as saying that after Israel's first attack on West Cairo airport, a Soviet expert ran up to the pilots of five undamaged aircraft and shouted at them: "Why don't you do something?" The pilots answered: "We have no orders".

Several months before the war, said Al Akhbar, a Soviet expert reported that anti-aircraft defences at Egyptian military airports were very weak. "But the Soviet expert's report vanished. He left Egypt, declaring that he could not be held responsible". When the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, Zakharov, visited Egypt "he learned that tank drivers had not been sufficiently trained but were handed modern military vehicles after five hours' training".

Al Akhbar claimed that a large number of Egyptian Army officers "assumed important positions in the nationalised copanies and also in the Government. Generals' salaries exceeded those of Ministers. Priority was given to the military instead of to the specialists. The Army became more important than the State and the (Arab) Socialist Union. It was beyond political control... Every day a new scandal was reported in the Press and talked about... The most significant was the uncovering of a large-scale smuggling network in Field-Marshal Amer's office".

4. A plea for the release of Algerian "progressive" political detainees was made in a broadcast by the clandestine East German-based Iraqi Communist Party station "Voice of the Iraqi People" on 18 September. Quoting the current issue of Muqawamah, the journal of the Algerian Socialist Tali'ah Party, the radio mentioned Ben Bella, former President of Algeria, Ben Alla and their colleagues who "have been detained for 26 months"; about 100 "strugglers of the Tali'ah Party who have been in prison for two

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/years",

years", and some Trade Union "strugglers" who were arrested "despite written guarantees by Sharif Bilqasim" (Head of the Executive Secretariat of the FLN). The broadcast said their conditions of detention were "inhuman" and were "aimed at destroying their morale".

5. The need for moderation and good relations with the West were stressed by the Editor of the Cairo paper Al Ahram in his article of 15 September. Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal wrote: "The Arab world must maintain contact with the West bacause, no matter how bitter it feels towards it, it cannot dump its relations with it into the sea".

He was against Viet Nam-type fighting. "Those who advocate it are people who like to copy things without giving them much thought... I believe Viet Nam-type fighting is not suitable for us because of the vast difference between conditions in the Arab world and those in Viet Nam".

6. The Director of the "Voice of the Arabs" radio, Ahmad Sa'id, has been relieved of his post, Cairo newspapers reported on 19 September. The removal of this excitable commentator, who broadcast violent propaganda indiscriminately against "enemies" of the moment, may represent the moderation mentioned above. Jumhourieh suggested that Sa'id should be brought to trial as being among those responsible for the recent setback. Sa'id's successor, Mohammed Uruq, broadcasts comments "characterised with calmness", according to the independent review "Arab World".

7. Using the Suez Canal on both legs of the trip, an 80,000-ton tanker could haul a ton of Kuwait crude oil to Rotterdam at a cost of 3.84 dollars. A tanker of 200,000 tons (53 are on order) by rounding Africa on its loaded voyage but returning through the Canal in ballast, could reduce the cost by 34 per cent. A tanker of 300,000 tons (six are on order) carrying 1.25 million barrels of oil and rounding Africa both ways, could cut the cost by 39 per cent. - Estimate by senior oil analyst for New York brokerage firm, Paine Webber, Jackson and Curtis, 24 September.

On 26 September Esso announced that it had placed orders with British shipyards for four tankers of 240,000 tons each at a total cost of £26½ million.

8. In his Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September U Thant also said that the issue of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from neighbouring Arab States "loses sizeable support when taken alone by separating it from other vital issues, and particularly that of national security.

"The unwillingness of the Arab States to accept the existence of the State of Israel, the insistence of some on maintaining a continuing state of belligerancy with Israel ... the question of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, are also fundamental issues which present hotly controversial problems and sharp division, even though there is much agreement on the principles involved".

9. Noting that some Arabs had criticised Communist countries for sacrificing the "national liberation movement" for the principles of peaceful co-existence a Prague Home Service commentary on 24 September went on "... demands for direct involvement of the Soviet Union, as voiced in the Middle East during the war and

/shortly

shortly after it, are scarcely justifiable. Let us remember that even the Vietnamese Communists fighting for years in far worse conditions have never made such demands. On the contrary, only recently they emphasised again that they want to gain national liberation and at the same time to avoid a world war and thus to crown the policy of peaceful coexistence... The solution of the Indian-Pakistani conflict at a conference in Tashkent, thanks to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy, is an example of the political solving of a conflict which was as long-standing as the Arab-Israeli one... Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is much more complex than that between Pakistan and India, both parties will sooner or later have to look at the problem with different eyes than those of hatred of 20 years".

10. Pravda correspondents Belyayev and Primakov wrote in the latest issue of the Soviet weekly Za Rubezhom that the putting forward of "progressive Socialist slogans" in Egypt was "not accompanied by corresponding work to organise the masses". The article (quoted by Tass on 22 September) said that "another hindrance" was "the existence of certain restrictions with regard to some progressive democratic leaders".

The writers noted that "far from all Egyptians who sincerely believe in scientific Socialism are attracted into active political work". In the last six or eight weeks there had been "a downslide of mood in favour of an immediate continuation of armed struggle with Israel".

11. Belyayev also took part in a discussion programme on 24 September in the Moscow Home Service and said "In Khartoum, where my colleagues and I covered the conference of Arab States which took place from 29 August to 1 September, we noticed a very interesting new note in the debates. The Arab countries now understand that their defeat in the six days' of war is far from being an advantage and, understanding that the Middle East problem cannot at present be solved by old methods, they are prepared to agree to a settlement which would justly take their interests into account. And the plan which was discussed there at a closed session envisages the possibility of a document being presented at the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly which would fix the present situation in the Middle East, but on condition that the Israeli troops withdraw behind the lines which existed until 5 June, behind the dividing lines".

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CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Telno. 957 29 September. 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 957 of 29 September.
Repeated for information U/N Saving UKMIS New York, HC Aden (Personal) Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residence) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv Tripoli, Tunis, LIC Aden and JIC Cyprus.

Arab/Israel at the United Nations.

Reactions to Secretary of State's speech on Mid-East (Ahram, which reflects official line), sub-headlined on 27 September your concentration on Israel withdrawal, early opening of canal on U.N. presence. Sub-lead refers to "important speech by Brown" and Israel attacks on it. Reuter report of Arab delegation's applause is also mentioned. Gomhouriya and Akhbar headlined your demand for speedy opening of canal and use of United Nations to solve crisis; only Gomhouriya picked up call for recognition of Israels right to exist but also mentioned your concern about Israel settlements in occupied territory.

2. No (repeat no) editorial comment; and no (repeat no) report today of Israel criticism and Gomhouriya mention of your warning to Israel over settlements. I hear widely however that in official circles speech was well received.

Foreign Office pass U/N Saving UKMIS New York, HC. Aden (Personal) Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residence) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv Tripoli, Tunis, LIC Aden JIC Cyprus.

Mr. Tesh.

Sent 1330Z/29 September.
Recd 1842Z/29 September.

[Repeated as requested]

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CYPHER/CAT A F.O. TEL. No. 112 SAVING TO Rabat.

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CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 958 29 September 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.958 of 29 September.
Repeated for information to Washington, Paris, U.K. Mission New York, Moscow and unnumbered Saving Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, B.H.C. Aden (Personal) JIC Nicosia.

not recd.

Reference my telegram 939: Arab/Israel.

In his article today Heikal explains why he is discussing war at a time when the United Nations Assembly is discussing peaceful solutions. The Arabs had agreed to seek a political solution; but only on certain conditions no (repeat no) recognition of Israel, etc. Such a solution could be on the lines of the Tito formula, which was "a reasonable frame-work for the attempt"; or on the lines of President Johnson's conditions as amended by Mr. Goldberg, or the Israeli conditions, neither of which was even a starter. The attempts in New York could lead to a reasonable decision but that could only transform itself into a solution with the consent of both sides.

2. There follows a re-examination of his old thesis that war is ultimately inevitable in the nature of things. Israel's head has been turned by its unexpectedly easy victory. But this does not (repeat not) alter the basic facts that she exists heterogeneous and against nature in the middle of the vast Arab nation with its growing power. There can be no (repeat no) "acclimatisation" only a growth in Arab hatred. This Israel "and her friends in the U.S." do not (repeat not) understand. The Arabs have suffered a defeat but not (repeat not) a catastrophe and now there are two problems-the problem of Palestine and the problem of recovery from the defeat; they are cumulative, not (repeat not) self-cancelling. The defeat was a passing accident which he proposes to examine more closely next week.

3. I read this article as a reaction against strong feeling here that the attitudes of both Israel and the U.S. have hardened against the Arabs since Khartoum.

F.O. pass Washington 105, Paris 26, U.K. Mission New York 86, Moscow 23 and Saving unnumbered to Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency) Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis Tel Aviv, B.H.C. Aden (Personal), LIC Aden, J.I.C. Nicosia.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1330Z 29 September
Recd. 1842Z 29 September

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- 5 OCT 1967

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Eastern Dept. J.I.R.D.

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F.O. TEL. No. 110 SAVING TO RABAT

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PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO TUNIS

TELNO 423 29 SEPTEMBER 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TUNIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 29 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, CAIRO, RABAT, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, AMMAN AND KUWAIT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 270: ARAB/ISRAEL.

THE MAIN DEVELOPMENT SINCE MY GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 HAS BEEN THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE, AT WHICH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, LED BY TUNISIA AND THE OTHER MODERATES, SEEMED TO SHOW SOME REALISATION THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A KIND OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IN EXCHANGE FOR WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE ISRAEL POSITION IS NOT CHANGED AT ALL.

2. PLEASE ASSURE THE TUNISIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WE WELCOME THE REALISTIC ATTITUDE OF THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT. WE HAD INDEED NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S COURAGEOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH OF 23 AUGUST AND THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT PUT OUT ON 20 SEPTEMBER. I SPOKE WARMLY OF THEM TO MR BOURGUIBA JUNIOR WHEN I SAW HIM RECENTLY IN NEW YORK. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST ALL OF US RECOGNISE THAT THE POSITIONS OF ISRAEL AND OF THE ARAB STATES IN GENERAL ARE STILL REGRETTABLY WIDE APART. BRITISH INFLUENCE WITH BOTH PARTIES REMAINS CIRCUMSCRIBED, BUT WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER THE TUNISIANS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS AS TO HOW IT CAN BEST BE USED TO CLOSE THE GAP.

/3. ONE ASPECT

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 10 OCT 1967

3. ONE ASPECT WHICH IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO H.M.G. IS THE HUMAN SUFFERING OF THE REFUGEES. WE REGARD IT AS IMPERATIVE THAT THE ARAB COMMUNITIES WHOSE LANDS WERE OVERRUN DURING THE RECENT HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED, IF DISPLACED, TO RETURN: AND IF NOT DISPLACED, TO REMAIN WHERE THEY ARE. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED IN STAGES TO THE RETURN OF A NUMBER OF THESE REFUGEES, BUT ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAT MANY MORE WILL REMAIN EXCLUDED. WE HAVE MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE FROM THE START BEEN MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY: IT IS WITH THE NEEDS OF THE NEWLY-DISPLACED POPULATION IN MIND THAT H.M.G. HAVE MADE AN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO U.N.R.W.A. OF DOLLARS 500,000 AND A CONTRIBUTION OF £ 500,000 TO JORDAN FOR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN addition TO PROVIDING EMERGENCY MEDICAL AND OTHER AID.

4. AS REGARDS A SETTLEMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POINTS I MADE IN MY SPEECHES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 21 JUNE AND 26 SEPT. WE WELCOME U THANT'S STATEMENT PROPOSING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (WHICH AVOIDS THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS) AND HIS SIX PRINCIPLES FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. WE WELCOME PRESIDENT TITO'S EFFORTS TO SEEK OUT A BASIS FOR A SOLUTION, BUT WE CONSIDER THE TITO PROPOSALS INADQUATE, IN THAT THEY FAIL TO ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENT LINK BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THE END OF ARAB BELLIGERENCY AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ABLE TO COMMAND SUFFICIENT VOTES IN THE U.N.

/5. TAKING

5. TAKING OUR STAND AS WE DO ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT ANY COUNTRY SHOULD PERMANENTLY ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY BY THE USE OF FORCE. THIS IS WHY WE SO STRONGLY DEPLORE THE MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S YEARNING TO HAVE SECURE BORDERS. THUS IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO SINGLE OUT ANY ONE ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, SUCH AS WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, FOR CONSIDERATION AND TREATMENT SEPARATE FROM AND PRIOR TO THAT ACCORDED TO THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY. THIS WE THINK POINTS TO THE NEED FOR A BALANCED APPROACH, INCLUDING THE PROVISION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF A DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE TO HELP TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA. AN URGENT AND PRACTICAL WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS WOULD BE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PASS A RESOLUTION, ON THE LINES OF THE SO-CALLED GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULAE: THIS WOULD LINK WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH FURTHER PRACTICAL STEPS COULD BE TAKEN. DO THE TUNISIANS THINK THAT OPINION IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY WILL NOW UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION ? WE DOUBT WHETHER TIME IS ON THE ARABS'SIDE: THE LONGER THE DELAY, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO DISGORGE.

SOSFA SENT 1146Z/29 SEPTEMBER 1967

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(New York Times
1.10.67)

TRAINING OF ARABS IS REDUCED BY U.S.

In Shift of Policy, It Sends Iraqis and Sudanese Home

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 — The Defense Department, in a policy shift, has terminated the military training here of 20 Iraqi and Sudanese military personnel and is sending them home.

That was confirmed here today by defense officials, who said that hopes that the Sudan and possibly Iraq would restore normal relations with the United States had faded.

Word of the termination of facilities for Iraq and the Sudan was first conveyed privately to the American Jewish Congress on Sept. 12 after officials of the group had written to the Pentagon protesting reports that the department would virtually double the number of Arab trainees this year.

These two, plus a number of other Arba countries, broke relations with the United States during the Arab-Israeli war early in June. Despite American denials, these Arab states insist that the United States supported Israel in the war in a variety of ways, including covert armed action.

Defense officials also disclosed that the number of military trainees that the United States was planning to accept from the so-called "moderate" Arab states in the year ending June 30 will rise from 306—not including the 20 Iraqis and Sudanese — to approximately 477.

In a letter in August to the House Armed Services Committee, the Pentagon had forecast a rise in Arab military trainees from 326 to 633. The projected cutback to 477, officials said today, is partly due to delays in the resumption of arms deliveries to the Arab states.

Majority From 3 States

Of the 477 trainees, officials said, at least half will come from three states: Saudi Arabia, where the United States has both oil investments and military installations; Lebanon, and Jordan.

Despite Jordan's participation in the Arab-Israeli war in June, American officials have tended to hold the door open so Jordan can return to a pro-Western position.

Thus, the United States is willing to train a selected number of Jordanian military personnel, it is explained here, mainly to prevent Soviet or other Communist or leftist influences from stepping in, and also to expose young Jordanian military men to American influences.

The rest of the Arab trainees, defense sources said, would come from Libya, where the United States also has important oil and military interests, and from Tunisia and Morocco.

Libya is not regarded here as a militant on the Israeli issue. The United States has also long pursued a policy of controlled arms deliveries to Tunisia and Morocco. This policy is regarded as one of insurance against the radical, anti-Western militanncy of Algeria, situated between the two countries.

A Warehouse for Arms

Defense officials estimate that Algeria, to date, has received at least $200-million worth of arms from the Soviet Union, and the belief here is that Algeria is acting as a warehouse for Communist arms shipments, with the arms to be used in areas of Africa or the Middle East that offer possibilities of subversive exploitation.

The Pentagon's policy shift came to light today when the American Jewish Congress made public a letter dated Sept. 12 from Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

In his leter, addressed to Stanley H. Lowell co-chairman of the A.J.C. commission on international affairs, Mr. Hoopes pointed out that "while certain Arab states—particularly the U.A.R., Algeria and Syria — have progressively adopted a radical, revolutionary posture with strong, anti-American overtones" other Arab states were trying to follow a "more reasonable and moderate" course.

"It has been our policy," he said "to encourage and strengthen these moderate Arab states, in order to weaken the radical potential and to avoid a polarization of power relationships."

The Pentagon's policy, Mr. Hoopse continued, was based on the following factors:

¶By training future leaders of Arab countries, the Pentagon is "exposing" them to life in "our democratic society."

¶Oil investments of American companies in Libya and Saudi Arabia may be jeopardized by any seemingly hostile step taken against all Arab countires.

The United States has terminated the training of military personnel from all countries that have broken diplomatic relations with it and "we are sending them home," Mr. Hoopes wrote.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
13 OCT 1967

Ed (2829)

Chancery, Rabat.

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

(A.B. Urwick)

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 October, 1967

× the Algerians have practically admitted as much: cf. their Foreign Minister's reply to Laraki's renewed plea for an end to the arms race in North Africa recently. A.L. Sowton. 17.x

C. d/A 17.x

CONFIDENTIAL

113

Rabat 1076

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RS
AHS

Telno 1086 3 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1086 of 3 October, Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem and Saving to UKDel Geneva, Algiers Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Rabat and Tunis.

My telegram No.1071: Refugees.

A meeting did in fact take place on 28 September between Tekoa and a Dr. Zahini, described as Head of the Jordanian Red Crescent. Zahini was friendly and pleasant but said that he had to report that there were no more refugees to be produced for repatriation. He gave a number of valid reasons such as emigration to the oil States, desire to remain with relatives on the East Bank and simple disappearance when sought for by the Jordanians. There was some argument about the numbers involved: the Jordanian sticking to his figure of 3,500 and Tekoa sticking to the Israel figure of 6,400, but it was agreed that these figures were really irrelevant since there were none to come.

2. Tekoa asked what cases the Jordanians would like to put forward under the hardship and family reunion schemes and was told that they had none. Tekoa stressed that cooperation between Israel and Jordan even on this part of the scheme could be politically productive as improving the atmosphere. Zahini replied that he was not authorised to discuss political matters. Tekoa asked Zahini about future meetings and was told that he had no instructions to arrange for these. He then raised one case with Tekoa, as an aside, to the effect that the Chief Justice of Jordan was very ill; his wife was in Ramallah and he requested that facilities should be given for her to join her husband on the East Bank. This was agreed to.

3. It would appear that the ball is now really in the Jordanian court. If they want to take advantage of the Israel offer to go ahead with the hardship and family reunion scheme, it is really up to them to produce some cases rather than to confine themselves to asking for one more refugee to be added to the list as they have done.

4. See my immediately following telegram.

5. Foreign Office please pass UKMIS New York 232, Washington 243, Cairo 107, Beirut 163, Jerusalem 134 and Saving to UKDel Geneva 3, Algiers 3, Bahrain 9, Benghazi 6, Jedda 9, Khartoum 4, Rabat 3 and Tunis 3.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1140Z/3 October
Recd 1430Z/3 October

[Repetition to Cairo referred for Departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

See also i.p.t. below.
A.L. Southam 08 12.X
Cairo
I.O. 12/10

Telno. 1087 3 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 1087 of 3 October
Repeated for information to:

U.K. Mission New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem,
and Saving to U.K.Mis.Geneva, Algiers, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis.

My immediately preceding telegram and paragraph 3 of my telegram 1055: Refugees.

I had lunch with Jacob Herzog yesterday and spoke to him on the lines of my telegram 1055.

2. I added that it would now appear that Mr. Eban's task in the U.N. had been made much more difficult by the Etzion bloc affair. It seemed to me that it was high time that Israel should try and rehabilitate herself in the U.N. by some gesture and that action over the refugees was an obvious choice. Why could not Mr. Eban now announce in the U.N. that Israel was prepared to have back all the refugees who wished to come from the East Bank? To have any effect this should be done during this session.

3. Herzog did not endeavour to defend Israels action over the Etzion bloc, the ill-advisedness of which he seemed to accept, though he said that this was a subject which had great emotional and historical overtones in the Israel mind. To my surprise, however, he said he thought my argument about the return of refugees had considerable validity. He would certainly therefore be reporting to the Prime Minister what I had said about the desirability, in Israels own interests, of making some generous gesture.

4. This is faintly encouraging, but I am afraid that Eshkol is such a basically weak man that the narrow opinions of small pressure groups within Israel probably count more with him than world opinion.

5. F.O. pass U.K. Mission New York 233, Washington 244, Cairo 108, Beirut 164, Jerusalem 135, and Saving to U.K.Mis. Geneva 4, Algiers 4, Bahrain Res.10, Benghazi 7, Jedda 1, Khartoum 5, Rabat 4, Tunis 4.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1150Z 3 October
Recd 1438Z 3 October

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, Repeated as requested to other posts].

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0 TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 251

[Date] 3 OCT

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[Priority] PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ARAB/ISRAEL.

1076/67

GUIDANCE NO 218.

THERE ARE AT THE MOMENT SIGNIFICANT INDICATIONS THAT BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT NASSER ARE TAKING A FAIRLY REALISTIC ATTITUDE ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM ON TERMS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ISRAELIS WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THEIR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS. AND THE MODERATE ARABS GENERALLY MAY AGREE TO ACQUIESCE IN A BALANCED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT OF LAST JULY (SEE PARAGRAPH N OF GUIDANCE NO 218).

2. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD RECOGNISE THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND. AND ON THE OTHER OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE

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ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

/mgh

RIGHT OF ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE: THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASSIST IN PUTTING THE RESOLUTION INTO EFFECT AND WOULD LOOK TO A U.N. PRESENCE TO HELP BRING ABOUT EVENTUAL SOLUTIONS OF PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM INCLUDING THE REFUGEES AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.

3. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE RUSSIANS WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WHILE THEY WILL NOT MOVE FASTER THAN THE MODERATE ARABS. THEY WILL NOT INSIST ON ARAB UNANIMITY.

4. THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING A HARD, INDEED AN INCREASINGLY HARD, LINE. THEY ARE INSISTING THAT THE ONLY WAY OF MAKING SATISFACIORY PROGRESS IS BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS. AND THEY DISLIKE THE IDEA OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WOULD BE AN INTERMEDIARY EVEN IF NOT SO CALLED. THEY INSIST THAT THE WHOLE OF JERUSALEM MUST REMAIN UNITED UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. THOUGH THEY ARE PREPARED TO ENVISAGE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE HOLY PLACES. THEY ARE STILL UNCOOPERATIVE

Yaboud

ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE NEW REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK, AND HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO ESTABLISH AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS THERE, THOUGH THEY MAINTAIN THAT THESE ARE FOR SECURITY REASONS THE MOVE MUST APPEAR PROVOCATIVE TO THE ARABS.

5. IN OUR VIEW EARLY PASSAGE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF PROGRESS. IF THERE IS ANY UNDUE DELAY IN GETTING SUCH A BALANCED RESOLUTION FORWARD, WE ARE LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH A PREVIOUS MOVE IN THE COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM AND/OR THE REFUGEES. EITHER OF THESE SUBJECTS WOULD BE LIKELY TO CREATE SUCH AN EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES TOWARDS A BALANCED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE IMPEDED.

6. THE U.S. HAVE MOVED CLOSER TO THE ISRAELI POSITION. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD STILL BE PREPARED TO TRY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA. THEY ARE NOW ANXIOUS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY SUCH FORMULA WITH REGARD TO THE RECOGNITION AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT FULLY. THIS RUNS COUNTER TO OUR OWN VIEW THAT THIS WILL BE /impossible

IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE UNTIL AFTER A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE HAS GOT TO WORK. WE SHALL BE WORKING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICANS THAT WE ARE RIGHT ON THIS.

7. THERE IS A DANGER THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT HARD ATTITUDE. THE PRESENT RELATIVELY FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY MAY PASS UND THE ARABS RELAPSE, AT WHATEVER COST TO THEMSELVES, INTO STERILE HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL. WHILE FROM A LOCAL POINT OF VIEW THE ISRAELIS COULD NO DOUBT IGNORE THE ARABS MORE OR LESS INDEFINITELY, AND REMAIN IN OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES THEY HELD AT PRESENT, THEY WOULD IN THE LONG RUN BE FACED WITH GREAT DIFFICULTIES OF A WIDER NATURE. E.G., CONSISTENT SOVIET HOSTILITY, ABSENCE OF WESTERN SUPPORT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES DUE TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A LARGE ARMAMENT, UND THE PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING OR ABSORBING SO LARGE AN ARAB POPULATION WHICH, WITH ITS HIGHER BIRTHRATE, COULD FAIRLY SOON COME TO OUTNUMBER THE JEWISH ELEMENTS UNLESS THESE ARE ENLARGED BY SUBSTANTIAL NET IMMIGRATION.

8. THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION. AS REGARDS PARAGRAPH 6. DESPITE THE CURRENT DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES ABOUT the urgency

THE URGENCY OF TABLING A RESOLUTION BASED ON THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA. IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION OF SERIOUS ANGLO-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES EVEN TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. SINCE THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO MAKE OUR OBJECTIVES MORE DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN. SOSFA

1076

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S. W. 1.

5 October, 1967

Dear Chancery,

Remittances to the Arab Inhabitants
of Territories newly occupied by Israel

... ... You may find the enclosed press release and Note on procedure which we have just received from the British Red Cross helpful in answering enquiries from Arabs who wish to remit funds to their relatives in the newly occupied territories.

2. We do not consider that you should take the initiative in publicising the arrangements made by the Red Cross: this must be regarded as something for the local Red Crescent societies.

3. In forwarding this information to us the British Red Cross have added the gloss that they understand that the facilities offered by the ICRC are intended for family remittances only.

Yours ever,

BDB
...

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Chancery,
Rabat.

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REGISTRY
13 OCT 1967

COPY

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Press & Information Department

7, Avenue De La Paix

GENEVA.

PRESS RELEASE.

Geneva, August 17, 1967. Press Release No.854 bis.

Remittance of funds to persons in territory

under Israeli military control

Geneva (ICRC), August 17,1967 - The disruption since last June of facilities for the remittance of funds from Arab countries to persons living West of the Jordan or in the Gaza Strip has given rise to considerable hardship.

In order to remedy this situation and assist the many families in need, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in co-operation with the various authorities concerned, has devised a system intended to permit the resumption of cash transfers to territories under Israeli control. A special ICRS account has been opened with a Swiss Bank in Geneva, (Swiss Bank Corporation, 2, rue de la Confederation, Geneva). Funds may be remitted to this account from all countries involved; they will be transferred for payment to beneficiaries through local banks in the main towns of West Jordan, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and Syrian territory under Israeli control.

Recipients will receive local recognized currency, i.e., Israelian pounds.

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the remitting countries have been informed by the ICRS so that they may make known locally the arrangements for the resumption of cash remittances.

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COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

Procedure to be followed for cash remittances

to territories under Israeli military control

1. Remittance should be made direct to the Swiss Bank Corporation, 2, rue de la Confederation, Geneva.

2. Instructions should be given immediately to the Swiss Bank Corporation, Geneva, to credit the account : "Compte special du C.I.C.R. No.129986/7 pour transfert Moyen-Orient, ref. 437 correspondence." The instructions to the Swiss Bank Corporation should show the full addresses of the sender and of the beneficiary and also the relationship between the two parties.

3. Remittances to a beneficiary may not exceed the equivalent of 1,000 (one thousand) Swiss Francs monthly.

4. If the local bank in the country where the intended beneficiary resides is unable to make payment, it will advise the Swiss Bank Corporation in Geneva. The latter will inform the ICRS, who will then endeavour to contact the sender to check information given and if need be obtain additional details.

Intended beneficiaries who are not traced will be reported to the Central Tracing Agency, which will institute enquiries immediately. If these give no result and payment can still not be made, the International Committee of the Red Cross will refund the cash to the sender.

5. Agio and bank charges will be deducted from the funds before payment is made. The beneficiary will therefore receive a sum correspondingly reduced.

Geneva, August 21, 1967.

F.O. TEL. No. ... 4/n ... Rabat

1076

By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

Telegram No. 36 Saving 6 October, 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

AS 17.X

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 36 Saving of 6 October, And Saving to certain other posts.

Middle East Talking Points.

5 October, 1967.

Algeria's policy of resuming the war against Israel was reaffirmed in an Algiers Radio commentary in Arabic on 26 September. The broadcast called upon Palestinian Arabs to march on the path of "armed popular resistance, whatever the price". It claimed that the Palestinian people "are on their way to create a new Algeria" (implying that their resistance might in time be comparable with that practised by the Algerians in their war against France). Algeria, said the commentator, "will not stint means of support and aid in all fields" for "the fraternal Palestinian Arab people". Similarly, Baghdad's "Holy March" programme said on 28 September: "Strugglers in our occupied territory: The peoples of the Arab nation and particularly the Palestinian people, firmly believe that the armed struggle is the revolutionary course to recover the stolen homeland and that fida'i activities are a practical translation of this course of action".

2. Chadli al Klibi, Tunisian Minister of Cultural Affairs and Information, included the following in his speech to delegates at the Arab Information Ministers' Conference in Bizerta on 27 September. "I should like to dwell on some particularly important questions. In the first place I shall mention the language of our information. We must divest it of rhetoric and must shed those inflamed oratorical formulae that have led our peoples astray to the point that they can no longer conceive of reality and its problems, except through a veil of passion covering a truth which has become ungraspable. We have gone so far in verbal excess that words have become powerless to serve their natural functions. Our abuse of language is such that no more than relative attention is paid to our statements. Neither our writers nor even a number of our leaders are free of this alienation.... In particular we must be firmly convinced that for the Arabs the best propaganda they can make abroad is what they tell their own peoples, what they do at home to increase their resources and put an end to poverty and to ignorance and to all the aspects of underdevelopment and of decadence."

3. "It is about time the resources spent on military forces by the developed world were at least partly directed towards raising living standards in the developing areas", the UAR Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Hassan Abbas Zaki, told the International Monetary Fund meeting in Rio de Janeiro on 27 September.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 13 OCT 1967

/The 1966/67

The 1966/67 Egyptian Budget presented to the National Assembly last May allocated 171.4 million Egyptian pounds to the armed forces. This was an increase of 13 million pounds (about 8 per cent) over the 1965/66 estimate. U.A.R. military expenditure has risen substantially since the Arab-Israeli war in June. Hundreds of destroyed tanks, aircraft and large quantities of arms have been replaced - by the Soviet Union.

4. Referring to Pakistan's continuing worry about Soviet arms deliveries to India, President Ayub of Pakistan said in Moscow on 28 September; "We should conserve our resources and utilise them for the welfare of the common man rather than fritter them away on the acquisition of arms ....We on our part would welcome an all-round reduction in arms and elimination of disputes likely to endanger peace".

5. "The courageous speech delivered (to the UN General Assembly) by British Foreign Secretary George Brown should not go without a quick word of appreciation", said the Jordanian paper Al-Difa, quoted by Amman Radio on 27 September. "He has set a good example to the Foreign Ministers of all other countries, regardless of their relations with the Arab countries or with Israel". The Lebanese Press gave prominence to Mr. Brown's speech, with favourable headlines on his insistence on a United Nations solution, and his deploring the extension of Israeli frontiers and Israel's continuing occupation of Arab land.

6. A U.A.R. envoy sent to tour Latin America to "establish contacts" had to be replaced because he had attended the Havana Tricontinental Conference which reminded Latin American leaders of "the danger threatening them from Havana". Reporting this in his Friday article on 22 September, the Editor of Al Ahram, Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, said: "We were faced with a set of contradictions: it was natural for us to attend the Havana Conference as we had contacts with revolutionary forces ....On the other hand, we need the votes of the Latin American States (in the U.N.) regardless of future consequences".

7. Speaking on the Arab/Israeli problem in the U.N. on 5 October the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Nikezic said "The right of all states to exist is for us a principle beyond dispute. It fully applies to the State of Israel, whose existence and equality of rights with other States we have never questioned. It is obvious that recognition of the right to exist and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all States constitute an integral part of any solution. It is in this spirit that my Government proposed guarantees to be given by the Great Powers, or by the Security Council, in order to ensure the respect of those rights in practice." "Yugoslavia is also for the respect and application of the principle of freedom of navigation through international waterways". (Mr. Nikezic went on to stress the need for a general settlement recognising the interests of the Palestine refugees and the need for withdrawal.) SOSFA/CROSEC

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...o Tel. No. 117 SAVING TO Rabat 1976

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Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 988 6 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 988 of 6 October,
Repeated for information to Washington, Paris, UKMis. New York, Moscow and Saving to Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, JIC Nicosia, HC Aden (Personal)

Heikal's Friday article examines the reasons for defeat, which is put down partly to accident, partly to ossification of Egyptian command (which may call for surgery) and the failures of Egyptian intelligence (now under investigation), and partly to the "extraordinary assistance" given to Israel which he will go into next week. The quality of Egyptian troops and equipment is exonerated.

2. The theory of Israel aggression is maintained; a main fault was the failure to switch in time from the offensive posture required to divert Israel from an attack on Syria to the defensive deployment required once this had succeeded.

Foreign Office pass Washington No. 108, Paris No.27, UKMission New York No. 99, Moscow No. 26 and Unnumbered Saving to Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, JIC Nicosia, HC Aden (Personal).

Mr. Tesh

Sent 0825Z 6 October
Recd 1650Z 6 October

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL
F.O. Eastern Dept
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F.O. TEL. No. 116 SAVING TO Rabat

1076

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AZS 18.X

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 989 6 October, 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 989 of 6 October
Repeated for information to:- Washington, U.K.Mis New York, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Jedda, Algiers, Khartoum and Saving to Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, LIC Aden, H.C. Aden (Personal) JIC Nicosia.

Middle East Crisis.

Since the opening speeches at General Assembly, Egyptian Press comment has been concentrating on the hardening of United States position and (more strongly) on that of Israel, and is alarmed by the signs of Israel's preparation for a permanent occupation.There has been much talk of a new "explosion". Heikal's articles in recent weeks have returned to the theme of the inevitability and the possibility of a renewal of war.

2. To some extent this must be spontaneous reaction, and to some extent tactical reaction by Government. But Edgar Gallad last night told me that the thinking of Heikal with whom he had been in touch was rather more alarming than this; and Heikal may always reflect the President's ideas. Heikal was convinced that Israel's tough line was derived from American support, and that Egypt must at all costs re-open Canal. Egyptian Forces were getting steadily stronger and should before long-Gallad mentioned two or three months-be able to undertake a limited campaign to drive Israelis back from the Canal if no (repeat no) United Nations solution was in sight. Gallad also said that Algerian Ambassador had recently proposed a new visit by Boumedienne perhaps with Aref and Sudanese, to discuss this sort of possibility.

3. Lack of patience is typically Egyptian and does not (repeat not) necessarily go right to the top. Russian Ambassador had told Gallad that USSR were just not (repeat not) interested in a further war. This sort of message therefore could merely be an attempt to get us to press Americans, or to touch us on the sore point of the Canal. I suppose it could also reflect uneasiness about Yemen and South Arabian situation and therefore about Arab subventions. But pressure could certainly develop which would make the present line harder to hold.

/Foreign

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17 OCT 1967

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Cairo telegram No. 989 to Foreign Office

Foreign Office please pass Washington unnumbered, U.K.Mis New York unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, Jedda unnumbered, Algiers unnumbered, Khartoum unnumbered and Saving to Bahrain (Residency) unnumbered, Beirut unnumbered, Benghazi unnumbered, Kuwait unnumbered, Rabat unnumbered, Tripoli unnumbered, Tunis unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, LIC Aden unnumbered, HC Aden (Personal) unnumbered and JIC Nicosia unnumbered.

Mr. Tesh Sent 1200Z 6 October, 1967

Recd 1838Z 6 October, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept

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FOREIGN OFFICE,

S. W. 1.

6 October, 1967

.... I am writing to send you a copy of the record of a conversation between Mr. Roberts and a deputation from the Board of Deputies of British Jews. The meeting was arranged at the request of the Board of Deputies.

2. As you will see, after the meeting the Board of Deputies issued a statement to the press. The wording of the release to the press was agreed between Eastern Department and the Press Officer of the Board of Deputies.

3. I am sending copies of this record to the Chanceries at Rabat, Tunis, Benghazi and Cairo who may have some observations to make about the condition of the Jewish communities in their respective countries. Copies also go to Stephen Egerton in New York and Alan Urwick in Washington. We should be grateful to learn from them whether the Board of Deputies' action in London has been paralleled in the US, and if so, how the Americans have reacted.

(A. J. Beamish)

N. Mandel, Esq.,
Tel Aviv.

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CALL ON 28 SEPTEMBER ON THE MINISTER OF STATE BY A DEPUTATION FROM THE BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS

Present:

Mr. Goronwy Roberts	Alderman Michael Fidler
Mr. T. J. Rutter	Sir Samuel Fisher
	Sir Barnett Janner
	Dr. S. Levenberg
	Mr. A. Marks
	Mr. H. Landy
	Mr. D. Carrington

Alderman Fidler began by thanking Mr. Roberts for the assistance which had been given by the Foreign Office and the British authorities in Aden in the evacuation of the last remnant of the Jewish community. Unfortunately, there were remnants of ancient Jewish communities in other Arab countries whose situation had deteriorated as a result of an upsurge of anti-Jewish feeling in connection with the explosion of the Arab/Israel dispute into hostilities. The difficulties of the small remaining Jewish community in the United Arab Republic were aggravated by the fact that a number of ex-Nazis had found refuge in Egypt where they had continued with anti-Jewish activities on behalf of the Egyptian authorities.

2. Sir Barnett Janner said that the insecurity and economic and social discrimination which over the years had caused 800,000 Jews to emigrate from Arab countries had been

/intensified

intensified as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East. The reaction of Arab Governments had varied. The Tunisian Government had taken action quickly to protect the Jewish minority against mob violence and the Moroccan Government had extended a "pretence of protection", but the Libyan Government had been slow to extend their protection. Those who suffered most were the stateless Jews who had no protecting power to turn to. The United Kingdom had in the past been generous in allowing such people to settle in this country.

3. Since these Jewish communities had nobody to speak on their behalf, the Board of Deputies wanted to bring their situation to Her Majesty's Government's attention and to suggest that Her Majesty's Government should, in the context of United Nations discussion on refugee problems in the Middle East, draw attention to the plight of these Jewish communities, Arab measures against whom contravene the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. This afforded Her Majesty's Government good humanitarian grounds on which to intervene.

4. Mr. Roberts pointed out that we were represented in the Third Committee by Lady Gaitskell and in the Fourth Committee by Mr. Luard, both of whom knew of HMG's concern for the Jewish communities and would decide how and when this could be best expressed.

/5.

5. Dr. Bevenberg said that this was a fundamental humanitarian problem which should be isolated from politics. The Board of Deputies' greatest concern at the moment was for the Jewish community in the UAR where, following compulsory registration of all Jews in May of this year, almost all men between 20 and 50 years of age, as well as some much older, were arrested on 5 June. It was estimated that out of the total Jewish population of 2,500, some 600 remained in prison. The Secretary-General's representative, Mr. Gussin, reported that he had been refused information by the UAR Government about the position of Jews there.

6. There were large numbers of Libyan Jews of Italian nationality who had taken refuge in Italy, leaving all their property behind. In the present atmosphere they did not know whether it was safe to return to collect or sell their property. There was little information from Iraq and Syria but those who had escaped reported that the Jewish communities were subject to torture and humiliation.

7. There was a good case in international law for representations to the Arab countries. The cease fire resolution adopted by the Security Council on 14 June recommended to the governments concerned "the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949". One

/of the

of the conventions referred to in the resolution imposes on all parties to a conflict the obligation to protect all persons in their territories against all acts of violence, threats or insults. These provisions apply particularly to persons who are not nationals of the countries concerned. Arab measures against Jewish minorities and against Jews of foreign nationality were undoubtedly in contravention of this convention.

8. The deputation recognised the difficulty of making representations in countries where Britain had no diplomatic representation. But this could be done through the protecting powers.

9. Her Majesty's Government could also speak about the problems of the Jewish communities in relevant discussions in the United Nations, and could discuss this with friendly governments in order to create a climate of opinion which would deter governments from such measures.

10. Alderman Fidler and Sir Samuel Fisher both emphasised that it was not only financial disabilities and sequestration of property that concerned them, but much more the cases of maltreatment, violence and torture. The British sympathy with the underdog would certainly create public support for any action Her Majesty's Government felt able to take.

11. Mr. Landy said that there were some countries where representations by Her Majesty's Government would be likely to

/be listened to

be listened to with respect. Libya was a member of the sterling block and had strong ties with this country. But Libyan Jews had suffered atrocities, and if they wished to leave were allowed to take with them only £50. There was nobody to speak for them except outside powers who had influence with the Libyan Government.

12. Mr. Roberts expressed his deep sympathy with the situation of the Jewish communities concerned and said that Her Majesty's Government were certainly prepared to help where they thought they had effective means of doing so. In considering any action they always had to ask first whether it would be likely to improve the situation of the Jewish communities concerned or whether specifically British representations might have even an adverse effect. The most effective means of help were not necessarily by frontal attack. The questions of how and when to bring pressure to bear on other governments were essential to the success of any representations that might be made on such a delicate subject. Our missions at the United Nations and in foreign countries knew well the Government's abhorrence of discrimination against and maltreatment of minorities. They had, however, to be given latitude to decide how and when to intervene. Mr. Roberts cited parallel cases of action by Her Majesty's Government to secure the release of British pilots from Algeria and the safety of our diplomatic staff in Peking, in

/neither

neither of which frontal assault had been successful but assiduous, determined and well-timed representations had.

13. But apart from specific representations to other governments we were working all the time to promote formal declarations and conventions in the United Nations which would bind countries to accept civilised norms of behaviour in these matters. We had as a basis for this work the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, and we were in the vanguard of efforts to add to these.

14. We would keep in the forefront of our minds what the deputation had had to say, and they could be assured that our representatives at the United Nations and in foreign countries would miss no opportunity of doing all in their effective power to discourage and prevent discrimination and maltreatment of minorities.

15. Sir Barnett Janner said that they were anxious that this question should not go by default at the General Assembly. There was at the moment much talk about the plight of the Arab refugees but no mention of the situation of the Jewish communities in the Middle East. If no-one spoke up for them, their position might meanwhile further deteriorate.

16. Mr. Roberts said that mention of this in the General Assembly might well give the situation of Jewish communities a public airing but that it would also be likely to strengthen the hand of the extremists in the Arab world and consequently to cause a deterioration in the situation of the Jewish communities. He said that there were two consoling features of the current

/ situation

situation. The present sufferings of the Jewish communities had come about as the result of popular emotions and uncontrolled mob action since the hostilities, and not because of any change in the attitudes of the governments concerned. The recent troubles would have been cause for even graver concern had they been instigated as a matter of deliberate policy by the governments concerned. Moreover, this emotional reaction was directed not only against Jews but against all Western interests, partly because of a general xenophobia but partly also because, in the Arab mind, the West was associated with Israel and Jewry.

17. Mr. Roberts said that we believe that the post-Khartoum détente was a real one and betokened a switch of policy and attitudes in the Arab world, including the United Arab Republic. This would make for better relations with the West and we hoped would lead to a resumption of diplomatic relations which would put us in a much better position to judge how and when effective representations could be made on behalf of the Jewish communities in the Middle East.

18. In response to a request by Alderman Fidler, Mr. Roberts agreed that the Board of Deputies might issue the following statement to the Press:

> " A deputation from the Board of Deputies of British Jews led by Alderman Michael Fidler and including Sir Samuel Fisher, Sir Barnett Janner, Dr. S. Levenberg, Mr. A. Marks and Mr. H. Landy, Mr. Carrington called today on the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Mr. Goronwy Roberts.

/ They

They made strong representations about the situation of Jewish communities in a number of countries and about individual cases of discrimination and maltreatment.

The Minister expressed his deep sympathy with the situation of the Jewish communities concerned and said that Her Majesty's Government would continue to do all in their power to discourage and prevent such practices.

1076

(2231)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

KUWAIT.

9 October, 1967.

Arab Ministers of Education Conference.

The press has announced that the Arab Ministers of Education are to hold a conference in Kuwait from 11 to 16 November, 1967. This conference is being held under the auspices of the Arab League and is not in the series of UNESCO-sponsored regional conferences.

2. We will send you the agenda and list of delegates as soon as we have them and will pass on any published documents that come out of the meeting, on the assumption that it is of some interest to you. If we are wrong, please let us know!

(J.A.N. Brehony)

A. Ibbott, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office.

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British Embassy,

TUNIS

(1075)

9 October, 1967

Dear Department,

Arab Information Ministers Conference
Bizerta, 27-30 September, 1967

A conference of Arab Ministers of Information was held at Bizerta from 27 to 30 September. Its declared purpose was the drafting of a unified information policy in the light of recommendations made at the Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum. The conference was preceded by a three-day meeting of officials from the countries represented during which an agenda was prepared and other points thrashed out before the main conference began. All proceedings, apart from the opening speech by Monsieur Chedli Klibi, Tunisian Secretary State for Cultural Affairs and Information, took place in secret session and no communiqué was issued at the end.

2. It was clear from statements made on arrival that most of the delegates came to Bizerta in chastened mood, much concerned about the Arab image, particularly in the West, and worried by the fact that the Arab case over Palestine had gone so badly by default in comparison to the superb information effort mounted by the Israelis. These feelings were evidenced by remarks in Klibi's opening speech when he called for an end to the invective and verbal excesses which characterized Arab propaganda and had rendered words completely valueless. "Our abuse of language", said Klibi, "has reached the point where our statements are scarcely heeded any more". Klibi went on to suggest that the most effective external propaganda for the Arabs was what they said to their own peoples and the measures they took to combat poverty and ignorance and develop their resources. It was sufficient to recall that Israeli propaganda, "the most efficient in the world", was based on that country's economic achievements which had made her a model for developing states.

3. With these sobering thoughts the conference then went into secret session. It is believed, however, that discussion centred on three main topics, viz:

(a) external information policy;

(b) the policy to be adopted in information work between the Arab countries;

(c) domestic information policy in each country.

4. On point (a) it is thought that activities will be largely concentrated on keeping up the information work of Arab diplomatic missions and League offices abroad, particularly in the Western countries, and I was told by a usually reliable source that the conference had in fact agreed to make a sum of £2 million available as a joint fund for external propaganda purposes. According to the same source it was agreed that a further sum (amount unspecified) be made available for

/propaganda

North and East African Department,
Foreign Office

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propaganda directed to Arabs in Israeli-occupied territory. Little is known of what transpired in connexion with points (b) and (c) but it is believed that the delegates discussed the desirability of such steps as ending campaigns of mutual abuse between Arab states, and more exchanges of information material such as films and television programmes. On the domestic front the feeling was also prevalent that each country should be more factual and objective in information fed to their respective peoples. Emotionalism was out, realism and cold hard facts in.

5. The Tunisians, even if their own claims are taken with a large grain of salt, seem to have played a very active rôle in the conference and seem well satisfied with the results. Press comment here is claiming that the convening of the Arab Ministers here represents an open acknowledgement by the other Arab states that previous campaigns of propaganda and vilification against Tunisia were unjustified and unjust. The choice of Bizerta, where Tunisian foolhardiness provoked a bloody massacre by the French armed forces in 1961, was clearly a feather in the cap for the Tunisians who are now very anxious to restore their image as "good Arabs", and no efforts were spared in rushing delegates poste haste to view the Place des Martyrs and other hallowed relics of Tunisia's struggle against colonialism. (Conveniently enough for the Tunisians, Bizerta offers this country's only large-scale conference facilities, in the shape of the conference centre built for the Destour Socialist Party's 1964 gathering). Little has been heard here of the part played by the "Revolutionary" delegates to the conference but I have been told that the Algerian remained fairly quiet throughout the proceedings whilst the Syrian decided to sulk and absented himself from the last two sessions. Though there were reports that the latter was given a wigging for his behaviour by President Bourguiba when the delegates paid their farewell call, this now seems doubtful in the light of subsequent remarks by Tunisian officials.

6. I enclose a list of the various heads of delegation. Since there was no published list names had to be gleaned from various sources and I apologise now for any omissions or inaccuracies.

7. Copies of this letter go to Joint Information Policy and Guidance Department, Information Research Department, the Chanceries at Amman, Beirut, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Kuwait, Khartoum, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Algiers, Cairo, Washington, Paris and the High Commission, Aden.

Yours ever,

I H Macrae

(I. H. Macrae)

Arab Information Ministers
Conference at Bizerta, 27-30 September, 1967

TUNISIA	Chedli Klibi	Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs and Information
LIBYA	Khelifa Mohamed Telissi	Minister of Information and Education
ALGERIA	Mohamed Ben Yahia	Minister of Information
LEBANON	Michel Edde	Minister of Information
SAUDI ARABIA	Sheikh Jamil Houjailan	Minister of Information
ARAB LEAGUE	Abdelkhalek Hassouna	
MOROCCO	Ahmed Senoussi	
U.A.R.	Ali Khashaba	Under-Secretary, Ministry of National Guidance
JORDAN	Salah Abou Zaid	Minister of Information
SUDAN	Abdelmajed Abou Hassabou	Minister of Information
SYRIA	Abdallah Al Hourani	Secretary-General at Ministry of Information and Director of Radio or T.V.
IRAQ	Malek Douhan Al-Hassan	
KUWAIT	Sheikh Jaber El-Ali Es-Salem	Minister of Information and Guidance
YEMEN	Abdul-Aziz Al-Maqaleh	High Official in the Yemeni Ministry of Information

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Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rabat

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I/O. o/r.

23/10

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

(1075)

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17 OCT 1967

BRITISH EMBASSY

TUNIS

9 October, 1967

1076

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
10 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

You sent to Urwick (who is away from the office for a few days) a copy of your letter of 6 October to Mandel in Tel Aviv, covering the record of a meeting between the Minister of State (Mr. Roberts) and a deputation from the Board of Deputies of British Jews on 28 September.

2. Atherton, the Israel Country Director in the State Department, tells me that a number of similar representations have been made by Jewish organisations here. The two bodies which have been most prominent in this have been the American Jewish Committee and the "Committee of Presidents" which unites the leaders of the principal Zionist associations. The lines on which they have spoken have been broadly similar to those employed by the Board of Deputies on 28 September in London.

3. The main target for these representations has so far been Ambassador James Wine, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs, although parallel approaches have also been made at a fairly junior level in the White House. In addition to these confrontations, Mr. Battle went to New York last week for an informal meeting with the Committee of Presidents, at which the problem of Jewish communities in the Arab countries figured prominently.

4. The American reaction to all of this has been similar to our own. They have concentrated upon persuading the Jewish organisations that no useful purpose can be served by calling public attention to the problem. They have also explained repeatedly their doubts about the utility of any sort of American "frontal attack" on the Arab governments concerned. On the whole, these efforts have been effective, although the Committee of Presidents apparently issued a press statement in New York some two weeks ago in which, having described the plight of the Jewish communities in Arab countries, they called upon the United States Government to take (unspecified) action to alleviate it.

5. The State Department have told Jewish representatives to whom they have spoken that they will, of course, watch out for any specific opportunity which occurs to intervene privately but effectively in the interest of particular Jewish communities. Meanwhile, they are doing their best to work through the International Committee of the Red Cross in order both to acquire fuller information about the position on the ground and to see that something is done about cases of special hardship. In this connection, Atherton remarked that they had now put together a good deal of factual information about the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries affected, which they would be glad to make available to us if we wished. It may be that your own enquiries

A J. Beamish, Esq.,
Eastern Department.

/have

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have already built up a complete picture. If not, we will, of course, be happy to take up this offer.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Mandel, in Tel Aviv, Egerton in New York, and to the Chanceries at Rabat, Tunis, Benghazi and Cairo.

I.M.H. Smart

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10 October, 1967

With the compliments of
I.M.H. Smart
THE BRITISH EMBASSY

AZS 19.X

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rabat

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
17 OCT 1967

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En Clair F.O. TEL. No. 118 SAVING to Rabat

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 997 10 October 1967

AZS 18.x

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 997 of 10 October.
Repeated for information to Washington, UKMis.New York, Moscow, Amman, Tel Aviv and
Saving to Khartoum, Jedda, Rabat, Algiers and Tunis.

Suez Canal.

U.A.R. Press.

Diplomatic correspondent of Ahram has learned that U.A.R. Government have given their views on soundings by certain countries as to whether she will accept resumption of navigation in the Canal if Israel withdrew 25 kilometres.

U.A.R. Government have explained through diplomatic channels that:

(a) They strongly agree that necessary measures be taken as a matter of priority to reopen Canal to international navigation.

(b) First step is retreat of Israeli forces to pre-5 June positions and that work of clearing it which should begin at once should be accompanied by beginning of Israel withdrawal.

(c) It is the impossibility of reaching this logical position which holds up clearance and harms the interests of many States.

(d) U.A.R. Government considers that beginning of clearing operations seems impossible as long as there are possibilities of clash on the two banks and possibilities of a general resumption of fighting continue.

(e) The danger of such a clash also threatens the security of the Canal itself as well as of clearance operations.

Foreign Office pass Unnumbered Washington, UKMis.New York and Saving Unnumbered to Khartoum, Jedda, Rabat, Algiers and Tunis.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 0930Z/10 October 1967

Recd. 1034Z/10 October 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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17 OCT 1967

EN CLAIR F.O. TEL. No. 119 SAVING TO Rabat

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PRIORITY TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 292 10 October 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.292 of 10 October.
Repeated for information to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Paris, Washington and Saving to Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, Benghazi, Jedda.

Arab-Israel.

The party newspaper "L'Action" today carried the text of a special interview given by President Bourguiba to Le Figaro (which has already appeared in that paper) references to President Nasser are scornful or ironic; in general the President's remarks constitute his strongest plea yet for the Arabs to reach a peace settlement with Israel. Following is main outline.

2. President Nasser's position.

After some pointed advice about the role of a Head of State being to lead and not follow the masses, President Bourguiba comments that he did not wish Nasser to go, and it was, moreover, none of his business. Nasser had done what he could: the Arabs were sorry for him, but it would perhaps be better for him and Egypt, and easier to find a solution (to the Arab/Israel problem) if he were to give up his position. This would perhaps be a useful sacrifice for the Arab cause. It was always difficult for thos e who had made war to make peace.

3. Arab/Israel

Had the Arabs played the 'peace card' they would probably have gained considerable advantages, and world opinion would swing in the Arabs' favour. To maintain a refusal to recognise the existence of Israel, to refuse to discuss or even to try to know Israel's conditions for a lasting peace was to play the game of the Israeli 'hawks'. There was a risk that the Israelis would stay indefinitely on the present cease-fire lines. Contrary to what they were now saying, the 1947 Resolutions would not be overtaken if the Arabs offered peace. The essential for Israel was not to have Sinai, but to have a land in which they could live in full security. They had won a battle but they had not won the war, and they ran the risk of never winning it. The Arab world was vast and they could not extend into the interior of Egypt or Syria. The problem of refugees and of guerilla operations carried the risks of continual deterioration in the situation. Israel would still remain a ghetto in the midst of refugees, of hatred and misery. Looking further ahead, there was perhaps a means of reaching a compromise which would bring the Israelis back to the limits which they themselves accepted. But other men were needed to carry it through.

/4. The President

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4. The President confirmed his view that if Israel accepted the return to the United Nations Resolutions, eventual cooperation between Israel and the Arab States would transform the facts of the problem. It would probably even permit the Arabs to realize that the Jews were people like any other. If, as was impossible to envisage, the Israelis played neither the card of peace nor that of cooperation, the Arabs would be in a better position to face up to war. Cooperation was a form of confrontation; the example of the Yemen showed what happened to a country which sought to close itself to the outside world.

5. The Arab position.

A long effort of re-education would certainly be necessary. There was no cause why the Arab people should not finish by understanding the language of reason.

6. Tunisia/U.A.R. Relations.

President Bourguiba disclaimed any intention of meeting President Nasser. He had sent a representative to Cairo just after the war had finished because Nasser had expressed a wish to renew contact with Tunisia. But he was still aware of Bourguiba's position, which had not changed over the years.

7. Inter-Arab Relations.

Tunisia's geographical position prevented her intervening in the affairs of the Levant, beyond giving advice. Tunisia had received little enough help from that quarter during its struggle for independence. But the people of the Mashriq had their history while Tunisia had hers. He had no intention of seeking to play a larger rôle than Tunisian means warranted, of seeking to be a leader of the Arab world or elsewhere.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 18 and Saving to Rabat 4.

Mr. Brant

Sent 1530Z/10 October
Recd 1837Z/10 October

[Repeated as requested]

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En Clair

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 1111 11 October, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1111 of 11 October,
Repeated for information to UKMission New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Saving to UKDel.Geneva, Algiers, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Rabat and Tunis.

My telegram No. 1103 (of 10 October) Family Reunion Scheme for Refugees.

On Tuesday, 10 October, Minister of Interior announced that as from Sunday, 15 October, residents of East Jerusalem and the West Bank will be able to apply for repatriation of members of their families now in Jordan. All persons who were residents of Jerusalem and the West Bank before 5 June and left their homes not later than 4 July may be considered for repatriation.

2. Residents of East Jerusalem will submit their applications at the local Population Registry Offices of the Ministry of the Interior. Residents of the West Bank will obtain application forms from their local authority who after approving them will in turn submit them to the Military Government.

3. Press reports that although no mention was made of the repatriation channels it is believed that the same Israel/Jordan machinery which managed the return of refugees until 31 August would be revived.

Foreign Office pass saving UKDel Geneva 6, Algiers 6, Bahrain 12, Benghazi 9, Jedda 12, Khartoum 7, Rabat 6, Tunis 6.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1135Z 11 October
Recd 1451Z 11 October

[Repeated as requested]

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A.L. Sowton 18.x

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 1103 11 October, 1967

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J.O. o/s. 24/10/67

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1103 of 11 October.
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem and Saving U.K.Mission Geneva, Algiers, Bahrain, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Rabat and Tunis.

My telegram 1087: Refugees.

Press reports that Israel authorities will shortly announce the procedures for the family reunion scheme which will permit West Bank residents to apply for the repatriation of refugee members of their families now in Jordan. Officials in Jerusalem have stated that the number of refugees who might return under this scheme cannot be estimated. They refuse to comment on a New York Times report stating that 40,000 would return under this scheme.

2. This move is in line with what Tekoah told me about his meeting reported in my telegram under reference, i.e. that the Israelis will be responsible for the working of the family reunion scheme and the Jordanians will be [grp. omitted] to put up the names of hardship cases who wished to be repatriated.

3. Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 238, Washington 250, Cairo 109, Beirut 165, Jerusalem 136 and Saving U.K.Mission Geneva 59, Algiers 5, Bahrain 11, Benghazi 8, Jedda 11, Khartoum 6, Rabat 5, Tunis 5.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1135Z/11 October
Recd. 1410Z/11 October

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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DIS. MOD.
xxxxx

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 17 OCT 1967

F.O. TEL. No. 122 SAVING TO Rabat

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

A.L. Sowton 18.x
C.A. Tue 19/x
F.S.C. Mon 19/10
H.O. 20/x.
23/10

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 1009 12 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1009 of 12 October.
Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Saving to Khartoum, Jedda, Rabat, Algiers, and Tunis.

Suez Canal. My telegram No. 997.

I have checked with M.F.A. and Fawziz Office that these statements in El Ahram were drafted and approved by them. El Faki told me that Italians most recently, and other countries earlier, had been making propositions for separate or partial solutions, and that this had provoked statement. Egyptian position is that clearance can start when Israel withdrawal begins, but will only finish (i.e. ships will only pass) when withdrawal to 5 June lines is completed.

2. This overtook my comments on Moores letter to Hadow of 23 September.

Foreign Office pass Washington 110, UKMIS New York 101, Moscow 27, Tel Aviv 36, Amman 36, and Saving to Khartoum 5, Jedda 14, Rabat 7, Algiers 10 and Tunis 7.

Mr. Tesh.

Sent 0800Z/12 October.

Recd 1253Z/12 October.

[Repeated as requested]

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N.E.A.D.

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Moroccan Ambassador and Middle East Situation

Mr. Ben Lamlih, my Moroccan colleague, called on me this morning. His last and only previous call was a courtesy one in 1965 after his arrival here. He told me he had recently returned from two months leave and would be leaving Tehran in about two months time to take up an appointment as Head of the Middle East Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rabat. He did not however give the impression that he had come to say goodbye, but rather to lobby on behalf of the Arabs in their present difficulties with Israel.

2. After telling me about his visit to London for a check-up and his coming departure, Mr. Ben Lamlih asked me what I thought about the Middle East situation. I said I thought he, as an Arab, was better qualified than I to speak about it. All I could say was that I regarded the situation as serious and I thought it essential that, if a lasting solution was to be reached, the Arabs should face facts and recognise that Israel was there to stay. The sooner there were direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs within the framework of the United Nations the better.

3. Mr. Ben Lamlih said that the Arabs were in no state to accept direct negotiations with Israel. Negotiations should be through an intermediary who (in answer to my question) should be the Secretary General of the United Nations. He thought the U.K. with all their experience in the Middle East, could play a helpful role, particularly by putting pressure on the United States to be less hostile to the Arab cause (this, I think, was the main point he wanted to get across). I said that the U.S., like ourselves, felt that the only lasting solution would be for Israel and the Arabs to have direct negotiations, and I could see no point in expecting the Americans to give up their belief in this.

4. Mr. Ben Lamlih, who sought to give the impression that we were being much more realistic than the Americans in trying to mend our fences with the Arabs, said that once we had resumed diplomatic relations with Cairo we ought to be able to use our influence there to good effect. I said that unfortunately "the big lie" perpetrated by Nasser and King Hussain had done us great damage in the Arab world and our influence was now far less than it used to be. The Moroccan Ambassador said no one believed the big lie and that in two or three months time we would be back in our old position of influence. Whereas nearly everybody wanted to see the end of Nasser, he thought we were much more realistic than the Americans in seeing that there was no acceptable alternative to Nasser.

/5.

5. Finally, I suggested to Mr. Ben Lamlih that what was really needed was for the more realistic Arab leaders to make it clear to the others that direct negotiations with Israel were the only way of reaching a permanent solution of the Middle East problem. Mr. Ben Lamlih thought our influence might be used in Cairo to this end.

(D.A.H. Wright)

12 October, 1967.

Counsellor

H. of C.

Mr. Dawson

Copies to: Mr. A.R. Moore (Foreign Office)
H.M. Ambassador at Rabat.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

A.L. Southern 25.X

It looks as though Sir D Wright might have been taking a broader line for Ahmed negotiations than I believe he is

C F.O.

A.O.S - M 27/10

H.E ofr.



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24 OCT 1967

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEHRAN.

1076

F.O. TEL. No. U/H ... SAVING TO Rabat

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BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 37 Saving 13 October 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 37 Saving of 13 October.
Repeated for information Saving to to Certain Other Posts.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 19 OCT 1967

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

12 October 1967

Peking's recent decision to break off diplomatic relations with Tunisia was the subject of strong comment in the Tunis paper L'Action on 28 September. Referring to China's "new style" relations with other governments, it said this was characterised by "the open repudiation and gross violation of all diplomatic rorms generally allowed in international usage, and recourse to insults and defamation. It alternates intimidation and threats and even extends to the virtual use of violence."

L'Action commented that Chinese Embassies were "becoming daily more open centres ror politial propaganda. They have assumed the right to take part in manifestly subversive activities, on tne pretext of spreading their so-called cultural revolution."

2. The Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Ahmad al-Shuqairi, said in Algiers on 28 September, after a six-day visit to Cairo. "The Palestinian people will not respect the cease-fire order of the United Nations Security Council, nor its resolutions. They will continue their armed struggle." Baghdad Radio on 6 October quoted Al Manar as follows:- "The popular resistance in occupied Palestine must become a great general war and must be assisted and supported by all Arab States and peoples. Its heroes, who throw bombs at the houses of the criminal murderers in Tel Aviv, blow up the strongholds of the occupation forces and challenge all the weapons and barbaric methods of the aggressors, must not be left alone in the battle field. Their struggle must turn into a people's war waged by Palestinians to liberate their homeland. Support for this heroic struggle must be in the form of arms which can reach the rebels in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nabulus, the volunteers and the Palestine Liberation Army. We must extend our hands to those who explode the bombs in Tel Aviv and every enemy position, those who have declared popular war which alone will ensure the security, freedom, dignity and future of the Arabs."

3. "I think it is high time we took a hard look at this unknown thing we have shrouded with secrecy and mystery and have called the setback. It has entered our life like a spectre that everyone talks about, although no one has seen it or can describe its frightful features." Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor of the Cairo paper Al Ahram, 29 September.

/4. The Amman

4. The Amman paper Ad-Dustur, referring to King Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union, said on 2 October: "The visit does not and should not mean that Jordan will become a Communist country, jumping on the Soviet bandwagon. Jordan has its Arab and Islamic characteristics, which it will never abandon. Like the other Arab States, Jordan wishes more than ever before to establish good relations with all countries of the world without exception."

5. Mr. David Barran, Chairman of Shell Transport and Trading, said in London on 4 October that the importance of the Suez Canal as an oil artery would gradually diminish. The trend to larger tankers (which cannot pass through the Canal) had been accelerated by the Middle East crisis. In any case "there will be practical difficulties when the Canal reopens, as silting may have reduced its effective depth by a couple of feet." On 11 October Mr. Marsh, the Minister of Power, told the oil companies that he did not consider any further increase in the temporary surcharge on oil prices was necessary at present. Commenting on the same day that tanker freight rates had fallen by over 20 points since 9 October a City broker said "the steam is going out of the market very quickly indeed. Oil supply patterns seem to be reverting rapidly to normal. Shipments from the Caribbean to Britain and Europe appear to have practically ceased. The oil companies have recaptured the initiative on the freight market".

6. A Yugoslav (Tanyug) broadcast on 4 October talked of encouraging "those political and social forces in both the Arab countries and Israel who realise that the way out of the crisis lies in co-existence, that is, return of Palestine refugees to their homes and recognition of Israel's right to exist." The complex situation "makes it necessary simultaneously to curb the Arab nationalism which denies the very existence of Israel, and to make an end once and for all to Israeli expansionism."

7. "The Sinai war began and ended in the air. It is very doubtful whether three-quarters of the Egyptian force concentrated in Sinai were ever given the chance to engage the Israeli forces." This was one of the conclusions reached by Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor of Al Ahram, in an article published on 6 October. Heykal said the failure to parry the blow dealt to the Egyptian Air Force was "astounding". Certain Egyptian commanders had remained in their posts for 15 years and were not transferred, "although the enemy facing them rotated its command personnel continually and regularly."

8. Israel Radio on 11 October quoted the following from "Hatsofeh" "The bad Bevinist spirit which prevailed in the British Foreign Office during his time and which marked Bevin's attitude to the Jews and Israel is once again spreading and dominating British foreign policy under Wilson's Labour Government." "Haaretz" however, was quoted as expressing surprise at Press criticism of British contacts with Cairo. "It is unjust to call this perfidious", the paper said. "Unlike France, Britain never claimed to be Israel's ally."

/9. Referring

9. Referring on 11 October to the Swiss Banks offer of a loan to Britain of £37,500,000 the London "Times" said "To a large extent, this loan will be a repatriation of the funds withdrawn from London during and since the Middle East fighting. In the first week of June, alone, some $212m. poured into the Swiss National Bank. Most of the Arab withdrawals from London found their way to Switzerland to the embarrassment of the Swiss authorities. At that time it was reported that at least one Swiss Bank had arranged with the Bank of England to hold on to part of the sterling".

10. When Sir Dingle Foot, former Solicitor General returned from a visit to Cairo on 12 October he was interviewed by the B.B.C. at London Airport and asked about his interview with President Nasser.

Interviewer: Has he [Nasser] still the notion that we helped Israel to win the war?

Sir Dingle Foot: I don't think that he thinks that any more but - what he may have thought momentarily at the time - I certinly didn't have the impression that this was on his mind.

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J.I.P.G.D.

vvvvv

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

(1571)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TUNIS.
16 October, 1967.

Thank you for the copy of your letter of 6 October to Mandel in Tel Aviv, with the record of the Board of Deputies' conversation with the Minister of State.

2. There is not much I can add to our previous accounts of the treatment of Tunisian Jews. Officially, the Tunisian Government has continued to uphold their tenets that Tunisian Jews are citizens of this country just as any other, and enjoy the same rights and the same protection. Officially, too, the Government has undertaken the restitution of Jewish premises attacked on 5 June, and has gone on record as promising compensation for material damage done. Moreover, whacking prison sentences have been handed out to those found guilty of participating in the rioting and looting. The premises have certainly been done up (particularly the main synagogue) though I have yet to hear of monetary compensation being paid. (One cannot, however, assail the Tunisians on this as yet - we have not received our compensation either for material destroyed, damaged or stolen from the Embassy).

3. It is true, however, that a fairly large segment of the Tunisian Jewish population, fearing for the future and fearful of a gradual encirclement by minor and unavowed but nevertheless effective harassment and discrimination, have made their way to France in June and the months following. I am told that the Tunisian Jewish colony in Paris, notably, has been greatly augmented by this exodus.

4. But officially there remains every inducement for the Tunisian Jews to remain here; and while Bourguiba lives they will certainly be protected physically as to persons and property. In the longer term the future must be pretty uncertain for them, though this is at present a choice for themselves alone.

/5.

A.J. Beamish, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
24 OCT 1967

5. The Tunisian Government's policy therefore offers us little cause or opportunity to remonstrate with them over the position of the Jewish community here. On the contrary, any advice we gave would undoubtedly arouse resentment and thus prove counter-productive.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

(C.T. Brant)

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancery,
Rabat

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

(1571)

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BRITISH EMBASSY

TUNIS

16 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

(1085/11)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
JEDDA.

18 October, 1967.

Nasser's Position in the Arab World

My view on Nasser's current position in the Arab world as seen from Saudi Arabia follows more on that described by Cable in his letter 1078/54/67 of 5 October rather than the more powerful figure described by Tesh in his letter 1071G/67 of 5 September.

flag A
-1024/67.
flag B

2. I agree with Tesh that Nasser has re-established a position in the Arab world and that he and Egypt have won time but as seen from here at the Khartoum Conference and subsequently he has been obliged to accept a lot from others which in normal circumstances and with greater power, he might have refused. He is acknowledged to be still a leader of the Arab world and one who must be consulted on all current Arab problems, but he is classed as a "moderate" and his apparently worsening economic and internal position makes him even less able to take strong measure which he might have done had he fully re-established his position, something akin to that which he had previously.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Paris, Moscow, New York, Aden (J.I.C.), Algiers, Amman, Bahrein (Residency), Beirut, Benghasi, Cairo, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis, and I would be grateful if you would show this letter to Policy in Arabian Department.

(C.P. Crematon)

D.J. Upcraves, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

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24 OCT 1967

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Chancery,
RABAT

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY

W.P. CRANSTON

JEDDA

AJS 25.X

18 October, 1967.

1076

UNCLASSIFIED

Canadian Embassy,
British Interests Section,
Cairo, U.A.R.

18 October 1967

Dear Department,

The 25th Conference of the Liaison Officers for the Arab Boycott of Israel ended yesterday at the Arab League building in Cairo after 15 days of discussions.

We enclose a copy of the Press release issued at the end of the Conference.

According to a statement made at the beginning of the conference items on the agenda, not subsequently mentioned in the final Press release, also included a study of the position of American insurance companies which gave a $50,000,000 loan to the Jewish Agency for investment in Israel, as well as the position of artistes who staged or participated in performances in support of the Israeli aggression on Arab countries.

I am copying this letter to CRED Board of Trade and to the Commercial Departments in Jeddah, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Bahrain, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat and Khartoum.

Yours ever,

(M.A. Holding)
First Secretary (Commercial)

North-East African Department,
Foreign Office.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 27 OCT 1967

c.c. Commercial Dept.
Rabat.

OCTOBER 18, 1967

ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO BENEFIT FROM THE CLOSURE OF SUEZ CANAL

The 25th conference of the Arab liaison officers for the boycott of Israel ended yesterday after deciding to lift the ban against 35 foreign companies which have stopped dealings with Israel.

The conference also decided to lift the ban against 41 other companies after investigations proved that they did not violate the boycott rulings.

The conference noted Israel's failure to benefit from the closure of the Suez Canal by tempting the Afro-Asian countries to send their products via the Gulf of Aqaba to Elath then overland to Isud for shipment to Europe. This failure was the result of the initiative taken by the boycott machinery warning the maritime companies not to cooperate with Israel or else the Arab boycott rulings would be applied to them.

The conference affirmed that foreign airlines companies have not cooperated with Israel in using the air space of the occupied Arab territories as part of what Israel claims is her air space.

The conference noted that the Arab boycott had achieved notable results as the number of companies which follow the rules of the Arab boycott of Israel is twenty times the number of those which violated them.

The results reached by the conference will be raised at the Arab League Council for approval. The conference began its meetings in Cairo on October 3.

(All Papers)
Almost Full Text.

To: Commercial Department,
Rabat.

With the compliments of

THE EMBASSY OF CANADA

(British Interests Section)

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F.O. TEL. No. ..... U/N SAVING TO ...Rabat

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By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 38 Saving

20 October 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 38 Saving of 20 October, and unnumbered Saving to certain other Missions.

Middle-East Talking Points: 20 October 1967.

Members of a Soviet delegation which recently visited Syria admitted in a Pravda article on 1 October that they had "arguments with our Syrian friends on differing problems" regarding the Middle-East crisis. The Syrian leaders "have their own point of view" on the development of the Middle-East situation but it was essential to achieve "a genuine unity of action of all Arab progressive patriotic forces, a unity which will help the Arabs overcome their present difficulties and proceed successfully along the path of progress". Signatures to the article included those of the delegation leader, V. Mukhitdinov, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and P. Demchenco, Pravda's Damascus correspondent.

2. President Bourguiba of Tunisia said in an interview with the Paris newspaper Figaro on 7 October that "many leaders in the Middle-East are obliged to admit the existence of Israel, but they gain nothing from this, while they could make capital out of it simply by saying it out aloud. Unfortunately politics is not so much a question of principles as of effectiveness." He also said: "To maintain this position of not recognising the existence of Israel, of not discussing, of not even trying to learn its conditions and what it would be prepared to grant in exchange for a durable peace, seems to me to be playing into the hands of the Israeli 'hawks'. They may well stay indefinitely on the present ceasefire lines".

Referring to the events of last May, Bourguiba said: "I can still not understand why he (Nasser) closed the Gulf of Aqaba, whereas if he had not made this move he might perhaps have come out of the affair as the victor".

3. "At the session of the U.N. General Assembly the Arabs showed that they were ready, that they wished to move towards a political solution which would include not only the withdrawal of Israel's troops, but also a recognition of the existence of Israel and guarantees for its security and, equally, guarantees for the security of all other states in the Middle-East". -- Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Marko Nikezic, at a Belgrade Press conference broadcast by Belgrade Radio, 10 October.

/4. Soviet ?

Algiers

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KD 27/11/67

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 27 OCT 1967

4. Algiers meeting of the "Group of 77" opened on 10 October and was attended by over 60 delegations from the developing countries. Algeria does not recognise South Viet Nam and South Korea and harrassed their delegates. Tight security restrictions were imposed upon the delegates and this provoked a boycott threat from the Latin American group. A compromise solution was reached only after the voluntary departure of the South Vietnamese, and Korean acceptance of a ring of security guards around their delegates at the conference hall and at their villa. Le Monde of 13 October said that the incident "darkened the climate" created by the speech of the Algerian President, Col. Boumedienne, upset many delegations and resulted in paralysing the meeting. "Certain delegates judged this gesture of Algiers as regrettable and undiplomatic."

5. A reader asked the Tunisian Jeune Afrique on 15 October: "Do you think the Arabs were let down by the Russians?" The paper's reply was "Yes, in the sense that the USSR, ally of the Arabs, allowed the occupation of their lands and the prolongation of this situation as long as Israel wants it." To realise the extent of the Soviet "let-down" of the Arabs and, before them, of the Vietnamese, the paper said that one had only to ask oneself two questions: "Would the US have allowed Egypt to attack Israel, invade its territory and occupy it? Would the USA have allowed the USSR to bomb the Phillippines? Of course not".

6. Since August the Presidential Committee of the Communist World Council of Peace (WCP) has been trying to hold an emergency session in an Arab capital to discuss the Middle East. WCP representatives sounded a number of capitals including Khartoum, Cairo and Beirut, but encountered difficulties in each place. They have now been forced to abandon the project.

This is a nice coupling.

7. "Regardless of the details of Britain's and France's attitudes towards the crisis, the two countries have adopted an attitude different from that of absolute support adopted by the US towards Israel and its aggression against the Arab States".
Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" -- 17 October.

8. The Suez Canal is closed and it seems it will continue to be closed for a long time. This harms Tanzania's trade, because it increases the cost of goods which we buy from outside and decreases the price of the crops which we sell to foreign countries. Therefore it is obvious that we are very concerned about the Middle East conflict ...

We believe that no permanent peace can be achieved in the Middle East unless the Arab countries accept that Israel exists and cannot be wiped out. But the Arabs also cannot be forced into accepting this by guns... We must accept two things: The first thing is the need of Israel to be recognised as a nation: the second thing, which is also important, is that the parts of Egypt, Jordan and Syria which were occupied by Israel must be returned to their owners....

These are the views of Tanzania. We recognise Israel as a nation and we want to be friendly with her as well as with Arabs.
Extracts from President Nyerere's speech to the TANU Conference on 16 October.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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Code Code R
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FROM Y.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] Y.O. 270

[Date] 20 OCT

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[Priority] ROUTINE

1) WO
2) OS C'd'A. 25/10
3) CT. Diaprincipal.

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF MR. NIKEZIC

THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, PAID AN OFFICIAL VISIT AT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY~S INVITATION FROM 16-21 OCTOBER. HE HAD TWO SESSIONS OF TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ALSO ADDRESSED THE FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION AND VISITED OXFORD.

2. IT WAS AGREED IN ADVANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FORMAL COMMUNIQUE. THE PRESS WERE MADE AWARE OF THE MAIN SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION, THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC BEING THE MIDDLE EAST. IN GENERAL ON THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FOUND THESE AMONG THE MOST VALUABLE BILATERAL TALKS HE HAD HELD SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE. HE WAS MUCH impressed

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389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

IMPRESSED BY MR. NIKEZIC WITH WHOM HIS PERSONAL

RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. MR. NIKEZIC DISPLAYED A

REFRESHINGLY PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE ON MOST ISSUES AND

SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HAD FOUND THE TALKS EXTREMELY

VALUABLE. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE

USEFUL TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE ISSUES

DISCUSSED. MR. BROWN ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO

VISIT YUGOSLAVIA AT A TIME TO BE SETTLED THROUGH

DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

MIDDLE EAST

3. MR. NIKEZIC. WHO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN

ENCOURAGED BY THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY~S

SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(VERBATIM NO 370). EXPLAINED THAT THE YUGOSLAVS

WERE NO LONGER PURSUING THEIR PROPOSALS OF LAST

AUGUST WHICH HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO BREAK AN APPARENT

DEADLOCK AND WHICH PRESIDENT TITO HAD USED DURING

HIS TOUR TO PROBE ARAB REACTIONS. SO FAR THE ARABS

HAD BEEN UNREALISTIC IN REFUSING TO DISCUSS WHAT

CONCESSIONS THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE: THE

YUGOSLAVS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THEY MUST TALK SERIOUSLY

TO THE AMERICANS WHO WERE NOT ONLY SUPPORTERS OF

Israel

ISRAEL BUT HAD WIDE INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THE PROCESS OF ARAB/UNITED STATES CONSULTATION HAD BEGUN.

4. MR. NIKEZIC SAID THAT THE WAY FORWARD SHOULD NOW BE TO FIND A FORMULA TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A SOLUTION BY EXCLUDING UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS. E G OCCUPATION OF ANOTHER COUNTRY~S TERRITORY. TERRITORIAL CONQUESTS. THE THREATENING OF THE EXISTENCE OF SECURITY OF STATES IN THE AREA. THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY AND THE INTERFERENCE IN FREE NAVIGATION OF WATERWAYS. HE THOUGHT PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES WOULD BE NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK.

5. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TOLD MR NIKEZIC THAT HE AGREED WITH MUCH OF HIS ANALYSIS. IN PARTICULAR HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE ARAB FAILURES TO PRESENT THEIR CASE OR ANALYSE THEIR OWN TRUE LONG TERM INTERESTS CORRECTLY. HE CONSIDERED IT VITALLY IMPORTANT TO SECURE RAPID ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF WE DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RELATIVELY REALISTIC ATTITUDE NOW BEING DISPLAYED BY THE MORE MODERATE ARABS THE PRESENT REGIMES MIGHT NOT SURVIVE.

6. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY

19 the

OF THE NON- PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PUTTING FORWARD A RESOLUTION WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE BALANCING PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND RECOGNITION AND NOMINATE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT ANY RESOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES GIVING THE REPRESENTATIVE A BASIS TO WORK ON. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF MR. NIKEZIC COULD INSTRUCT THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO ENCOURAGE AN INITIATIVE BY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. MR. NIKEZIC INDICATED A READINESS TO HELP.

VIETNAM

7. THE YUGOSLAVS PLAYED THIS IN A RATHER MINOR KEY. MR. NIKEZIC APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT. SINCE THEY HAD NO EFFECTIVE CONTACT WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THERE WAS LITTLE THEY COULD DO AT PRESENT TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

8. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD MOVED FORWARD BY NO LONGER DEMANDING A MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING (CF PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAN ANTONIO SPEECH OF 29 SEPTEMBER) BUT THERE WAS STILL NO INDICATION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD RESPOND TO A CESSATION. WE MIGHT

have

HAVE BEEN NEAR A BREAKTHROUGH IN FEBRUARY BUT WE WERE NOT NOW.

EUROPE

9. IN GENERAL MR. NIKEZIC~S ANALYSIS WAS VERY SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE TREND WAS TOWARDS DETENTE. PROGRESS WOULD DEPEND ON THE ABSENCE OF NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE YUGOSLAVS HAD NO ILLUSION THAT THE EXISTING ALLIANCES COULD BE IMMEDIATELY ABOLISHED. THEY DID NOT SEE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN TERMS OF ALLIANCES BUT THOUGHT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL CO-OPERATION AND CONTACTS SO AS TO REACH A SITUATION IN WHICH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCES WOULD BE DIMINISHED. HIS VIEW WAS THAT NEW FORMULAE SHOULD EVOLVE FROM PRACTICAL STEPS RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY ROUND.

10. YUGOSLAVIA SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE BUT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY SINGLE PLAN OR CONFERENCE COULD SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS. A SOLUTION WOULD RATHER BE FOUND THROUGH PROGRESS TOWARDS DETENTE AND CO-OPERATION IN PRACTICE. THERE MIGHT BE NEED FOR A CONFERENCE AT SOME STAGE. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATIONS

/for

FOR ANY CONFERENCE. IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF AND IN ANY OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM IT.

RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY

11. MR. NIKEZIC SAID THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE KEEN ON QUICK PROGRESS TOWARDS THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT WOULD DO NOTHING TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST GERMANS TO MOVE ON THIS. THEY WOULD NOT ADOPT AN ~~QUOTE~~ " ALL OR NOTHING ~~UNQUOTE~~ " ATTITUDE. THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE PATIENT. PRACTICAL RELATIONS WERE SATISFACTORY WITH THE RESPECTIVE MISSIONS OPERATING MUCH AS EMBASSIES.

12. THE YUGOSLAVS STARTED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF TWO GERMANIES BUT DID NOT DENY THE ULTIMATE RIGHT OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO BE UNITED PROVIDED THIS WERE DONE UNDER APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES.

13. YOU MAY USE THE FOREGOING AT YOUR DISCRETION WITH RELIABLE COLLEAGUES. SINCE THERE WAS NO COMMUNIQUE YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES ON THE MIDDLE EAST OR OTHER QUESTIONS IN DETAIL WITH PRESS CORRESPONDENTS. IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD NOT WISH YOU TO REFER TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE YUGOSLAVS USING THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SOSFA.

1076

(2231)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

KUWAIT.

22 October, 1967.

Conference of Arab Ministers of Information

Al Rai al Amm reported earlier this week that the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour and Acting Minister of Information, Khaled al Mudhaf, had stated that the Council of Ministers had agreed that a conference of Arab Ministers of Information should be held in Kuwait on 18 November at the same time as the conference of Arab Ministers of Education. The Minister also added that the Conference of Ministers of Labour would take place in Kuwait on 5 November and that this conference would be attended by the Secretary General of the Arab League.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter to Chancery Beirut, Bahrain, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli and Amman.

(R.D. Gordon)

A. Ibbott, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office.

AZS 30.X

LA [illegible]

I.O. [illegible] 31/10/67

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
27 OCT 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

No. 36

TEL AVIV.

(1101/67)

23 October, 1967

The Second Arab/Israel War, 1967

The Aftermath: Economic

Summary

In the months before the May crisis and the June War, Israel was beginning to secure the initial benefits of its deflationary policy. Although certain sectors of the economy were still depressed and unemployment caused worry, exports were increasing, imports were being successfully curbed and the deficit on the balance of trade was being progressively reduced (paragraph 1).

The immediate industrial cost of the June War was more than offset by the substantial contributions of overseas Jewry as were the costs of the two major logistic deficiencies thrown up by the War: transportation and medical equipment and supplies (paragraphs 3 and 4).

The creation of a more extensive home defence industry is now deemed necessary and will be costly both in skilled manpower and capital equipment (paragraph 5).

The occupied territories have brought no immediate economic gain to Israel and indeed the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will cost Israel relatively substantial sums even if they are kept on the present care and maintenance basis (paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).

In the immediate aftermath of the War the Israelis expected three substantial economic gains from their victory: a heavy upsurge in tourism; the conversion of many of the overseas volunteers from Western countries into immigrants; and a willingness on the part of overseas Jewry to make massive

/investment

investment available for the economy so that economic victories could be won comparable to those in Sinai and Jerusalem. On the first two they are likely to be disappointed (paragraphs 11, 12 and 13).

The one gain that seems likely to continue and to become increasingly important is the increased willingness of overseas Jewry to provide massive industrial investment. The Diaspora seems still prepared to continue contributions to the United Jewish Appeal at double the rate of 1966 and to put less restrictions on the use of these funds within Israel. The preliminary "Millionaires'" economic conference convened shortly after the War and its subsequent follow-up ensure that if Israel can put up a good case at the main conference, to be held in April next year, they will get overseas funds to meet all feasible economic projects and some guarantee on outlets for the resultant manufactures, particularly in the United States. The major proviso is that the Government of Israel shows willing to cut out the dead-wood from its present economic infrastructure and be more "capitalistic" in its attitude toward industry (paragraph 14).

The War by itself was not a costly affair to the Israelis. After the euphoria of victory the economic burdens resulting from the occupied territories and the defence needs of a constant vigilance while the situation remains so unsettled can now be identified. However, the strain presented by this on the economy will not be intolerable and in any case will be softened by the considerable increase in voluntary contributions from overseas Jewry. There is now an internal determination to instigate a period of massive industrial expansion. If the Government can convince overseas Jewry that this will be administered on the right lines the funds, the expertise and the necessary markets will be provided (paragraph 15).

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

23 October, 1967

Despatch No. 36 (E)

(1101/67)

Sir,

The Second Arab/Israel War, 1967

The Aftermath: Economic

In my despatches Nos. 18 and 19 I set out, as seen from this post, the events leading up to the War, and the conduct of the War itself. Sufficient time has now passed for a clearer picture to emerge of the political and economic problems which Israel now faces as a result of the War and the likely course the Israelis will pursue in facing up to these problems. In this despatch, I have the honour to attempt to give some picture of the economic situation following on the War, both in this country and in the territories at present occupied by the Israel forces. I am greatly indebted to my Commercial Secretary, Mr. Chalmers, for its compilation. I hope shortly to let you have Sir, a companion despatch to this on the political aftermath of the War.

Before the War

2. Ever since the foundation of the State of Israel the economy has been plagued by a situation where a relatively healthy surplus on the balance of payments has obscured a sizeable deficit on the balance of trade. Toward the end of 1965 and during 1966 an Israel Government geared itself for the first time to court unpopularity to remedy this situation by a determined deflationary policy. This had the aim of lowering home demand, rationalising industry by killing off the inefficient and permitting the efficient to expand

/and,

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.,

etc., etc., etc.,

CONFIDENTIAL

and, with a wage freeze and increased unemployment, make local production more competitive in overseas markets. After a sticky start (which included the resignation of the Minister of Commerce, a crisis of confidence in business circles, a number of noteworthy bankruptcies, and anguished cries about unemployment), the results were perceptible by the end of 1966. Exports during that year rose by $70 million to an all-time high of $500 million of which $408 million were industrial goods (an increase of 19% over 1965). The limitation on home demand cut imports, which coupled with the increase in exports, caused a reduction in the balance of trade deficit for 1966 of 16%, i.e. a drop from $410 million in 1965 to $342 million in 1966. In January 1967 it was estimated that exports from Israel would increase during the year by about $90 million and that imports would be held at approximately the same level as for 1966. This would have reduced the trade deficit for 1967 to approximately $260 million. The preliminary trade figures for January to May 1967 gave every reason for assuming that this target would be achieved even if there were some easing up on the controls both on wages and public works expenditures to improve the unemployment situation. Then came the War.

The War

3. During May and June 1967 with the high rate of mobilisation and the actual six day military effort, industrial production was reduced over-all by between 30% and 35% and exports by about 50%. However, all firm export commitments were met on time. The immediate industrial cost of the War was a loss in home production of the region of $70 million and in export production of $17 million. Coupled with this there were essential additional purchases overseas necessitated by the War. These amounted to about $23 million. The total immediate cost therefore was approximately $110 million. During the same months, overseas Jewry either contributed or committed contributions to Israel of $230 million. If the actual value of equipment captured by the Israelis is

offset against what they themselves lost, it would appear that the War in the very short term was a profitable enterprise from the point of view of the Israel economy. But that is not the whole story.

Immediately Thereafter

4. Two considerable deficiencies were quickly discovered in Israel's needs to wage an effective war against the Arabs. The first of these was in road and rail transportation where it was found that the total resources of buses, trucks and rolling stock could not serve the military forces adequately in time of crisis and also provide the minimal services necessary for the civilian population. In this field it is reckoned that approximately $30-35 million will have to be spent during the next six months. The second was in medical facilities and equipment where, mercifully, the shortness of the War and the paucity of civilian casualties did not reveal to the civilian population the almost unbelievable deficiencies. The hospital re-building and re-equipment programme which had been initiated by the Ministry of Health last year and was scheduled to cost in total $70 million over the next five years had been proceeding in a relatively leisurely fashion. It has now been decided that this must be both accelerated and extended. During the remainder of the year provision must be made for the purchase of additional medical equipment and mobile hospitals to the value of approximately $15 million. Neither of these fields can have a high proportion of their requirements met from local sources and somewhere in the region of 70% will have to be purchased overseas.

5. Another additional cost resulting from the War will be the extension of the defence industries within Israel. Ample confirmation has now been given to the Israelis that those prepared to sell military equipment to Israel during time of relative peace may not be prepared to continue to do so in time of crisis, during war or during the aftermath. The initial cost of this policy will be the purchase overseas of the necessary manufacturing equipment; the longer-

term and much greater cost will be the demand on highly skilled labour within Israel, which is already in short supply, and will inevitably be diverted from Israel's improving export effort. It is impossible to place a quantitative value on this industrial re-organisation: an informed guess is that the foreign exchange cost will be not less than £120 million over the next 3 years.

The Post-War Inheritance

6. As a result of the War in June Israel now has to control and administer an additional 26,100 square miles of territory with an Arab population variously estimated at 1.0 to 1.4 million, of whom more than half are refugees. For the purposes of this despatch it is assumed that Israel will have to retain this additional responsibility for the foreseeable future. Since the economic policy which the Government of Israel is at present formulating varies from territory to territory, as do the economic problems which they face in each of them, it is necessary to consider each case individually.

7. The territory occupied on the Syrian border has a limited population at the present time and while Israel does not derive any economic advantage from it neither does it present any serious economic problem. Israel has no desire to do much more here than exercise sufficient military control to ensure security.

8. The Sinai Peninsula, extending to 18,125 square miles with a primarily nomadic population of approximately 135,000, falls into much the same category in the eyes of the Israelis. However, there was one economic advantage which was secured, namely the oilfield recently exploited by the E.N.I. Petroleum Company. Immediately after the War much was made in the local press of this potential. It is now clear to the Israelis that production could quickly be raised to 6 million tons a year. This, in theory, would meet the normal consumption of Israel, which is in the region of 3.5 million tons a year, and leave a comfortable margin for export. However, the poor quality of the crude

oil, with its high sulphur content, considerably diminishes its economic value. Further, E.N.I. with their other interests in Egypt (which are more lucrative) is not prepared to assist in the marketing of any surplus or even in the production of the oil itself. Finally, the thirty-year old refinery at Haifa with its ancillary units for utilising petroleum by-products has been geared to a much higher quality of crude and there is a considerable reluctance on the part of its management to start basing its future on a poor quality crude oil whose long-term availability is far from guaranteed. In the short-term there is no intention to do much economically on the Peninsula. But now that the Israelis are beginning to believe that they may well have to retain control for a period of years there is some tentative thinking about exploring and exploiting the mineral potential possibly coupled to the re-settlement of a proportion of the Palestinian refugees at present situated in the Gaza Strip. As the Director-General of the Ministry of Development told a member of my staff after a tour of the Sinai Peninsula, the Army stopped short of the only earning asset around these parts, namely the Suez Canal, and merely presented him with a series of further burdens. For the present, therefore, both of these territories remain a problem of providing adequate manpower to retain them and administer them.

9. In the eyes of the Israelis the Gaza Strip is an entirely different problem. Here there has been a direct threat to the security of Israel throughout the country's short history and there is a strong feeling that drastic economic measures must be taken to implement what are considered the security requirements. The Strip is 218·75 square miles in extent into which is jammed a population of 380,000 of whom 270,000 are refugees. Even in a good year the Egyptians are believed to have had to meet a deficit of slightly more than £12 million and this was with a population generally living slightly below subsistence level. At present there is only employment for about 48,000

people. Of the 15,000 acres of citrus plantation, 10,000 were planted in recent years and do not yet bear fruit. The administrators are therefore faced with the problem of maintaining over 300,000 people who at the moment neither have employment prospects nor any particular skills. The Economic Planning Authority in Jerusalem consider that the Strip, after the citrus trade develops and with an agricultural investment from outside of £25 million could provide a living for the indigenous population of slightly more than 100,000. The problem, therefore, in the view of the Israelis is the removal of the refugees for re-settlement in parts of Sinai and/or on the West Bank of the Jordan. In short, the Gaza Strip is an economic nightmare and even to keep it at its present low standard is going to cost the Israelis a minimum of £15 million per year. If a positive plan is effected for re-settling the refugees and for assisting the indigenous population toward economic viability, the annual cost is reckoned to be in the region of £160 million per year over a period of $2\frac{1}{2}$ years.

10. The West Bank of Jordan is, if anything, an even greater problem. Here the Israelis have to cope at the moment with a population of rather more than 700,000. For planning purposes it has been assumed that slightly more than half of the estimated population are refugees. The economic planners in Jerusalem assess the deficit which the Jordanian Government must have had to meet for the economy on the West Bank to be approximately £31 million per year. Their own experience during the past few months, when purchases of essential foodstuffs for the area were centralised in a consortium and a programme for buying agricultural surplus from the territory at rock bottom prices was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture, has brought them to the conclusion that they will have to find £40 million per year to keep the economy going. Already the efforts to provide a market for the West Bank farmers has placed a severe strain on the sophisticated pricing system in Israel for agricultural

commodities. With the tacit understanding of the military administration Arab farmers are being permitted to smuggle their produce into Jordan and to use their traditional channels for its further re-export to the oil producing countries. In the week ending on the 30th of July it was estimated that 870 truckloads had left the West Bank by this means. However, as this trade gained momentum it also presented problems. The incidence of corruption among Israeli officials and troops on the West Bank increased and the military authorities had increasing anxieties about its potential as a convenient channel for subversive activities. In the early days of the occupation this trade was considered worthwhile both from the political point of view and also from the economic. Now it is considered no more than a temporary alleviation of the present economic situation and one that may have to be discontinued as soon as there are signs of serious disaffection among the Arab community. The Israel economic authorities are prepared to assist in the short-term financing of the limited industries in the territory and also to consider the provision of fairly substantial quantities of pesticides and fertilisers to improve agricultural productivity. However, at present there is a reluctance to make any sizeable investment toward longer-term development of present industries or the starting of new ones.

11. Against all this there seemed, immediately after the War, to be three likely substantial gains to the economy of Israel which would result from the victory. These were the potential increase in tourism as a result of the Holy Places being in the one country; the enthusiasm of the large number of young Jewish volunteers who came to Israel in May and June and which could be converted into an immigration bonus for Israel; and, the tremendous pride and enthusiasm which had been evoked among World Jewry which would result in a further large-scale investment in the economy of Israel and the preferential treatment of Israel's products in the wholesale and retail outlets which World

Jewry control in Western countries.

12. It will not be known until the tourist season in 1968 whether the optimistic predictions of the Ministry of Tourism will be fulfilled. Over 80% of the tourists who have normally come to Israel have been Jews and it is essentially for this trade that the tourist industry is geared. However, the tourist potential of the World Jewish population is limited and it will be essential to attract a much higher proportion of Gentile and in particular Christian tourists if the targets are to be met. Here the dietary laws within the hotel industry in Israel, the sheer lack of experience in attracting Gentile tourists, looking after them and ensuring that they make repeat visits, are going to be major handicaps. Even so, the present tourist trade has shown that as soon as there is a Middle East crisis or even a few border incidents the bookings fall off. If 1968 is a troubled year in the Middle East it seems unlikely that much in the way of gains will be made by the tourist industry.

13. The situation on immigration seems no better. Over 60% of the volunteers who arrived here in June have already left the country, and it is now highly unlikely that more than 5% of all those who came will stay here permanently or return as settlers at some later stage. There has been much mutual recrimination over all this and the possibility of the small Jewish minorities in the Arab countries coming to Israel, if they can get out of their present States of domicile, seems more likely. The War has not triggered off the wave of Western immigration which was hoped for.

14. On the credit side, the renewed pride and interest on the part of World Jewry in Israel and its military achievements has been sustained. The fantastic contribution of the Diaspora during May and June of this year has certainly not emptied the coffers and there is still evident a considerable determination to assist Israel through its current economic difficulties into a

period of expansion and also, more interestingly, to assume part of the defence burden which the Government of Israel seems likely to have to bear for the next few years. Up to May of this year Western Jewry concerned itself principally with meeting the initial financial costs for new immigrants, making considerable individual contributions to the academic institutions and medical services and only in a few honourable but isolated cases investing substantially in the country and providing markets for the resulting products through Jewish wholesale and retail outlets in Western Europe and the United States. All this was a substantial help but left Israel in the position of having to shoulder an immense defence burden out of its own budget and also of having to provide a large proportion of the necessary capital expenditure for its industrialisation. Many of the fine distinctions of what the Diaspora would and would not provide have now gone. As the Minister of Finance has pointed out, World Jewry now appreciate that Israel will still have to bear a substantial defence budget for the foreseeable future and are prepared to help with this. As regards the rapid industrialisation of Israel, the preliminary "Millionaires'" economic conference held here a couple of months ago and the subsequent preparatory meetings for the major economic conference of 500 Jewish multi-millionaires to be held in April 1968 indicate that if Israel is prepared to improve her domestic housekeeping and can show the opportunities to wealthy overseas Jewry for long-term investment which will make the economy more viable and also provide a reasonable economic return, the funds will be readily available. At next April's conference the Government of Israel seek undertakings from overseas Jewry that they will be prepared to invest £1,000 million in a period of three to five years, principally in new industries, and will provide the expertise and the potential foreign markets for the products which will arise from this new investment. I understand that £197 million have already been promised. £8,000 million of overseas funds was

invested in Israel since its inception and it must be admitted that not all of this has been wisely looked after. It will be interesting to see whether this new injection of industrial capital is better applied. If it is and the markets are made available, the economic face of Israel and its future potential will be considerably changed for the better.

Conclusions

15. As a result of the war in June the following gains, losses and problems are apparent. The immediate costs of the war and the immediately identifiable logistic deficiencies were more than offset by the substantial financial contributions made from overseas. However, the victory has pointed up the need for Israel to accept an even heavier defence burden in material and manpower than before and, of course, there is the additional costs of maintaining security in, and the economies of, the occupied territories. The only substantial economic gain seems likely to be the much greater contribution which overseas Jewry is prepared to make toward the industrialisation of the country and the costs of its heavy defence burden. None of the new burdens forced on Israel by the present Middle Eastern situation will prove intolerable. However, the events of June have made it impossible for the Government to continue the cautious deflationary policy of the pre-war period. This was beginning to pay dividends and, within the limited scope of the economy at that time, seemed likely to put it on a much healthier basis. To offset this, if the Government of Israel is prepared to improve its internal economic organisation, overseas Jewry are now prepared to inject industrial capital, expertise, and probably provide markets on such a scale that this country, with a population of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million, will move in to a situation of economic strength nearly equivalent to that which it now holds as a military power.

/16.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and the Bank of England, and recipients of despatches Nos. 18 and 19.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(R. M. Hadow)

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M. Representative,
RABAT.

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

TEL-AVIV

24 October, 1967.

du mm 9/11/67

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PRESSE PRODROME RABAT==========

VERBATIM SERVICE 323/67 MONDAY 23RD OCT 1967 ARAB-ISRAEL

SINKIN OF DESTROYER EILAT (F.O) SPOLKESMAN) FOREIGN

OFFICE SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY 23 OCTOBER : '' WE HAVE NO

INFORMATION OF OUR OWN ON THIS INCIDENT AND THE STATEMENTS

FROM THE TWO SIDES, AS [redacted] YOU ARE AWARE, HAVE BEEN

CONFLICTING IN SOME RESPECTS. THIS WAS ONE OF A LONG SERIES

OF INFRINGEMENTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH WE PROFOUNDLY

REGRET. WE REGRET ESPECIALLY THE LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HS

RESULTED. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND- THUT IS THE IN
FRINGEMENTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE [redacted] -HER MAJESTY'S

GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN WORKINV VERY HARD WITH OTHERS TOWARDS

A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA WE HOPE THAT THIS

LATEST INCIDENT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THSE EFFORTS''

END VS 323/26 CFM CKD XX V

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PRODROME RABAT
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Copies to F.O.
Alec to US Embassy
MFA.

ALS 23.X

Frères Musulmans, Marocains !

L'heure de la dernière lutte a sonné contre les païens, les piétineurs de la religion et l'ennemi numéro un du peuple islamique. En avant dans la lutte même ici, au Maroc, qui est une partie intégrale du monde arabe.

Vos souverains, ceux qui jouissaient de notre confiance, ceux pour lesquels nous avons lutté, ceux que nous avons aidé, nous ont trahi. Nous avons été les sacrifiés de leur trahison issue de l'impérialisme, du sionisme et de leurs acolytes locaux sur la Sainte Terre du Maroc.

Un colonialisme a succédé à un autre colonialisme. Les Américains sont devenus un patron imposant et toujours grandissant au Maroc. Hassan, roi juif, est leur mercenaire. Le Prince des Croyants est remplacé par le Prince des Israéliens.

Comment se taire plus longtemps sur les bases américaines au Maroc. Les Américains occupent absolument les bases de Kénitra, Ben Guérir, Sidi Slimane, Sidi Jahia. La base de Sidi Jahia est dotée d'un système contre les attaques atomiques. Entièrement installée sous terre, elle comprend un hôpital d'une capacité de deux cents lits et d'un stock d'aliments et de médicaments pour une année. Celle de Kenitra est dotée d'un système radar à longue portée et autres installations. La base, qui est officiellement installée pour servir à l'entraînement des aviateurs-pilotes marocains, est organisée de manière à pouvoir être transformée dans les 24 heures et servir ainsi aux buts agressifs des USA. Le projet de reconstruction de la base aérienne de Nouaceur, au sud de Casablanca, est en cours de réalisation. Ce sera un aéroport international civil d'une importance éminente, le plus grand aéroport sur notre continent apte à recevoir de lourds avions à réaction. L'accord comprend des clauses secrètes sur l'entière exploitation de cet objectif doté d'installations militaires ultra-modernes par les Américains.

Il est vrai que toutes les anciennes bases américaines sont formellement sous la direction des autorités militaires marocaines, mais en réalité, elles sont mises n'importe quand à la disposition des Etats-Unis, selon leurs plans militaires. Au Maroc, ces derniers temps, le nombre des avions militaires américains préparés au décollage immédiat des bases américaines hausse et de pair, le personnel militaire en tant qu'officiers et soldats.

Il n'est plus possible d'ignorer les instructions secrètes de Washington, la collaboration militaire secrète des Etats-Unis

et du Maroc visée contre les bases de l'unité arabe. Les Américains nous écharnent, Marocains, contre nos Frères Algériens. A bas la tension artificielle sur les frontières de nos deux pays : Maroc et Algérie et instaurons une ambiance de coopération avec nos voisins et les autres Frères arabes !

Suivons l'exemple des autres pays arabes et ouvrons la lutte décisive contre les bases américaines comme nos Frères libyens ! Organisez des sabotages sur les bases américaines, chassez les Américains de tous les coins de notre pays !

Les Américains protègent et soutiennent les juifs. Sur leur ordre, Hassan porte atteinte à l'unité du front arabe contre les juifs. Sur l'ordre des Américains, il traite avec les juifs derrière de dos des autres frères arabes, il délègue des émissaires à Tel-Aviv, il facilite la mobilisation des juifs marocains et leur depart pour Israël afin de lutter contre nous. Sur l'ordre des Américains, les patriotes sont arrêtés et incarcérés pour la seule raison de s'être soulevés contre les juifs et leurs acolytes au Maroc.

L'Armée marocaine et la Police ne protège pas le peuple marocain, mais les juifs et l'Ambassade américaine.

A bas le sionisme, les Américains tant haïs, ainsi que les juifs et leurs mercenaires au Maroc !

Vive ISlam, base de l'unité des Arabes !

Que soit victorieuse, la lutte arabe éternelle contre les païens !

L'heure de la dernière lutte a sonné, Marocains, luttez pour vos droits !

Que le monde entier soit informé de la trahison historique de Hassan !

L'Organisation de la Lutte pour l'Unité
des Arabes.

FRERES ARABES!

EN AVANT DANS LA LUTTE

CONTRE LA TRAHISON!

F.O. TEL. No. 131 SAVING TO Rabat

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 297 24 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 297 of 24 October.
Repeated for information Saving to: Algiers, Benghazi, Cairo, UKMis New York, Tripoli, Rabat, Washington.

Arab - Israel.

Mrs. Margaret McKay M.P., had a long interview with President Bourguiba yesterday, mainly to seek his views on the Arab-Israel conflict. She told me afterwards that she found him disappointingly imprecise in his proposals for a settlement.

2. In particular the only clarification he could or would give her of his advice that the Arabs should now play "the card of peace" (my telegram No. 292) was that:

(a) The Arab States should declare unilaterally that they were now at peace with Israel. This would put Israel in the wrong in her continued occupation of the territories captured from the Arabs during the June fighting and she would have no option but to withdraw from them.

(b) The Arabs should thereafter return to the 1947 U.N. resolutions as a point from which they could begin to work for a settlement (just as he himself had initially accepted the legality of the French Protectorate in Tunisia as a first base from which to campaign for his country's independence). If the Arabs now accepted the 1947 resolutions, it followed that Israel would automatically have to accept all the U.N. resolutions passed against her from 1947 up to the present time.

3. In general the President thought that some kind of settlement might emerge provided that the Great Powers agreed on a solution, provided that the Arabs agreed, and provided that there was no veto on a settlement in the Security Council. He was entirely confident that Israel would have no alternative but to accept such a solution. But he did not show himself unduly concerned about the need for a settlement. In his view the Levant was a long way from Tunisia and it was really for countries involved and for the Palestinians themselves, to reach a settlement. Neither he nor Habib Bourguiba JR (whom Mrs. McKay had seen earlier) were at all clear as to the circumstances of and significance of the sinking of the "Eilat".

Foreign Office pass Saving Algiers No. 4, Benghazi No. 5, Cairo No. 5, UKMis New York No. 3, Rabat No. 5, Tripoli No. 5 and Washington No. 6.

Mr. Brant

[Repeated as requested].

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Eastern Dept.
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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 31 OCT 1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher (CAT.A)

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0. TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 273 D M

[Date] 24 OCT. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY.

A.L. Southern 27.X
Apologies Jan 23/x
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F.S.L.
L.A.
C.O. 27/10/1967
A.D.
A.D.S Las Seen.
Dep Min.
H.E. o/s.

CONFIDENTIAL

BALFOUR DECLARATION: FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS.

THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN CELEBRATED IN ISRAEL BY A DINNER ORGANISED BY THE ISRAEL-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY AT WHICH A LEADING BRITISH PUBLIC FIGURE HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK. AS THIS YEAR IS THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION. AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT MONTH THERE WILL BE LARGER CELEBRATIONS THAN USUAL TO COMMEMORATE THIS ANNIVERSARY IN ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. THESE ARE BOUND TO ATTRACT CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY.

2. AS YOU KNOW IT IS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT~S DECLARED POLICY TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. IT WOULD CLEARLY NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

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389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

TO/

TO DECLINE TO JOIN IN A NATIONAL CELEBRATION OF THIS KIND LINKED SO CLOSELY WITH THE HISTORY OF ANGLO/JEWISH RELATION WITHOUT DISPROPORTIONATE DAMAGE TO ANGLO/ISRAEL RELATIONS. CERTAIN INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE HAVE. THEREFORE. BEEN ACCEPTED.

3. THE ORIGINAL INVITATION TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CELEBRATIONS IN ISRAEL WAS ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT IN VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A HOSTILE ARAB REACTION TO ANY BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THESE CELEBRATIONS. IT WAS DECIDED THAT NEITHER THE PRIME MINISTER. A FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER NOR A SENIOR CABINET MINISTER SHOULD REPRESENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BUT THAT INSTEAD IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE THAT THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. MR. SHORT. WHO WAS FORMERLY CHAIRMAN OF THE ANGLO-ISRAEL ASSOCIATION SHOULD REPRESENT THEM. IT WAS ALSO DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FINANCE A VISIT TO THE CELEBRATIONS BY A SMALL ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION.

4. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL WILL BE IN ISRAEL FROM 28 OCTOBER TO 6 NOVEMBER AND WILL ATTEND THE

PRINCIPAL

PRINCIPAL BALFOUR CELEBRATIONS IN JERUSALEM ON 1 AND 2 NOVEMBER. ON 5 NOVEMBER HE WILL OPEN A BRITISH SCIENTIFIC WEEK IN HAIFA. WHICH IS A NORMAL EXPORT PROMOTION EVENT. THE DELEGATION. WHICH WILL BE LEAD BY SIR BARNT JANNER. W/LL INCLUDE MR. JAMES DUNN (LABOUR) MR. JOHN PEEL (CONSERVATIVE) AND MR. JOHN PARDOE (LIBERAL). THEY ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN ISRAEL FRCM 29 OCTOBER TO 3 NOVEMBER.

5. UNOFICIAL BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CELEBRATIONS IN ISRAEL WILL INCLUDE ~~MR. GODBER~~ SIR IAN ORR-EWING (REPRESENTING THE OPPOSITION). LORD ROTHSCHILD. LADY ASQUITH. FORTY OTHER DISTINGUISHED PERSONAGES (BOTH JEWISH AND GENTILE) AND SOME SIXTY PROMINENT JEWISH FUND RAISERS FROM THHE UNITED KINGDOM.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ALSO INVITED TO ATTEND THE OFFICIAL CELEBRATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IT WAS AGAIN DECIDED THAT PARTICIPATION BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR A FOREIGN OFFICE MINISTER WOULD BE LIKELY TO INTENSIFY HOSTILE ARAB REACTION. BUT IT WAS NOT THOUGHT THAT THE SAME OBJECTION APPLIED TO PARTICIPATION BY OTHER CABINET MINISTERS AS APPLIED AGAINST THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CELEBRATIONS IN ISRAEL. THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WILL REPRESENT

B

REPRESENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND MAKE A SPEECH AT THE BRITISH ZIONIST FEDERATION~S JUBILEE CELEBRATIONS AT THE THEATRE ROYAL DRURY LANE ON 5 NOVEMBER. WHEN THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER WILL SHARE THE PLATFORM. THE MINISTER OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERN- MENT WILL REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT AT THE ANGLO-ISRAEL ASSOCIATION~S COMMEMORATIVE DINNER ON 9 NOVEMBER.

7. THESE CELEBRATIONS WILL INEVITABLY GIVE RISE TO SOME HOSTILE ARAB REACTIONS BUT WE HOPE THAT AS OUR PARTICIPATION WILL BE IN A RELATIVELY LOW KEY. PERMANENT HARM TO ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS WILL BE AVOIDED. IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO HOPE THAT OUR LONGER TERM POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD WILL BE AFFECTED MUCH MORE BY OUR STAND AT THE U.N. THAN BY ANYTHING WE MAY DO IN CONNECTION WITH THESE CELEBRATIONS.

8. YOU SHOULD NOT DRAW ATTENTION TO BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THESE CELEBRATIONS. WHEN APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER. YOU CAN POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE NEVER MADE ANY SECRET OF OUR WISH TO HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BOTH WITH ISRAEL AND WITH THE ARAB STATES AND THAT

IT/

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INCOMPATIBLE WITH MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO HAVE DECLINED ALTOGETHER TO JOIN IN A MAJOR CELEBRATION OF A HISTORIC EVENT IN WHICH THE U.K. WAS SO CLEARLY CONCERNED. YOU COULD ALSO POINT OUT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY~S SPEECHES AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A TRUE INDICATION OF THE BRITISH GOVSRNMENT~S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND WITH SUITABLE RELIABLE CONTACTS. YOU COULD SUGGEST THAT ANY BLOWING UP OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BALFOUR DAY CELEBRATIONS CAN ONLY HARM THE IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND BRITAIN AND THE GROWING UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARAB CASE IN THIS COUNTRY. SOSFA.

I do not think we should make too much of this!

CONFIDENTIAL

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

24 October, 1967.

You sent us a copy of your letter of 6 October addressed to Mandel in Tel Aviv, covering the record of an interview with members of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and asked for our comments on the situation of the Jews in Morocco since the Arab/Israel War.

2. I think that the British deputation exaggerated the situation, at least where Morocco is concerned. However, before I enlarge on this, I should say at the outset that the Reuter correspondent here understands that the Jewish population, which numbered some 50,000 at the beginning of the year, was down to 34,000 by September, and estimates that by the end of the year only about 20,000 will be left. These figures are eloquent; but they do not reflect official policy. Indeed, from the start of the recent crisis, the attitude of the Government here has been admirable, even to the extent that at the height of the tensions after the ceasefire King Hassan was being referred to scornfully in many quarters as the 'King of the Jews'.

3. Traditionally the Moroccan ruler is the protector of the Jewish community, and the Moroccan Government's behaviour went far beyond the "pretence of protection" claimed by the British Jews. It must always be borne in mind that the Government was in a very difficult position and that if it had gone beyond a certain point it would have endangered its very existence by appearing to support the Jews and oppose the Arabs. The King therefore had a tightrope to tread, and he trod it with admirable aplomb and sang froid. With the exception of one or two isolated instances there was no physical violence against Jews, and the Government went out of its way to confirm Jews in positions of responsibility in the aftermath of the war. In the last month or so it has even been allowing organised emigration to Israel by way of France, and if the opposition press is to be believed, despite the stringent currency controls at present in force in Morocco emigrants departing under this scheme have even been able to take a certain amount of money with them - though probably by recourse to the black market.

4. The reaction of Moslem public opinion was, however, rather different, although with the exceptions I have mentioned above it was vociferous rather than physically violent. At a very early stage a boycott of "Zionists" was proclaimed by nearly all the political parties, and it is true that many Jews were forced out of business by this. The Government disapproved but was unable to prevent it, since although the distinction between Zionists and Jews became progressively more blurred, the Government found that, as this sort of situation had not been

/foreseen.....

J. Beamish, Esq.,

foreseen, there were no constitutional methods to hand to combat the boycott. Nonetheless, it quickly issued an authoratitive statement reaffirming the rights, and the responsibilities, of all Jews in Morocco, and defending the Jewish community as such while condemning Zionist activities. Subsequently the authorities imprisoned an influential trade union leader after he had published his criticism of the support given by the Government to the Jews. (In this connexion, I enclose a copy of a clandestine pamphlet we have received through the post this morning; it speaks volumes. We do not know its source, but it is reasonable to scent Algerian instigation).

5. Thus, in Morocco the Jews have undoubtedly had to face considerable popular hostility, but on the whole this took the form of economic pressure rather than open violence and in any event the Government acted successfully to keep it in check. Isolated demands for a boycott of the Jews still continue to appear, but the force of the campaign is spent, and the Government, which has done its best to protect them, is now in addition contributing its own solution to the tensions by allowing those who wish to depart quietly for Israel. Many are taking advantage of this liberal emigration policy, as the young people in particular see few prospects for themselves in Morocco for the future, despite the official protection which they continue to enjoy.

6. I am sending copies of this letter without the enclosure to the recipients of yours.

(A. L. Southorn)

F.O. TEL. No. 133 SAVING TO Robert 1076

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO. 5748 25 OCTOBER 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 5748 OF 25 OCTOBER, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS AMMAN JERUSALEM CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN BELGRADE AND SAVING TO PRAGUE SOFIA BUDAPEST WARSAW BUCHAREST TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET MESSAGE.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THEHPRIME MINISTER ON 23 OCTOBER TO DELIVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. KOSYGIN WHICH IS SUMMARISED IN M I F T. PARALLEL MESSAGES HAVE GONE TO PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE. THE PRIME MINISTER PROMISED AN EARLY REPLY AND MADE THE FOLLOWING INTERIM COMMENTS ABOUT H M G'S ATTITUDE.

2. NEITHER WEST NOR EAST COULD AFFORD TO ALLOW A RECURRENCE OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE. THE RISKS OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AND THEIR ESCALATION WERE ALTOGETHER TOO GREAT, AND HAD BEEN FURTHER UNDERLINED ONLY THIS WEEKEND BY THE ATTACK ON THE ISRAEL DESTROYER QUOTE EILAT UNQUOTE. WHILE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE POINTLESS TO SEEK TO ESTABLISH THE DEGREE OF BLAME ATTACHING TO EACH SIDE IN THE CASE OF AN INCIDENT OF THIS KIND , THE INCIDENT ITSELF ILLUSTRATED THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SUPPLY OF EVER MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO THE AREA. THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF MISSILES ON THIS OCCASION WAS BOUND TO MAKE THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MORE RIGID AND TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO ADVOCATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPON.

3. WE REMAINED, THEREFORE, CONVINCE D OF THE URGENT NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY MEANS OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RENEWED INTEMPERATE AND PARTISAN DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE BOUND TO LEAD TO A FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES AND TO THE BUILDING UP OF NEW RESENTMENTS MAKING ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

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CONFIDENTIAL

31/10/67

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 31 OCT 1967

I should like to see these two tels. again just before I call on the M.F.A.

31/X

4. WE HAD WELCOMED THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERMENTS IN JULY ON THE TERMS OF A BALANCED DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH CAME TO BE KNOWN AS THE GOLDBERG/ GROMYKO DRAFT. WHILE IN NO WAY SEEKING TO APPORTION BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THAT COMMON GROUND WE VERY MUCH REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET AND U S GOVERNMENTS DID NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO SPONSOR A RESOLUTION ON THAT BASIS.

5. WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT ANY FORMULATION WHICH EMERGED WOULD CONTAIN THE TWO BALANCING ELEMENTS WHICH APPEARED IN THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION AND ALSO IN THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO TEXT I E WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE OTHER. WE ALSO CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A U N SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. IN OUR VIEW THE MORE EXPLICIT THE STATEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES THE MORE USEFUL THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE AS A GUIDE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE U N REPRESENT-ATIVE. THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF HOW THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE PUT INTO PRACTICE COULD, HOWEVER, BE APPROPRIATELY LEFT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE TO WORK OUT IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

6. WE HAD WELCOMED THE GROWING SIGNS OF REALISM ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE ARAB STATES AND WE HAD CERTAINLY BEEN DOING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO, ALL WE COULD TO ACHIEVE A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH ON THE PART OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT. THE USE OF SOVIET MISSILES AGAINST THE ISRAELI DESTROYER WOULD UNFORTUNATELY NOT HAVE HELPED OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

7. AS IT HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO TEXT, WE BELIEVED THAT EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN TO THE EFFORTS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARRIVE AT A BALANCED AND ACCEPTABLE DRAFT AUTHORISING THE APPOINTMENT OF A U N REPRESENTATIVE. WE, FOR OUR PART, WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO FACILITATE THEIR EFFORTS AND WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD DO THE SAME.

/ 8.

8. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT APPEARED TO BE RETREATING FROM THE TERMS OF THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG RESOLUTION AND ASKED WHETHER HMG COULD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT HOW WE SAW THE SITUATION BUT SUGGESTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A TEXT AGREED BETWEEN THE U S AND U S S R THERE WAS EVERY ADVANTAGE IN HELPING THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT.

9. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT RUSSIAN MISSILES HAD BEEN IN U A R HANDS SINCE BEFORE THE CRISIS AND THEIR USE IN THIS SKIRMISH WAS NO GROUND FOR ISRAEL COMPLAINT. THE DESTROYER HAD BEEN QUOTE GIVEN TO ISRAEL BY SOMEONE ELSE UNQUOTE . THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THE DANGER OF ESCALATION, INCLUDING EVENTUALLY NUCLEAR ESCALATION, WHICH COULD RESULT FROM THIS KIND OF ACTION. SMIRNOVSKY AGREED THAT THESE DANGERS EXISTED.

10. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE SENDING KUZNETSOV TO HANDLE THE NEXT STAGE OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE U N AND HOPED THAT LORD CARADON WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS SURE LORD CARADON WOULD BE GLAD TO DO THIS.

SOSFA

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PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MIS. NEW YORK

TELNO 5749 25 OCTOBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 5749 OF 25/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS AMMAN JERUSALEM CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN BELGRADE, AND SAVING TO PRAGUE SOFIA BUDAPEST WARSAW BUCHAREST TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT AND UKDEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. Under

MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET MESSAGE.

THE MESSAGE, DESCRIBING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISUPUTE FROM THE FAMILIAR RUSSIAN STANDPOINT, NOTED WITH APPROVAL MY STATEMENTS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ALLEGED U S ENCOURAGEMENT OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS UNQUOTE. IT ARGUED THE NECESSITY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SECURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BY THE IMMEDIATE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED AT THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS BALANCING WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-5 JUNE POSITIONS AGAINST QUOTE THE RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES OF THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY UNQUOTE, AND DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE U S GOVERNMENT ARE CHARGED WITH TRYING TO QUOTE RETREAT FROM THEIR OWN PROPOSALS UNQUOTE BY PUTTING FORWARD NEW CONDITIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREED PROPOSALS. THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE STATED TO HAVE REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE.

2. (MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKMISSION NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BELGRADE, CAIRO ONLY). FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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T.L. No. 4/A. Rabat 1076

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

d/f saving tel saying series no longer necessary Telno 4/11

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno. 41 Saving 25 October, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 41 Saving of 25 October.
Repeated for information Saving to Certain Other Missions.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

This series of weekly Saving telegrams was initiated immediately after the Arab/Israel war of last June. One Middle East post has now reported that they no longer serve a useful purpose. We should be grateful if other recipients would send a brief Saving telegram saying whether they find the series useful or not.

2. We intend in any case to reduce the frequency to once fortnightly after the telegram due to be issued on 27 October.

FILES

J.I.P.G.D.
J.I.R.D.
Eastern Dept.
N.E.A.D.
Arabian Dept.
Oil Dept.

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1076

VERBATIM SERVICE 3[illegible]/67 WEDNESDAY 25TH OCTOBER 1967.

ARAB - ISRAEL: LORD CARADON IN SECURITY COUNCIL.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEECH BY LORD CARADON IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 24 OCTOBER:

MR. PRESIDENT,

FIRST OF ALL LET ME CONVEY MY RESPECTS TO YOU ON YOUR ASSUMPTION OF YOUR DUTIES AS OUR PRESIDENT. ALREADY IN THE CONSULTATIONS WHICH YOU HAVE CONDUCTED YOU HAVE EARNED THE ADMIRATION OF US ALL. AND I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD A WORD OF WELCOME TO THE AMBASSADOR OF DENMARK. DENMARK HAS ESTABLISHED ALREADY IN THIS COUNCIL THE HIGHEST REPUTATION, AND I AM SURE THAT THE NEW AMBASSADOR WILL FULLY MAINTAIN THAT REPUTATION IN THE FUTURE.

MR. PRESIDENT, I DO NOT WISH TO PURSUE RECRIMINATIONS ON RECENT TRAGIC DEVELOPMENTS. I DO NOT THINK THAT ACCUSATION AND COUNTER-ACCUSATION WILL TAKE US ANY-WHERE. ALL OF US, I AM SURE, DEPLORE AND CONDEMN THE GRAVE BREACHES OF THE CEASE FIRE WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE, BREACHES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN SPITE OF THE PERSISTENT AND ADMIRABLE EFFORTS OF GENERAL BULL AND THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS.

IT IS WELL THAT WE SHOULD MEET URGENTLY TONIGHT. WE MEET TO PUT THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE COUNCIL, AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BEHIND A DEMAND THAT THE CEASE FIRE SHALL NOW BE OBSERVED, AND THAT BELLIGERENCE FROM EITHER SIDE SHALL ONCE AND FOR ALL BE ABANDONED.

I WISH TO SPEAK TONIGHT ONLY TO URGE ON BEHALF, I WOULD HOPE, OF ALL OF US THAT WE SHOULD TURN FROM HATE AND CONFLICT. I TRUST THAT ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED WILL NOW AT LAST REQUIRE A CHANGE OF HEART AND A CHANGE OF DIRECTION, THAT WE SHOULD NOT GO BACK TO BLOODSHED BUT GO FORWARD TO A SECURE PEACE. SURELY WE CAN NOW ALL OF US SEE THAT DELAY HAS HAD FRIGHTFUL CONSEQUENCES. SURELY NO ONE NOW CAN CLAIM THAT WE SHOULD HESITATE ANY LONGER. SURELY THE NEED FOR URGENT ACTION IS NOW CLEAR TO EVERYONE.

UKMIS ◇ TELEX ◇ SERVICE

I AM GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ONCE MORE OPENLY HERE IN THIS SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE ISSUES WHICH WERE LAST DISCUSSED IN THIS COUNCIL MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AGO: THREE WASTED MONTHS. IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAD A MONTH'S DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN JUNE AND JULY. AND OUR FEARS THAT THAT DEBATE WOULD NOT LEAD TO EFFECTIVE AND URGENT ACTION WERE UNHAPPILY CONFIRMED. AND OUR CONVICTION THAT THE RIGHT PLACE TO TAKE ACTION WAS HERE IN THIS COUNCIL HAS BEEN REINFORCED. OUR VIEW IS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE MET MUCH EARLIER AND ACTED MUCH SOONER, AND THAT VIEW IS STRONGER STILL TONIGHT.

BEFORE THE CONFLICT BEGAN WE WERE AMONGST THE FIRST TO CALL FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET AND TO ACT. WE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CALL TO FOREGO BELLIGERENCY. HAD THE COUNCIL ACTED THEN, THE CONFLICT COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED. WHEN THE WAR BROKE OUT, WE AT ONCE ADVOCATED AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE. HAD OUR RECOMMENDATION BEEN APPROVED, JORDAN AND SYRIA NEED NEVER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. FOR MONTHS WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. I RECALL THAT THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF INDIA WAS ALSO AMONGST THE FIRST TO MAKE THAT PROPOSAL, AND WE WERE AMONGST THE FIRST TO SUPPORT IT, AS LONG AGO AS LAST JUNE. WHAT A DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THERE MIGHT NOW BE IF OUR PROPOSAL, FIRST MADE LAST JUNE, HAD BEEN PROMPTLY APPROVED.

IN JULY WE SUPPORTED AND VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION IN THE ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR URGENT ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HAD ACTION BEEN TAKEN THEN, WE MIGHT NOW BE WELL ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT. ALL ALONG WE HAVE WORKED AND SPOKEN FOR ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE DONE SO OPENLY AND CONSISTENTLY. OUR PROPOSALS THROUGHOUT HAVE BEEN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. WE WERE BAULKED AND FRUSTRATED IN OUR PURPOSES. WE WERE CRITICISED, AND EVEN ATTACKED, BY DIFFERENT INTERESTS AT DIFFERENT TIMES FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. BUT NO ONE CAN SAY THAT WE WERE NOT CLEAR IN OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NO ONE CAN SAY THAT WE WERE NOT CONSISTENT IN OUR AIMS. NO ONE CAN ACCUSE US OF THE DELAY AND THE HESITATION AND THE OPPOSITION TO UNITED NATIONS ACTION WHICH FIRST LED TO CONFLICT AND THEN TO DEADLOCK, AND HAS LED TO SO MUCH UNNECESSARY SUFFERING, AND HAS NOW LED TO MORE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION. IT WAS DELAY THAT LED TO THE CONFLICT, IT WAS DELAY WHICH LED TO THE DEADLOCK, IT WAS DELAY THAT HAS NOW LED TO MORE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ UKMIS

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NOW WE ALL KNOW THAT MEMBERS OF THIS COUNCIL HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH INCREASING URGENCY, PARTICULARLY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, TO ESTABLISH AND DECLARE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN A SETTLEMENT, AND TO TAKE THE FIRST PRACTICAL STEPS ON THE HARD ROAD TO PEACE. WE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE SET THEMSELVES THE TASK OF PREPARING A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION - I EMPHASISE AGAIN, A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION - UNDER WHICH A UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE CAN GO WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION ON THE SPOT IN CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED. THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING ALL ALONG. MY SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN THE ASSEMBLY A MONTH AGO "WE MUST WORK FOR A DURABLE PEACE, THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS, AND AN END TO POLICIES INCONSISTENT WITH PEACE". THAT IS THE OVERRIDING PURPOSE. THAT IS THE PRIZE: A DURABLE PEACE. IT CANNOT BE WON WITHOUT JUSTICE AND EQUAL RECOGNITION OF EQUAL OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. IT CANNOT BE WON WITHOUT A REAL SENSE OF THE UTMOST URGENCY.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AN OVERWHELMING SUPPORT IN THE GENERAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION AND FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION BY A UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. INDEED, I CANNOT REMEMBER A GREATER SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE, COMMON IMPATIENCE AND GENERAL AGREEMENT AMONGST US. THAT CAN GIVE US SOME HOPE AND SOME CONFIDENCE.

SURELY WE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE OUR DISCUSSION TONIGHT, SO I EARNESTLY SUGGEST, WITHOUT RESOLVING TOGETHER TO MOVE WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED TO TAKE SUCH POSITIVE, JUST AND URGENT ACTION, AND SO, I TRUST, TO TAKE IT UNANIMOUSLY.

ENDS VS 3[illegible]/67. L.P.S.

SENT 1610/25 +
PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

SERVICE TELEX ◇

PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

1076

VERBATIM SERVICE 407/67 THURSDAY 26TH OCT 1967

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ARAB-ISRAEL: BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

HERE TEXT OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND WRITTEN ANSWER ON TWENTYSIXTH OCTOBER:

MR. ERIC DOBSON (BILLERICAY): ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IF HE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAELI/ARAB RELATIONS.

MR. G. ROBERTS: HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO ARRANGE AN EARLY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO THE ADOPTION OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION WHICH COULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE EFFORTS OF A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE IN WORKING WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TOWARDS A REASONABLE AND DURABLE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD, IN HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY RESOLUTION PASSED. THE RECENT SINKING OF THE ISRAEL DESTROYER ''EILAT'' AND THE SUBSEQUENT SHELLING OF EGYPTIAN INSTALLATIONS AT SUEZ HAVE UNDERLINED THE DANGERS OF LETTING MATTERS REST AS THEY ARE AND HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT SEE NO REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT EXCEPT IN THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM AND THROUGH THE USE OF SECURITY COUNCIL MACHINERY.

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE 407/67.....LPS

SERVICE TELEX ◇

◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇

1076

VERBATIM SERVICE 407/67 THURSDAY 26TH OCT 1967

SUEZ CANAL CLOSURE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND REPLY BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 26TH OCTOBER WITH SUPPLEMENTARIES:

MR SHINWELL (EASINGTON) ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER, IF HE WILL STATE WHAT IS THE PRESENT POSITION ON THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL ACCESSIBLE TO THE SHIPS OF ALL MARITIME COUNTRIES.

SIR KNOX CUNNINGHAM (ANTRIM, SOUTH) ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER, WHAT STEPS HE HAS TAKEN IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO ENSURE THE UNMOLESTED USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL BY INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING.

THE PRIME MINISTER: THE HOUSE WILL RECOGNISE THE ACUTE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE FACING IN OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE SUEZ CANAL OPEN. WE ARE IN CLOSE AND DIRECT TOUCH WITH ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND ARE ALSO PLAYING A FULL PART IN THE UNITED NATIONS' CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION. CERTAINLY IT IS OUR VIEW THAT ANY LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST PROVIDE FOR FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS FOR THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS.

SIR KNOX CUNNINGHAM : IS IT TRUE THAT THE SOUTHERN EXIT HAS BEEN SILTED UP AND BECOME UNUSABLE, AND AS IT HAS BEEN SOME MONTHS NOW SINCE THE CANAL HAS BEEN CLOSED, WILL IT BE A MATTER OF YEARS BEFORE ANYTHING IS DONE?

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

THE PRIME MINISTER: NO, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY A FACT THAT THE LONGER THE CANAL IS NOT IN USE THE MORE THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS OF SILTING, NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO THE EXIT BUT ALSO IN RELATION TO THE ACTUAL CANAL ITSELF, AND SHIPS WHICH COULD HAVE PASSED THROUGH SIX MONTHS AGO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PASS THROUGH, EVEN WHEN THE CANAL IS OPENED, TILL FURTHER ACTION IS TAKEN. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE URGENCY OF GETTING THE CANAL OPENED, AND THEN CLEARING UP ALL THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND THE PHYSICAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN THROUGH SILTING OF THE CANAL.

MR SHINWELL: IS IT NOT EXTRAORDINARY THAT THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CAN DEFY THE WISHES OF EVERY MARITIME NATION IN THE WORLD AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS? WILL MY RIGHT HON FRIEND SUGGEST TO LORD CARADON, OUR REPRESENTATIVE THERE, THAT INSTEAD OF INDULGING IN PIOUS PLATITUDES HE SHOULD ADOPT A MORE VIGOROUS AND LESS UNPREJUDICED ATTITUDE?

THE PRIME MINISTER: MY NOBLE FRIEND IS DOING A TREMENDOUS JOB IN THE UNITED NATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO MY VERY DEAR AND RIGHT HON FRIEND THE MEMBER FOR EASINGTON (MR SHINWELL), HIS REMARK JUST NOW, I FEEL, WAS MORE IN THE NATURE OF A PIOUS PLATITUDE AND LESS IN THE NATURE OF SOMETHING UNPREJUDICED THAN WHAT MY NOBLE FRIEND HAS BEEN ENUNCIATING IN NEW YORK. IT IS INTOLERABLE THAT ANY NATION SHOULD KEEP THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSED TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING. IT IS ALSO INTOLERABLE THAT ANY NATION ON EITHER SIDE SHOULD NOT CO-OPERATE IN AGREEING CONDITIONS IN WHICH, WITH GOOD WILL, THIS CANAL COULD BE OPENED. MY RIGHT HON FRIEND HAS PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS UNDER WHICH THERE COULD BE A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CANAL SHORES, AND AN OPENING OF THE CANAL, AND UNDER WHICH WE COULD MOVE FORWARD TO SETTLING SOME OF THE BROADER AND MORE LONG STANDING ISSUES SUCH AS THE RIGHT OF ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL, TO USE THE CANAL, AND SUCH AS THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE QUESTION. BUT FOR PEOPLE TO INSIST ON STANDING ON THEIR RIGHTS, GETTING EVERYTHING THEY WANT AND KEEPING THE CANAL CLOSED IS INTOLERABLE, FROM WHEREVER IT MAY COME.

MR HEATH: CAN THE PRIME MINISTER SAY WHAT IS NOW THE COST TO THE BRITISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE CLOSURE OF THE CANAL AND THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION PER MONTH ?

THE PRIME MINISTER: IT IS A SERIOUS COST, THOUGH I THINK THAT THAT COST WILL SHORTLY BE DIMINISHING..... WHILE THE CANAL HAS BEEN CLOSED IN RECENT MONTHS THE COST TO BRITAIN HAS BEEN SOMETHING IN THE ORDER OF TWENTY MILLION POUNDS STERLING A MONTH. THAT IS THE ESTIMATE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE. THAT FIGURE WILL FALL EVEN IF THE CANAL REMAINS CLOSED. IN THE EARLY MONTHS WE HAD TO BUY A LOT OF VERY EXPENSIVE OIL IN NON-MIDDLE EAST AREAS. IN ADDITION, B.P., FOR EXAMPLE, WAS VERY MUCH UNDER-TANKERED AND HAD TO CHARTER LARGE TANKERS AT VERY EXPENSIVE FREIGHT RATES. NOW, TANKER RATES ARE FALLING. THIS TWENTY MILLION POUNDS STERLING WILL FALL, BUT IT IS STILL AN INTOLERABLE COST FOR THIS COUNTRY, JUST AS IT IS FOR INDIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHO ARE SUFFERING THROUGH THE NON-DELIVERY OF GOODS WHICH THEY URGENTLY NEED.

MR LUBBOCK: IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOW BECOME CHEAPER TO TAKE OIL IN 200,000 TON TANKERS ROUND TH CAPE THAN IN VERY MUCH SMALLER TANKERS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, WOULD IT MATTER VERY MUCH IN THE LONG TERM TO OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IF THE CANAL REMAINED CLOSED PERMANENTLY?

THE PRIME MINISTER: IT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS OR ANYONE ELSE'S - LEAST OF ALL IS IT IN EGYPT'S INTERESTS, BECAUSE SHE IS PAYING A VERY HEAVY PRICE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CLOSURE OF THE CANAL - TO SEE THE CANAL CLOSED. AT THE SAME TIME, THOSE WHO THINK THAT ANYONE IS IN A POSITION TO BE BLACKMAILED BY THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF THE CANAL IS WRONG. THE GROWTH OF BIG TANKERS IS MAKING THE SUEZ CANAL RATHER A PATHETIC IRRELEVANCE FOR OIL TANKERS VERY SOON. CERTAINLY IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS I INDICATED SOME MONTHS AGO, TO SEE THAT WE TAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT WE GET OUR REQUIREMENTS OF OIL TO THIS COUNTRY WITHOUT BEING DEPENDENT ON A CANAL WHICH IS SUBJECT TO THE POLITICAL WHIMS OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES WHO CAN INTERFERE WITH AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY.....

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE VS40?/67.....LPS

PRODROME RABAT
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London Press Service
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VERBATIM SERVICE VS408/67 THURSDAY 26 OCTOBER 1967

MIDDLE EAST : BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND ANSWER BY PRIME MINISTER ON 26 OCTOBER WITH SUPPLEMENTARIES :

MR NEIL MARTEN (BANBURY) : ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER, WHAT CONSULTATIONS HE HAS HAD WITH LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

THE PRIME MINISTER : DURING THE RECESS MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND AND I HAVE BEEN IN ALMOST CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENTS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD ABOUT THIS PROBLEM. I WILL CIRCULATE A FULLER DESCRIPTION OF THESE CONTACTS IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT.

THE PRIME MINISTER PURSUANT TO HIS REPLY TO ORAL QUESTION THIS DAY CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION :

DURING THE PERIOD I HAVE DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH A NUMBER OF COMMONWEALTH LEADERS, WHO HAVE VISITED LONDON. I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT WHO HAD TAKEN CERTAIN INITIATIVES TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SETTLEMENT. MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS HAD PERSONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MIDDLE EASTERN AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES AND WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN ALMOST CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS CLOSELY INTERESTED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA.

MR. MARTEN : I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THAT INFORMATIVE REPLY, BUT COULD I ASK THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER WE CAN GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT NO BRITISH FINANCIAL AID WILL BE GIVEN TO EGYPT TILL SUCH TIME THAT EGYPT HAS OPENED THE SOUTHERN END OF THE CANAL AND LET OUT THE SHIPS WHICH ARE KEPT THERE ?

THE PRIME MINISTER : MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND HAS ALREADY TAKEN UP WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY THE NEED FOR URGENT ACTION TO OPEN UP THE SOUTHERN END EVEN IN ADVANCE OF WHAT ALL OF US WANT, THE GENERAL OPENING UP OF THE CANAL TO SHIPPING OF ALL NATIONS. CERTAINLY I WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION TO WHAT THE HON MEMBER HAS SAID, BUT I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SUGGESTION AT ALL FOR FINANCIAL AID TO EGYPT AND I THINK THE OTHER QUESTION IS CERTAINLY MORE URGENT THAN ANY QUESTION OF FINANCIAL AID....

MR. E. ROWLANDS : CAN MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND SAY WHAT REPRESENTATIONS THE GOVT HAVE MADE TO THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES AS A RESULT OF EGYPT'S SINKING OF THE ISRAELI SHIP ?

THE PRIME MINISTER : THE SINKING OF THE SHIP AND OTHER ACTIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE THIS WEEK OF COURSE ONLY EXACERBATE AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION. THINGS WERE DIFFICULT ENOUGH IN MOVING FORWARD IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TWOARDS THE OPENING OF THE CANAL. THESE OTHER ACTIONS CAN ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT. I DO NOT THINK IT HELPS FOR US TO EXPRESS OPINIONS ABOUT THE MERITS, THE TIMING, OR THE LOCATION OF THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE LAST WEEK. OUR CONCERN IS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS TO GET THE CANAL OPEN AND THEN TO FIND THE BEST WAY TO SOME GENERAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

END VS408/67

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Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE F.O. TEL. No. 135 SAVING TO Bahrain

Telno 1075 27 October, 1967

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as ALS

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1075 of 27 October,
Repeated for information to Washington, Paris, UKMIS New York, Moscow, and Saving to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Bahrain (Residency) Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Tel Aviv, H.C. Aden (Personal) LIC Aden and JIC Nicosia.

Heikal's article today is another of his round ups, in a tone of modest optimism which would perhaps be more convincing had he mentioned the sequel to the sinking of the "EILAT".

2. The short term aim is to prevent Israel imposing its will on Egypt; and Egyptian position is strengthening day by day. This optimism is not (repeat not) merely the result of the sinking of the "EILAT", though principal effect of this, on Arab morale, is important. It arises rather from history of recovery of the last four months - Nasser's return to the helm -his successful removal from army of its discontented element (while the enemy camp, headed by United States, gleefuly anticipated Nasser's overthrow and even the friendly camp, headed by U.S.S.R., waivered) - the reconstruction of armed forces - Khartoum conference - the rallying of Arab world - and successes in international sphere (particularly the recent contacts with British "yes, even with British" demonstrating a self confidence which augurs well for the future (closer examination is promised in a future article). The immediate objective is still limited to preventing a total enemy victory and this cannot (repeat not) be left too long. There will be time enough thereafter to win the final victory of Arabs.

Foreign Office please pass Washington 10, Paris 28, UKMIS New York 120, Moscow 28 and Saving to Algiers 11, Amman 10, Beirut 17, Bahrain (Residency) Unnumbered, Benghazi 8, Jedda 15, Khartoum 7, Kuwait 8, Rabat 8, Tripoli 9, Tunis 8, Tel Aviv 13, H.C. Aden (Personal) 3, LIC Aden 1 and JIC Nicosia 1.

Mr. Tesh

[Repeated as requested]

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Rabat 1076

BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 43 Saving 27 October 1967

(JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No.43 Saving of 27 October And to Certain Other Missions.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

The Israel Government are studying a plan to build a 42-inch oil pipeline from Eilat, on the Gulf of Aqaba, to Ashdod, on the Mediterranean. Both ports are capable of handling supertankers now being built which are too big to go through the Suez Canal loaded. It is estimated that it would be cheaper and quicker to pump oil from Eilat to Ashdod, than to send a series of smaller ships through the Canal. The pipeline would cost up to £15 million to build and have an annual capacity of 50 million tons.

The Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, Mashour Ahmad Mashour, said on 19 October that should a political decision to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal it would take at least four months to clear it for navigation.

The Beirut newspaper Safa stated (15/16 October) that in spite of selling them arms, Russia had told the Arabs never to count on her material aid should war be renewed in the Middle East. Nida ul Watan, another Beirut paper, said on the same date that Russia's face in the Middle East was ugly, and that her reported readiness to interfere in the Yemen following Egyptian evacuation would increase the ugliness of her image.

Up to the time of the Arab/Israeli war, many thousands of visitors from the United States, Britain and West Germany provided the bulk of Egypt's tourist revenue worth 115 million dollars in 1966; Egypt's third largest source of foreign currency. The forthcoming visitors from Communist countries referred to in the Cairo paper Al-Goumhouria on 22 September - 73 Czechs for a 15-day visit, 450 Russians to spend four days in Alexandria and "agreements" for tourist visits from Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary - obviously cannot make good the deficit.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

KUWAIT.

29 October, 1967.

(2231)

Arab Ministers of Labour Conference

In my letter 2231 of 22 October I mentioned that according to Al Rai Al Amm the Arab Ministers of Labour Conference would be held in Kuwait on 5 November. x.

2. The Ministry of Guidance and Information have now published the draft agenda for the conference which has been postponed until 25-28 November. I enclose a translation. This draft agenda has ... been prepared by the general secretariat of the Arab League and the wording of some of the Syrian and Iraqi items (notably under sub-head 7) leaves much to be desired. We propose to take this up with the Kuwaitis, both with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: clearly they will disclaim responsibility for the agenda, but we do not think we should let the phrase "tripartite aggression" pass without comment.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Morris in Beirut, and to the Chanceries at Bahrain, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli and Amman.

(R.D. Gordon)

x. Postponed
Moroccan ministr leaving for Kuwait on 22.11.67.

A. Ibbott, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office.

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With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

ENCLOSURE TO R.S. GORDON'S LETTER 2231 OF 29 OCTOBER 1967. APOLOGIES FOR THE OMISSION.

KUWAIT

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10 NOV 1967

CHANCERY
RABAT.

The draft agenda of the Arab Ministers of Labour Conference due to be held in Kuwait from 25 to 29 November:

1. Social Security

A draft Arab agreement on basic standards of social security (presented by the Secretariat of the Conference).

A draft Arab agreement on reciprocal treatment in systems of social security (presented by the Secretary of the Conference).

An Iraqi proposal to set up an Arab Social Security Organisation. Exchange ofinformation experts and fellowships, and the holding of meetings and symposia on Social Security.

2. Subjects related to Manpower

A draft Arab agreement concerning the movement of workers within the Arab world and a model bilateral Arab agreement on the movement of workers (presented by the Secretariat of the Conference).

Work incentives (suggested by the UAR).

Position of Arab agreement on work levels - approved by the Second session of the Conference and the Arab League Council being implemented (suggested by the UAR).

3. Labour Education

A draft Arab agreement on co-operation in the field of Labour education (presented by the Secretariat of the Conference).

Exchange of information, experts, visits, fellowships and the holding of meetings and symposia on Labour education (suggested by Iraq).

4. Vocational Training and Rehabilitation.

The establishment of a centre for vocational training and productive efficiency.

The establishment, in co-operation with the International Labour Office, of a centre for the preparation of trainees needed by the rehabilitation centres in the Arab countries (suggested by Iraq).

/5.

/Iraq.

5. <u>Diverse Technical Subjects</u>

Co-operation and promotion of Co-operative Movements (suggested by Iraq).

Standardisation of Labour terminology in the Arab countries (a report submitted by the temporary Secretariat and based on a Kuwaiti proposal).

The implementation of the Arab Labour Charter and the Constitution of the Arab Labour Organisation (suggested by Syria).

Study of the recommendations made by the 11th Session of the Social Affairs and Labour Conference of May, 1967 (suggested by Syria).

Review and study of the resolutions and recommendations of the Economic Unity Council on Social and Labour affairs.

6. <u>Subjects Related to the International Labour Organisations</u>.

The formation of an Arab bloc in the International Labour Organisation. (suggested by Iraq).

Study of a Pakistani proposal, made at the 49th Session of the International Labour Conference, to set up an Asian bloc in the International Labour Organisation (suggested by Iraq).

Reconsideration of the composition of the Board of Directors of the International Labour Organisation.

The laying down of rules for the selection of Arab candidates for membership of the Board of Directors of the International Labour Office (suggested by Kuwait).

Appointment of Arabs in the offices of the International Labour Organisation in the Arab countries.

Use of the Arabic language in the committees of the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation (suggested by Kuwait and the UAR).

Amendment of the time basis of the International Labour Organisation. (suggested by the UAR).

7. <u>Subjects related to the Israeli Aggression against the Arab Countries</u>

The tripartite aggression and its outcome from the social and labour points of view:

/ a).

/view.

a) Discussion of means of labour mobilisation and enlightenment on a national Arab level through the economic integration outlook in the battle of destiny.

b) Discussion of the question of employment of foreigners and laying down of organisation rules for it as a result of the outcome of the recent tripartite aggression (suggested by Syria).

The role of Arab workers in the present stage (suggested by UAR).

Replacement of British, U.S., and West German technicians and experts as well as those of any country supporting aggression, by Arab technicians and experts or technicians and experts from friendly countries. (suggested by Iraq).

Boycott by Arab workers of the work connected with the interests of the countries which supported or support aggression.(suggested by Iraq).

8. General Subjects

Review of the resolutions of the First and Second Sessions of the Arab Ministers of Labour Conference and these resolutions which have been implemented. (suggested by Iraq and Sudan).

Report of the Secretariat of the Conference (Social Affairs and Labour Department of the Arab League).

Determination of the date and place of the 4th Session of the Arab Ministers of Labour Conference (suggested by Kuwait and the Secretariat of the Conference).

Ministry of Guidance and
Information.
Bulletin. 23.10.67.

How do we judge Nasser's current rating here? I have recorded two reactions in 1076 my letter to Spearas & its enclosure allowing my conversation with the M.F.A. Since then, the Libyan Ambassador has taken with me the line of "Better the devil we know..."

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BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

29 October, 1967.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY - 7 NOV 1967

See minutes inserted at 21/11

Nasser's Position in the Arab World

Please refer to James Cable's letter 1078/54/67 of 5 October on Nasser's reduced prestige in the Lebanon.

2. In Kuwait, as in Lebanon, Nasser's prestige has suffered a severe blow, the main effect of which has been that we have heard a good deal less of him and his supporters over the summer. His position, as seen from Kuwait, has certainly not been re-established and probably, even for his supporters, it can never be again what it was before 5 June. Even so he remains for most Kuwaitis by far the most important leader of the Arab world. Whatever mistakes he has made, and these are frankly admitted, though usually with the rider that it is his colleagues, or the army, or the Americans, or the Russians who must take the lion's share of the blame, he is still the best Arab leader in sight.

3. For these others who even before 5 June saw Nasser as a menace to the non-revolutionary Arab world, the trimming of Nasser's wings has been the cause of considerable satisfaction. For these people, little that Cairo or Nasser say now carries conviction; but even for them Nasser remains important, as, for example, when he earned praise for the moderate stand he adopted at the Khartoum conference. And he is still feared for the trouble he might cause.

4. There has been little sign of any actual turning <u>against</u> Nasser except perhaps in the army, where the experiences of the Kuwait Expeditionary Force appear to have made many of the officers anti-Egyptian, and in the Palestinian community. The left wing press has remained largely loyal. For example, 'al Hadaf' has explained that the whole purpose of the June war, launched with Western backing, had been to bring down Nasser and the progressive Arab regimes. Signs of criticism have appeared in the right wing press, particularly 'al Rai al Amm' which has often in the past gone as far as the press law will allow, and beyond, in criticism of Nasser. A member of its editorial staff has told us that a cartoon prepared at the time of Amer's suicide, but promptly censored, depicted a dying Rommel pointing to Hitler and saying "Why don't you commit suicide too ?"

5. If one can sum up, the feeling in Kuwait is that Nasser's prestige has suffered a blow, but Kuwaitis are prepared to give him a second chance, since despite the mistakes he has made, he remains a great deal better than anyone who might take his place. They would certainly run for cover if he turned his

/propaganda

D.J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office.

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propaganda on to them; but they no doubt feel that their financial aid secures them from that for the time being.

6. I am copying this letter to the Chanceries in Washington, Paris, Moscow, New York, Aden, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Khartoum, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli and Tunis.

(J.A.N. Graham)

1076

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[Date] 30 OCT. R M

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FOLLOWING SENT TO MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NO 3040 OF 27 OCTOBER

KOSYGINS MESSAGE TO THE P.M. ON THE MIDDLE EAST

(COPY SENT BY BAG)

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE

PRIME MINISTER TO MR. KOSYGIN.

BEGINS.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF THE 20TH OF OCTOBER

ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING PEACE IN THE

MIDDLE EAST. WHILE WE MAY NOT AGREE ON THE

ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, I FULLY SHARE YOUR

CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS

TOWARDS A MORE STABLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE

EAST. THE SINKING OF THE ISRAEL DESTROYER

~EILAT~ AND THE SHELLING OF SUEZ ILLUSTRATE ALL

TOO VIVIDLY THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF THE

/cease. fire

Hunter 31/x

H.E.
Ops. Adv 31.x
W.O. 1/11/67
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CEASE-FIRE AND THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO CONTINUE. A STERILE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE PRECISE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF EITHER SIDE FOR THESE INCIDENTS WILL GET US NOWHERE, BUT THE RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION AND ULTIMATE GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IS PLAIN FOR ALL TO SEE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HER MAJESTY~S GOVERNMENT REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR VERY EARLY ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN BEST TAKE THE FORM OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE A START ON HIS CONCILIATORY MISSION. AS YOU KNOW, WE WELCOMED THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS IN JULY ON THE TERMS OF A BALANCED DRAFT RESOLUTION. WHILE I HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING TO APPORTION BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO BUILD ON THAT COMMON GROUND, I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERMENT~S POLICY WHICH YOU PUT FORWARD IN YOUR LETTER. THE PRESENT NEED IS THAT ALL WHO CARE ABOUT PEACE SHOULD ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF

those

THOSE IN NEW YORK WHO ARE SEEKING AGREEMENT ON A FRESH DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WILL BE BOTH BALANCED AND ACCEPTABLE. WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I AM GLAD TO NOTE FROM YOUR LETTER THAT WE SHARE A COMMON PURPOSE IN ACHIEVING THE EARLY ADOPTION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION. AS TO THE FORM OF THE RESOLUTION, WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT TIED TO ANY PARTICULAR WORDING. BUT WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT ANY FORMULATION WHICH EMERGES WILL CONTAIN THE TWO BALANCING PRINCIPLES WHICH APPEARED IN THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND ALSO IN THE TEXT DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND U.S.A. IN JULY, I.E., WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL, AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE OTHER. IN OUR VIEW, THE MORE EXPLICIT THE STATEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN BE AGREED ON, THE MORE USEFUL WILL THE RESOLUTION BE AS A GUIDE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE. THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF HOW THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT COULD, HOWEVER, APPROPRIATELY BE LEFT TO

the representative

THE REPRESENTATIVE TO WORK OUT IN CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. HER MAJESTY~S GOVERNMENT WARMLY WELCOME THE SIGNS OF REALISM ON THE PART OF THE ARAB STATES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED. TO WHICH YOU DRAW ATTENTION IN YOUR LETTER. WE, LIKE YOU, ARE KEEN NOT TO LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THIS FAVOURABLE DEVELOPMENT. WE CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO INFLUENCE THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH, AND WE SHALL URGE RESTRAINT ON THEM. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT CONDONE THE ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST SUEZ. I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE USE BY THE U.A.R. OF SOPHISTICATED MISSILES OF SOVIET ORIGIN TO ATTACK AN ISRAEL WARSHIP HAS NOT MADE OUR TASK ANY EASIER IN THIS REGARD. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO URGE ON THE U.A.R. AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS THE NEED FOR THE GREATEST RESTRAINT IN THIS DELICATE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION. IN THIS CONNEXION, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE ATTACK ON THE ISRAEL DESTROYER, ABOUT WHICH THE FACTS, IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPARTIAL REPORTS, ARE DEBATABLE, I CANNOT FAIL TO POINT OUT THE VERY

/serious

SERIOUS NEW ELEMENT OF RISK WHICH THE MISSILE ATTACK HAS INTRODUCED INTO AN ALREADY HIGHLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. YOUR AMBASSADOR MR. SMIRNOVSKY HAS ASSURED ME THAT THE MISSILES CONCERNED HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO THE U.A.R. WELL BEFORE THE JUNE CRISIS: AND I GLADLY ACCEPT HIS ASSURANCE. IT NEVERTHELESS REMAINS A FACT THAT THE USE OF THESE MISSILES NOW MAY GIVE THE ARMS SPIRAL A NEW AND DANGEROUS TWIST. IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REINFORCE THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO ARE AGAINST ANY CONCESSION AND IT WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE ADVOCATES OF ISRAEL~S DEVELOPING HER OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YOU WILL ALREADY BE ONLY TOO FAMILIAR WITH THE RISKS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN CIRCUMSTANCES OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF THE SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM THE NUCLEARISATION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. ALL THIS LEADS ME TO ASK YOU MOST EARNESTLY TO CONSIDER ONCE AGAIN WHETHER YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AGREE TO SOME MEASURE OF LIMITATION IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IF ALL CONCERNED COULD AGREE NOT TO SUPPLY ARMS OF GREATER SOPHISTICATION THAN ALREADY EXIST IN THE AREA. THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BE A GREAT STEP FORWARD IN

the cause

THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE. IN YOUR LETTER YOU HAVE REFERRED WITH APPROVAL TO SOME OF THE STATEMENTS BY OUR FOREIGN SECRETARY ABOUT THE NEED FOR ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS INDEED ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE POSITION WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN UP. THE OTHER POINTS MADE BY MR. BROWN IN JUNE AND SEPTEMBER ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT AND TOGETHER FORM A BALANCED WHOLE WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR FAIR AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THIS AND THAT IN SO DOING I ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUE CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. SOSFA.

Reference.....

Despite D, I should like
HQC to convey the gist of this,
particularly A. B & C, orally
in advance to the Head of
Middle East Div'n, Hqrs. F.A.
and I.O. to act similarly with
the Head of the Press Dep't. at
the Army.

H.E. / 6 cee

H Hoffberg
I.C.

Lm
30/x

I have raised this with the Romanian
in connection with the M.A.P. tape
(from Jerusalem!) announcing the arrival
of the Shah in Tel Aviv for the 10th
Anniversary celebrations. Tape attached

J Walker 30/x

I have taken action accordingly with
Mr. Mohamed Farzi, Head of Press Div.
2. I am afraid he borrowed the relevant MAP
tape from me; but he promised to return it.

A Ramsaman 31/10/65

Ed (1626)